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The study conducted in this thesis will gravitate around three main topics: language, 
gender and sexism. The aim of the first chapter is to present an overview before delving 
into the following parts in which the analysis will go into greater detail on how gender 
issues can be treated. The choice of presenting the key points is to have at first a better 
understanding of the theory behind them but also to discover how the topics are connected 
and how they influence each other, but most importantly, how the views are vital for the 
purpose of this paper. The introduction of the issues will be combined with the work of 
scholars and linguists, which are the basis of the whole analysis. Many different voices 
will be considered in order to present the topic in the most unbiased way possible. The 
central focus is to analyze how women are represented through language and provide an 
overall view of whether the language that people use is sexist or not. As mentioned, each 
topic will be individually analyzed and then their connection will be explained as well in 
order to show how they are valuable for the aim of this work. Their connection will 
gradually show what will be discussed and argued in the second chapter. 
 
This first chapter will highlight the main features of the field of language and gender by 
assembling the different opinions of scholars and reporting what studies have been carried 
out so far. The background knowledge will come from various writers who from the 
1970s, starting with Robin Lakoff’s work, have dealt with gender bias. With this literature 
review I will try to introduce the background knowledge with also a possible gap in the 
studies that I will try to fill with my corpus analysis at the end of this thesis.  
 
The second chapter will explore the various solutions that have been proposed and which 
processes have been adopted to overcome sexism and gender bias in the English language. 
The possible outcomes will be explained, such as the concept of neutralization or 
specification, which were included in Anne Pauwels essay Linguistic Sexism and feminist 




Finally, in the third chapter, another important key element of this work will be an 
analysis of a corpus made up of four different declarations of human rights. The corpus 
will include: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights published in 1948, The Human 
Rights Act published in 1998, The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
published in 2007 and The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations which came into 
force in 2020. The analysis will be managed through the help of Paul Baker’s book Using 
Corpora to Analyze Gender (2014). 
 
As mentioned above, one of the core questions that will be frequently repeated throughout 
this thesis is “how women are represented through language”. The aim is to glean 
information and data from the declarations in order to understand whether language 
reflects the ideals behind what is written, but also how language use to represent women 
has changed over time. The analysis will be both at word-level and discourse-level and 
the study of this corpus will attempt to illustrate the changes, the choices and the usage 
of language in order to reveal how women are represented through acts and declarations.  
 
The analysis of the corpus will be conducted through AntConc, a software which helps 
the user to create a better and quicker search on occurring terms inside a corpus. I have 
used it to search for all of the terms that I knew could be useful for my analysis and that 















1 Language, Gender and Sexism 
 
In this chapter I will introduce the three cornerstones of this thesis. The three main points 
are language, gender and sexism. I will try to explain how language is defined, by 
exploring the field of sociolinguistics which will play a vital role in the following 
chapters; with gender I will define the difference between it and sex and what actually 
differentiate man and women from each other; lastly, with sexism I will mention the 
different types of it and what is identified as sexist language. As regard language and 
gender, I will focus on two main aspects which are the perception of women speaking 
differently from men and the concept of sexist language and how to deal with it. The 
literature review of this chapter will offer a background knowledge on the topic, while 
highlighting possible gaps in the studies which I will try to fill with my corpus at the end 
of this thesis. New studies have shifted attention from language to discourse, because 
early studies focused on how individual words where to be considered sexist, but the latest 
studies analyze how a text can be sexist (Weatherall, 2002: 76). The idea is not to observe 
language and its single use of negative words towards women, but to analyze how gender 
stereotypes are created that ultimately create a disadvantage for women and eventually, 
how women are represented through language. 
 
1.1 Language  
1.1.1 Defining Language 
 
The first topic involves the definition of language. From a linguistic point of view, 
Ferdinand de Saussure sees language as one way to represent reality. He identifies three 
types of language: “langage” which he divides into “langue”, the total language system 
and “parole”, the individual use (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 22). “Langue” represents the 
mental knowledge, the rules within languages, which are possessed as abstract knowledge 
by a linguistic community. “Parole” represents the individual speech act, which appears 
as a verbal message in a specific language (Berruto and Cerruti, 2011: 35). Language 
manifests itself through “parole”, but the linguist analyses the “langue” while using 
“parole” as a starting point (Berruto and Cerruti, 2011: 36). Saussure (2011) agrees with 
Whitney, that “language is a convention, and the nature of the sign that is agreed upon 
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does not matter”. Saussure criticizes the idea that language can be reduced to a naming-
process only. The linguistic sign connects a concept to a sound-image, which is a 
psychological imprint of the sound, what our senses recall (Saussure, 2011: 9-10). This 
theory of sign provided by Saussure leads to the idea that meaning is constructed at word-
level (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 20). The sign is made up of signifier, the sound, and 
signified, the concept connected to the sound. The link between langue and parole is quite 
important and the rules of langue can be modified, a new word and its meaning can be 
adopted by a community and people will start to understand it. That is the contribution of 
parole to the abstract system of langue (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 23). Other elements 
that are vital to the study of languages are the concept of synchronic, which refers to a 
specific moment in time, and diachronic, which is an analysis of language changes during 
time (Saussure, 2011: 83). The diachronic study will fulfill its vital role in the third 
chapter with its analysis of four different human rights declaration and their use of 
language.  
 
Nolan Chomsky (2006), in his book Language and Mind, describes language as a 
“creative activity” and goes on to say that humans “use language as an instrument for the 
free expression of thought and feelings” (Chomsky, 2005: 89). Moreover, the linguist 
states that this creative aspect can be considered as a unique human possession and the 
ability to acquire languages is rooted in the human mind. Also, he sees language as an 
instrument of expression and free thoughts (Chomsky, 2005: 90). “A person who knows 
a language has mastered a system of rules that assigns sound and meaning in a definite 
way for an infinite class of possible sentences. Each language thus consists (in part) of a 
certain pairing of sound and meaning over an infinite domain” (Chomsky, 2005: 91). 
  
Another perspective comes from Mills, who claims that language “is a product of 
negotiations over meaning in the past as well as in the present” (Mills, 2008: 124). 
Deutscher (2005) in Mills (2008) describes language as a “complex process of decay and 
renewal” (Mills, 2008: 125). Deutscher’s analysis includes general changes of vowels and 
pronunciation and in addition Mills states that it can be applied to society as well (Mills, 
2008; 124). In her view, perceiving language as dynamic and heterogeneous, working 
between societies and language groups is relevant to her study at language and sexism 
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that will be unfolded in the next paragraphs.  Deutscher (2010) reports the dominant view 
of language, by saying that it is an instinct and it is encoded in our genes and it is the 
same for every human being (Deutscher, 2010: 6). 
 
There are so many different definitions of language that vary from expert to expert, 
depending on the field of analysis. Language is everchanging, is dynamic, it evolves and 
it depends on the social background of the speaker and at the same time identifies the 
culture of the speaker. It represents a country; a minority and it reveals someone’s origin. 
The aim of this work is not to give a technical definition or a dictionary entry, but to 
unveil how language it is used. An example of this are the studies conducted by David 
Crystal (1991). In one of his lectures, held in 1991, he addresses the distinction between 
real and imaginary change in language use. His examples of imaginary change include 
comment clauses such as “you know, I see, frankly speaking” and speaking speed which 
has been contested by Crystal, because he does not believe that speakers nowadays speak 
faster even if studies of radio speaker might be misguiding considering the fact that they 
pinpoint a different between formal and informal conversation. He then identifies real 
change which later in his lecture he will say is made up more of examples of phenomena 
that has ever been noticed before, within vocabulary change, especially with affixal 
construction and change in prosody, rhythm, intonation of the language. Peter Trudgill 
(2000) refers to language both as a tool to maintain relationships and as a first introduction 
of the speaker. From the way a person speaks, the interlocutor can examine the type of 
background someone has. He identifies two aspects of language behavior which are 
connected to a social point of view: the first one has to do with language establishing 
social relationships and the second the role played by language as an informative 
mechanism (Trudgill, 2000: 2). 
 
1.1.2 Language and Society 
 
First of all, sociolinguistics “is the field that studies the relation between language and 
society, between the uses of language and the social structures in which the users of 
language live” (Spolsky, 1998: 3). Also, Yule (2010: 254) and Lyons (2009: 266) describe 
sociolinguistics as the study of the connection between language and society, but they 
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also underline importance and the connection within sociolinguistics and ethnolinguistics, 
which is the study of language correlated to culture. Moreover, Yule (2010) describes 
culture as “socially acquired knowledge” that a speaker learns unconsciously. I will 
analyze sociolinguistics aspect of language, especially when referring to female and male 
use of language. Sociolinguists are interested in the “parole” because they investigate how 
people use languages (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 23). 
 
Sociolinguistics first drew attention in the 1960s and it can be defined as a variation in 
time and space (Cameron, 1992: 30), this synchronic and diachronic distinction can be 
connected to the above-mentioned theory by Saussure. Moreover, in contrast with 
Chomsky, who believes that language and the communicating system should be divided 
to avoid confusion, Spolsky (1998) theorizes that sociolinguistics presents language as a 
system of variation, which can only be explain through social forces and facts (Spolsky, 
1998: 4). The aim of this branch of linguistics is to find a correlation between the 
characteristics of speech types and the social background of the speaker, which might 
seem as a study of parole when it is actually a tool to reformulate the distinction between 
langue and parole. The analysis looks into detail on the different types of registers that a 
speaker can use depending on the interlocutor, age and place. (Cameron, 1992: 31). As 
sociolinguistics is an analysis of language and society, it can be used to work side by side 
with feminist studies, considering the fact that sociolinguistics can provide data about sex 
differences but can also investigate the source of the relations between language, power 
and social disadvantage (Cameron, 1992: 34). Pauwels (2003) believes that a 
sociolinguistics approach aims at a social change and she divides the process into four 
main stages: the “fact-finding stage”, which is the documentation over the issue; the 
“planning stage” analyzes the possibilities to have change and develops proposals for the 
change; the “implementation” stage promotes those changes; the “evaluation/feedback” 
stage looks into detail which processes have been successfully achieved from the 
“planning” stage (Pauwels, 2003: 150). Cameron (1992) defines sociolinguistics as a 
study of language variation that concentrates on the choices that “speakers make from the 




As mentioned, the analysis will be conducted both at word-level but also at discourse-
level. Norman Fairclough (2015) in his book Discourse and Social Change refers to 
discourse as what linguists have traditionally called “parole”. However, Fairclough unlike 
Saussure, portrays language as a social practice and not as an individual activity and 
discourse as socially constitutive. Discourse does not only represent the world and the 
social structures but it constructs them as well (Fairclough, 1992: 64). Another definition 
of discourse implies that it is “a term used in linguistics with a range of meanings.” 
Discourse is built on different layers, from conversation and written text, to what is hidden 
behind a text and also to bigger ideology that are defined as “dominant discourses” 
(Mooney and Evans, 2015: 234). Furthermore, Yule (2010) states that discourse is 
“language beyond the sentence” and discourse analysis is often concerned with the studies 
of conversations and texts (Yule, 2010: 142). 
 
The concept of power is also closely related to language. Feminist linguists support the 
idea that power in language is held by men, who create language notions. Moreover, 
power is not to be seen as commodity, but an effect of discourse (Weatherall, 2002: 80). 
Power can be perceived as a way of talking about gender. Back to a more general context, 
power can be explained also as an attitude that people have towards language (Mooney 
and Evans, 2015: 14). The way in which language is used, gives someone the idea of a 
speaker’s intentions. Considering the following essays from Maltz and Borker’s (1982), 
the features of women conversation are performed as symbols of the secondary role of 
women compared to men. The power of man over women seems to be innate in language 
use from a young age. Even so, linguistics such as Cameron (1997, 2003) pursuit a 
different perspective on this matter.  
 
Maltz and Borker (1982), in their essay A cultural approach to male-female 
miscommunication offer an approach and explanation to cross-sex conversation, which 
can be ideal when considering language from a sociolinguistic point of view. The aim is 
not to merely present language but to provide a better understanding of how language is 
used by men and women and to discover their similarities and differences by exploring 
the features of both women and men in cross-sex conversation (Maltz and Borker, 1982: 
196). The power in their speaking style portrays how men use interruption and topic 
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control to display their power (Maltz and Borker, 1982: 203). They quote Robin Lakoff 
(1975) as concerns the idea that women are supposed to speak like “ladies” as a result of 
their role in society is displayed in their conversations features and requirements (Maltz 
and Borker, 1982: 199). Crawford (1997) reports Maltz and Borker’s study and explains 
what women and men learn to do with words: women learn how to maintain relationships, 
criticize other people indirectly and interpret other women’s speeches. Men instead 
confirm their dominant role, try to maintain the audience and try to get the floor 
(Crawford, 1997: 88).   
 
Robin Lakoff (1975) described in Language and Woman’s Place what she believed to be 
women’s language. As Maltz and Borker (1982) will later maintain in their study, Lakoff 
(1975) underlines how women are taught to behave and speak like women “through 
childhood socialization” in order to maintain their “symbolic enactment of 
powerlessness” (Cameron, 1997: 26). Gal (1995 in Cameron 1997) proposes a shift, 
which involves perceiving women’s language as an “ideological-symbolic construct 
which is potentially constitutive” of women’s or men’s identity (Cameron, 1997: 28). 
Being a woman is talking as one and people produce their speech act on the basis of what 
culture confers to specific ways of talking (Cameron, 1997: 28). As Lakoff (1975) 
proposes a model in which women speakers are inferior to men, Cameron (2003) rebuts 
with the opposite idea and she theorizes that women can be considered superior to men 
in their use of language (Cameron, 2003: 461). Women are supposed to be better at 
language due to their concern with the personal relationship that they have with their 
interlocutors; also, what used to belong to the private sphere, linguistically speaking, now 
flow into the public one and gives women the capability of having better conversation 
skills (Cameron, 2003: 461).  
 
Sociolinguistics does not restrict its analysis to sex and gender when studying language 
use. There are other many aspects that influence the communicating style of a speaker, 
such as social classes (Trudgill, 200: 23), social interaction (Trudgill, 200: 105), ethnic 
groups (Trudgill, 200: 42). Yet again, for the sake of this thesis I have considered only 




1.2 Language and Gender 
1.2.1 Sex and Gender 
 
Correlated to the topic of language there is the concept of gender, which “is not something 
we are born with, and not something we have, but something we do, something we 
perform” (Eckert and McConnel- Ginet, 2003: 10). It is vital at this point to explain the 
difference between gender and sex. As mentioned above, gender has to do with society 
and how people perform their identity. Sex on the other hand is simply the biological 
aspect of the human being. However, gender can be seen as the result of sex, because 
science and society identify what is seen as male or female. To be even more specific, 
“‘sex” refers to a biological distinction, while “gender” is the term used to describe 
socially constructed categories based on sex” (Coates, 2013: 4). Trudgill (2000) considers 
sex as the first characteristic that a person notices after meeting someone else (Trudgill, 
2000: 61). Cameron (1997) acknowledges that sex is easier to identify because of the 
gender divisions which are created by our societies (Cameron, 1997: 24). Also, Butler 
(1999) sets gender apart from sex and defines their distinction as the fight against the 
concept of “biology-is-destiny”. Their distinction attempts to prove that whatever the 
problem connected with sex, gender will always be culturally determined. Gender it is 
“neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex” (Butler, 1999: 9-10). 
Gender is the identity wore by the body and it cannot follow the binary concept of sex, 
which is divided between male and female (Butler, 1999:10).  
 
George Yule (2010), a British linguistic, in his book The Study of language identifies 
three ways to classify gender: biological gender, the distinction between the male and the 
female species; grammatical gender, the distinction between masculine and feminine; 
social gender, the distinction made when using words such as “man” or “woman” to label 
people in terms of their social role (Yule, 2010: 274). Other linguistics, such as Hellinger 
and Bußmann (2001) have divided gender into four categories: grammatical, lexical, 
referential and social. Grammatical gender has the control over the agreement between 
the noun and some other “satellite elements” and it is usually divided in two or three 
gender classes (Hellinger and Bußmann, 2001: 22). Lexical gender, relates to a 
“extralinguistic” properties which are femaleness and maleness; specific gendered names 
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carry a semantic property, which identifies in male or female, that can be described as 
“gender-specific”, such as mother or son, in contrast to other nouns that are usually 
defined as “gender-neutral”, such as patient or citizen (Hellinger and Bußmann, 2001:22). 
Referential gender “relates linguistic expression to the non-linguistic reality”, this means 
that a noun can be gender-specific but in certain other linguistic situation can be used to 
be gender-neutral (Hellinger and Bußmann, 2001: 8-9). Social gender depends on the 
distinction made by society between women and men, but it also has to do with 
stereotypical assumption of appropriate roles for men and women; this aspect is shown 
particularly in the case of work-related nouns, where “male as norm” seems to be 
followed. Hellinger and Bußmann (2001) report the example of “female surgeon” and 
“male nurse” in which the concept of social gender can be perceived due to the distinction 
between what it is supposed to be a job for a man and which is supposed to be a woman 
job (Hellinger and Bußmann, 2001: 25-26).  
 
In her paper Theoretical debates in feminist linguistic: question of sex and gender, 
Cameron (1997) quotes the work of Nicole-Claude Mathieu (1989), who identified three 
different paradigms on the relationship between gender and sex, in order to resolve issues. 
The first paradigm is called “homology”, which sets gender as an expression mediated 
through sex. People learn what is “masculine” or “feminine” through what is biologically 
considered as “male” or “female”. This idea does not identify gender as a consequence of 
sex; instead it suggests that sex is the grounds on which gender builds itself (Cameron, 
1997: 22). The second paradigm is “analogy”, in which gender symbolizes sex. Gender 
collects its identity from cultural expectations and roles. This paradigm refuses to accept 
a direct relationship between gender and sex, because gender is a symbolic marking of 
sexual differences and not based on biological characteristics. The third paradigm is 
“heterogeneity”, which accepts the idea that gender and sex are different. We should not 
consider two different categories that forces individuals to identifies as “male” or 
“female”, but we should move the focus of what this division has done to enforce the 
power of one group over the other. In this paradigm gender constructs sex (Cameron, 
1997: 23). Gender becomes both an identification for the social aspect of people’s life, 




However, in the linguistic field some scholars are trying to introduce the idea that gender 
should not be considered a strict distinction between male or female, because the debate 
over this topic should consider more variables. Bonnie McElhinny (2003) in her essay 
Theorizing Gender in Sociolinguistic and Linguistic Anthropology explains how the 
differentiation between the concept of gender and sex has been one of the foundations of 
the Western Feminist thought, which refers sex to the biological aspect and gender to the 
cultural aspect of a human being (McElhinny, 2003: 22). Moreover, she fights the idea 
that gender should be studied when and where is more salient, which is during speech 
interaction between same sex or cross sex interaction (McElhinny, 2003: 22). The issue 
of connecting gender to sex is implying that only two types of gender exist, which leads 
to heterosexuality as the normative. McElhinny quotes Judith Butler (1990) to discuss 
how “gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural 
means by which "sexed nature" or “a natural sex" is produced and established as 
“prediscursive" prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts” 
(McElhinny, 2003: 24). According to Butler this means that gender is disconnected from 
the aspect of sex and it evolves the feminine or masculine identity through society and 
culture. The question is not centered around the difference of gender, but what are the 
differences made by gender and when an individual performs gender outside the binary 
distinction created by sex it is considered out of the ordinary (McElhinny, 2003: 24). 
McElhinny states that gender expresses significance not only to people who analyze it, 
but also to people who live their lives and identify in gender. She then reflects on the fact 
that most of conversational analysis are based on “gender fail”. Thorne (1990 in 
McElhinny) stresses the importance of knowing when gender is relevant, especially when 
it comes to conversational analysis, because a woman might not always speak as a woman 
(McElhinny, 2003: 33). To support this argument, she quotes Tannen studies (1989, 1990) 
on the concept of interruption, which asserts that women are often interrupted by men 
when speaking. Schegloff (1987 in McElhinny 2003) explains how gender, but also class 
and ethnicity, should not be considered as influential conversation elements, because 
linguists should focus on “variations in social identity”, which leads to individualism 
instead of perceiving gender as relevant or salient (McElhinny, 2003: 34). The question 
then shifts from when gender is relevant to how gender can be relevant and Schegloff 
(1987 in McElhinny 2003) denies the possibility of the existence of woman’s language.  
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However, Ochs (1992 in McElhinny 2003) critiques Lakoff and her idea of mapping 
language and gender, but at the same time she admits that linguistic features can index 
gender (McElhinny, 2003: 35). The final aim proposed by McElhinny (2003) is to 
sanction the traditional assumptions of gender as connected to sex and heterosexuality, to 
consider gender as an activity rather than a relation and search the relevance of gender, 
in order to create a new concept of gender (McElhinny, 2003: 36). 
 
1.2.2 How gender influences language 
 
To understand what links language and gender, an initial clarification needs to be 
presented. Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny (2007) identified three types of language, 
which were later agreed upon by Prewitt-Freilino, Caswell and Laasko (2011): genderless 
languages, natural gender languages, and grammatical gender languages. Genderless 
languages, language families such as Uralic or Turkic, do not express gender in either the 
noun or pronoun system but gender can be expressed through lexical means (Prewitt-
Freilino, Caswell and Laasko, 2011: 269). In natural gender languages, like English or 
Scandinavia languages, the pronouns are the resources to identify gender because the 
majority of nouns do not carry gender themselves (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 
2007: 165). In grammatical gendered languages or gendered languages (Prewitt-Freilino, 
Caswell and Laasko, 2011: 269), instead language families such as Slavic, Germanic and 
Romance, all nouns are identified as feminine or masculine (or neutral) gender and 
dependent forms, such as articles or adjectives, carries the corresponding gender that has 
to agree with a noun (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 166). However, they 
point out that it is impossible to find a sexless language, which lacks femaleness or 
maleness expressions, considering that sex is one of the most important social categories 
(Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 163).  
 
1.2.3 Feminist Linguistics 
 
Cameron (1992) describes how language and feminism are connected. The fight over an 
equal use of language in not to considered a side issues, but another goal to the feminist 
movement (Cameron, 1992: 6). According to the European Institute for Gender equality, 
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“gender equality in language is attained when women and men – and those who do not 
conform to the binary gender system – are addressed through language as persons of equal 
value, dignity, integrity and respect.”1 
 
Feminists who are concerned with linguistics fight both for equal payment and fair 
representation through language, in order to dethrone one gender from the role of setting 
a standard of human value (Cameron, 1992: 7). The awareness on the topic was brought 
from the early second wave of feminism, who have studied language and gender 
(Sunderland, 2006: 20).  Wodak (1997) identifies the feminist scholarship within 
linguistics and it concerns every criticism made towards the androcentric view (Wodak, 
1997: 7). The androcentric rule is defined by Coates (2013) as the attitude to consider 
admirable and desirable what men do linguistically, and to perceive what women do as 
negative and reprehensible (Coates, 2013: 10). Hellinger (1990 in Wodak 1997) observes 
the aspects of feminist linguistics: it analyses the linguistics aspects of both women and 
men; it analyses the asymmetries inside language as expressions of discriminations to 
women; it attempts to find a solution to those discriminatory use of language in order to 
achieve an equal treatment of women and men (Wodak, 1997: 8). Feminist linguistic 
however, goes beyond a pure analysis, it searches for proposal change and an analysis of 
the relationship between language, sex and gender (Wodak, 1997: 8). 
 
 Cameron (1995) expresses her idea of a shift between the 1980s and the 1990s in the 
field of language and gender studies. She goes on by identifying three different 
approaches in feminist linguistic. The first one is the “deficit model”, in which women 
are at a disadvantage due to their sex roles (Cameron 1995: 33). Also, thanks to Lakoff 
(1975) women’s language is established within its characteristics of being perceived as 
weak and deficient when compared to the norm of male language. This model was later 
challenged because the idea behind was that women needed to talk like men in order to 
be taken seriously and their language was too weak to be used (Coates, 2013: 6); the 







role and acknowledge the male social privilege (Cameron 1995: 33), which perceives 
women’s language as a subordinate state compared to men’s dominant state (Coates, 
2013: 6); the last approach is the “cultural difference model”, which compares gender to 
other social divisions such as ethnicity (Cameron, 1995: 33) and reinforces the idea that 
women and men are part of different subcultures (Coates, 2013: 6). This third approach 
highlights the differences between men and women in order to strengthened women’s 
language without comparing it to men’s language or a subordinate and powerless state 
(Coates, 2013: 6). Weatherall (2002) presents the different approaches by stating that the 
dominance approach is the representation of the powerless position of women compared 
to men and the difference approach is presented as an alignment to a set of cultural values 
between women and men (Weatherall, 2002: 55). Moreover, Pusch (1990 in Wodak 
1997) maintains that the target of feminist linguistic is the patriarchalism in the language 
system (Wodak, 1997: 10).  
 
Cameron (1995) then proceeds with an explanation of the differences between two of the 
models, the dominance and the difference approaches. The first one highlights inequality 
as the root of every sex interaction and sees elimination of inequality as the goal. The 
difference approach uses the word “misunderstanding” and believes that women and men 
are not unequally portrayed but simply symmetrical. The solution is finding and exposing 
the roots of these misunderstandings and spreading awareness about them (Cameron, 
1995: 34). This approach can be seen as more appealing because men are not portrayed 
as villains and feminist not as anti-male. Cameron writes that “both dominance and 
difference represented particular moments in feminism: dominance was the moment of 
feminist outrage, of bearing witness to oppression in all aspects of women’s lives, while 
difference was the moment of feminist celebration, reclaiming and revaluing women’s 
distinctive cultural traditions” (Cameron, 1995: 39). The aim for feminists is to find a new 
theory to respond to new conditions. In Cameron’s opinion, what happened is that the 
concept of male power through dominance is to be considered obsolete, while women’s 
differences now “seems either so essentialists or else so depoliticized as to be 
reactionary”, which is why new studies and ideologies needs to be brought to light, 
otherwise the work that has been done so far will be needless (Cameron, 1995: 39).  Then 
the concept of “theorizing gender” is introduced, because Cameron (1995) identifies an 
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issue in the feminist linguistics analysis: it follows the established practice that language 
“is the phenomenon to be explained” while gender is the explanation (Cameron, 1995: 
39). Cameron suggests to overcome the stereotypical notion of “men do this, women do 
that” and by doing that she quotes Simone Beauvoir (1949) and her concept of becoming 
a woman (Cameron. 1995: 42), but how? Simone de Beauvoir in Butler (1999) believed 
that gender is constructed and someone becomes a woman under a cultural compulsion 
which is dissociated from sex (Butler, 1999: 12). Recent feminist theories report that 
someone never stops being a woman or man (Cameron, 1995: 43). People are constantly 
asked to challenge their identity through society and cultural elements that define 
masculinity and femininity (Cameron, 1995: 42-43). 
  
1.3 How women talk 
 
This section addresses the issue of how gender influences language use. Instead of 
conceiving “women’s language” or “men’s style” as defined markers, we could theorize 
that styles themselves are produced as masculine or feminine and that people conform to 
those styles in order to present themselves as gendered subjects (Cameron, 1995: 43). 
Coates (2013) opens her discussion with a key point: “Do men and women talk 
differently?”. She goes on to assume that speakers can be divided into women or men but 
also, she asks why we are talking about differences rather than similarities, even though 
she agrees on the fact that women and men may have differences in their speaking styles 
(Coates, 2013: 4). There have been different linguists who have studied language and 
gender over the years, starting with Robin Lakoff and her work Language and Woman’s 
place (1975). Moreover, Cameron (2003) believes that the analysis of male and female 
language use is often based on the fact that they are considered complementarity, because 
what men’s language is, women’s language is not (Cameron, 2003: 452). Mills (1995: 
45) defines women’s language as a “sex-preferential usage which is determined by the 







1.3.1 Language and Woman’s Place 
 
In 1975 Robin Lakoff published Language and Woman’s place. In her work, she 
identifies what can be described as “women’s language”, which has its own 
characteristics that girls learn during their childhood (Cameron, 1992: 70). She starts by 
observing the two different types of discrimination through language: how women learn 
to use it and how language itself treats women (Lakoff, 1975: 46). Lakoff’s opinion is 
that after her analysis of both women’s language and how women are talked about, the 
bias of language will emerge (Lakoff, 1975: 49). According to Lakoff (1975), a woman 
has two choices: being less than a woman if she does not learn how to act like a lady, or 
less than a human if she learns how to act like a lady, but at the same time she is not taken 
seriously in discussion (Lakoff, 1975: 48). Language is both “restricted in use to women” 
and “descriptive of women”, language does not give full access to women to express 
themselves properly in order to keep them in their place and it place them in a demeaning 
position. She goes on by introducing examples, such as colours or adjectives (Lakoff, 
1973: 50-51) in women utterances whilst presenting the double-standard that 
characterizes the differences between the two genders. Lakoff (1975) then mentions the 
use of tag questions as a way of avoiding conflict, but also as a way of concealing 
confidence over a topic, which leads to the idea that women are seeking confirmation 
from their speaker (Lakoff, 1975: 55). According to Lakoff (1975) another feature of 
women’s talk is the concept of politeness, which is connected to the idea of not imposing 
points of views on someone else’s. Women are politer then man and the use of politeness 
“involves an absence of a strong statement, and women’s speech is devised to prevent the 
expression of strong statements” (Lakoff, 1975: 57). This work is an analysis of women’s 
language and Lakoff (1975) presents the characteristic of how women are taught to talk.  
 
First of all, it is important to highlight the importance of Lakoff’s work, because it can be 
considered one of the foundational texts of the feminist linguistic field (Bucholtz and 
Hall, 1995: 1). However, as I will explain later in this paragraph her work has been highly 
criticized for the lack of empirical evidence and her view of women as a passive speaker. 
Her essay has been the groundwork for the following studies and it has sparked different 
conversations and debates over the issue of language and gender. Even tough, as I will 
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explain below, her work has been overcome by new studies and linguistics who have 
identified new nuances of language, gender and sexism, Lakoff’s work still remain one 
of the pillars of feminist linguistics.  
 
Mooney and Evans (2015) returned to the subject of Lakoff’s work by saying that 
women’s language is characterized by avoidance of swear words, use of hedges, fillers 
and tag questions, empty adjectives, standard syntax, rising intonation and use of 
politeness (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 116). They perceive Lakoff’s work as a 
representation of the expectations around women language instead of a list of features. 
According to Coates (2013) this work represented a symbolic moment in the linguistics 
field, because it opened a new research into women’s talk, even though it was highly 
criticized for its lack of empirical evidence (Coates, 2013: 5). Crawford (1997) admits 
that Lakoff’s work was a spark to identify sexism in language use, but she quotes Hill 
(1986) and Frank (1978) who have criticized Lakoff ‘s empirical research (Crawford, 
1997: 26). Hill (1986 in Crawford 1997) acknowledges that Lakoff has provoked further 
studies with her work and Frank (1978 in Crawford 1997) pinpoints the fact that Lakoff 
lacks empirical evidence in her studies (Crawford, 1997: 26). Cameron (1992) also 
stresses that Lakoff studies lack empirical evidence and explains this shortcoming as a 
consequence of Lakoff training in the Chomskyan tradition, which suggested collecting 
data from her own experience rather than collecting external data (Cameron,1992: 44). 
Another criticism against Lakoff concerns the type of women on which she conducted 
her studies, considering that her analysis included the utterances of middle-class white 
American women (Kaplan, 1998: 62). Moreover, with her identification of “women’s 
language” in contrast with “neutral language” instead of “men’s language”, Lakoff (1975) 
identifies a deviant case, which can be connected to Simone de Beauvoir’s idea that 
women are defined as “Other” (Cameron, 1998: 216). Many of the criticisms concerns 
Lakoff’s idea that women’s language expresses women’s powerlessness, insecurity and 
secondary position compared to men, which may have nothing to do with gender, but 
involves the idea of numerous hierarchies (Cameron, 1998: 220). 
 
Maltz and Borker (1982) in their essay described the feature of intra sex conversation and 
by doing that they highlight what is supposed to be women’s language and men’s 
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language. In their study women use positive minimal responses and they adopt the 
strategy of silent protest when being interrupted and also use “you” and “we” in order to 
acknowledge the presence of the other speaker (Maltz and Borker, 1982: 197-198). On 
the other hand, men are more likely to interrupt and dispute what the partner is saying 
also, they make more direct declaration of opinions then women (Maltz and Borker, 1982: 
198). A key element that is analyzed by the two scholars are minimal responses, as the 
authors suggest that they might have different meanings for men and for women.  
 
Coates (2013) lists the features which can characterize conversation strategies: minimal 
response, hedges, tag questions and swearing (Coates, 2013: 86). The studies quoted by 
Coates (2013) show that women use more minimal responses then men in order to support 
the speaker (Coates, 2013: 87). Hedges, linguistic forms such as “I’m sure, I think” are 
used more by women to express certainty over a topic. It is however vital to understand 
the role played by hedging: as a matter of fact, Holmes (1984, 1987) divides hedging in 
two groups, expressions of certainty and confidence or uncertainty of various kinds 
(Coates, 2013: 88). Holmes (1984, 1987 in Coates 2013) shows that women use hedging 
to express confidence most of the time, which means that they are multifunctional. The 
investigation over tag questions, relies once again on Lakoff’s work (1975), who 
maintains that “tag questions decrease the strength of assertions” (Coates, 2013: 90). 
Siegler and Siegler (1976 in Coates 2013) confirmed through their tests that women are 
often attributed the use of tag questions, but it does not mean that women use more tag 
questions then man, it only confirms the speaker’s attitudes (Coates, 2013: 90). As far as 
swearing is concerned, Lakoff (1975) claims that men swear more strongly than women. 
However, Coates quotes different studies, in particular Gomm’s (1981). What was 
discovered, is that men swear more than women, yet, women are more likely to swear 
within same sex conversation and this applies also to men (Coates 2013: 97).  
 
1.3.2 Man Made Language 
 
In 1980, five years after Lakoff’s essay, Dale Spender published “Man Made Language”, 
which established the author’s radical position on feminism and language and gender 
matters (Cameron, 1995: 32). In her work she explores sexism in the English language 
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and gender differences in language use. Her idea that language has the power to influence 
the reality of the speaker is a strong representation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
(Cameron, 1998: 83). She reports how women are silenced and how men dominate the 
conversation, a theory that results in the “male dominance approach”, which 
characterized the study of language and gender in the 1970s (Sunderland, 2006: 14). 
Spender claims that men have kept control over language in order to assure their 
supremacy over women, while encoding sexism into the language (Weatherall, 2002: 3). 
Spender describes what can be called women’s “alienation” from language, a feminist 
view of language which exhibits language as a possession of the oppressor and for this 
specific reason it needs to be reclaimed (Cameron, 1992: 8). Language is described as 
one of the causes of oppression instead of a symptom of it and Spender believes that 
words embody sexism and their meanings are decided by men (Cameron, 1992: 104). 
One of the criticisms against Spender is that she has confused the “distinction between 
sexism in language and sexism projected on to language by systems of linguistic analysis” 
(Cameron, 1992: 98). Black and Coward (1981 in Cameron 1992) objects to the notion 
of power given by Spender, who believes that men have power over women. They 
pinpoint the fact that power regards not only gender, but also race and class. This idea 
creates a whole new set of relations and discussions over the concept of power itself 
(Cameron, 1992: 159-160). Another criticism involves the idea that men use language to 
force women into a subordinate place; power possesses different layers and linguists have 
criticized the idea of coercion expressed by Spender (Cameron, 1992: 160).  
 
Mills (1995) summarizes both Lakoff and Spender’s idea of women’s language by writing 
that the two linguists both mark the female language as “less fluent, less logical, less 
assertive the men’s speech”. However, neither Lakoff or Spender have identified in their 
research the so called “male norm” from which women are seen as subordinate (Mills, 
1995: 45). Mills (1995) also poses Coates above mentioned question on why linguistics 
looks into the differences between men and women instead of their similarities. Mills 
(1995) thinks that linguistics have followed the rules established by their male 





1.4 Language and Sexism 
 
Wodak (1997) recalls that the term “sexism” was invented in the 1960s and “it refers to 
discrimination within a social system on the basis of sexual membership” (Wodak, 1997: 
7). The relationship between the two sexes, male and female, is not egalitarian because 
the category of men is considered the norm and female is represented as “other” or 
“abnormal” compared to male. It was with the concept of sexism that women started to 
see themselves as a “social groups and as suppressed minority” (Wodak, 1997: 7). Mills 
(2008) writes that sexism it is not only found in words but also in conversations and 
culture. Vetterling-Braggin (1981 in Mills 2008) identifies sexism as “the practice 
whereby someone foregrounds gender when it is not the most salient feature”. She goes 
on to state that sexism cannot be considered as a simple “slip” due to a lack of awareness, 
which can be adjusted. When introducing the different kinds of sexism, which will be 
analyzed below, Mills (2008) offers another insight that does not see “sexism as 
something which is imposed on women by men” but “as a site of struggle over access to 
resources and positions of power” (Mills, 2008: 43). 
 
Many forms of sexism in language have been brought to our attention and Henley (1987) 
has identifies three types of it: “language that ignores women; language that defines 
women narrowly; and language that depreciates women” (Weatherall, 2002: 13). 
Language can make women feel invisible due to their absence in stories. This absence of 
women in academic or journalistic fields can be explained by the lack of opportunities 
that women were given and not the lack of intelligence. Women also were not given 
access to institutions that provided information (Weatherall, 2002: 14). Defying women 
narrowly means that they are talked about in terms of what they look like and their family 
relationships, whereas men on the other hand are talked about based on what they do. The 
concept of naming, which is defining women in terms of their marital status, is an example 
of world view and social hierarchies. It also gives an insight into the patriarchal nature of 
society (Weatherall, 2002: 19). Lastly, there is the depreciating aspect of language 
towards women. The idea has been identified as women’s derogation and it represents the 
fact that masculine forms can have a better connotation that the feminine ones 
(Weatherall, 2002: 23). 
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Xiaolan Lei defines language as sexist when it “expresses bias on favor of one sex and 
thus treats the other sex in a discriminatory manner” (Xiaolan, 2006: 87). According to 
Xiaolan (2006) a language is sexist because the sexism comes from society and that can 
explain why women are considered the “weaker” sex, because in the past they were 
supposed to stay home and remain powerless and subordinated to men (Xiaolan, 2006: 
87). Then, two questions are asked: “Does language discriminate against women? More 
precisely, do the ways in which language allow us to refer to males and females 
discriminate against women?” (Xiaolan, 2006: 87). In the following sections I will report 
on the different kinds of sexist language and how sexism characterizes language. 
 
1.4.1 Over, Covert and Subtle Sexism 
 
Sexism in language does not only involve the choice of the appropriate pronoun to refer 
to both female and male, but it has to do with society and the way in which women are 
represented through language with stereotypes and statements. The issues do not lie only 
on a linguistic level but also, on a discourse level, which is the view of language beyond 
the sentence (Yule, 2010: 142). Sexism can be divided in two categories according to 
Mills, but I have decided to add another definition found in an essay written by Swim and 
Cohen (1997): overt, covert (Mills, 2008) and subtle (Swim and Cohen, 1997). Overt 
means direct and it can be identified with the use of words and clauses that have been 
seen to be discriminatory to women, such as generic pronouns and semantic derogation 
(Mills, 2008: 11, 47). Covert, on the other hand, means indirect and highlights a subtler 
use of sexist language, while at the same time denying doing so through expedients such 
as irony or innuendo (Mills, 2008: 12, 135). Last, subtle sexism refers to stereotyped 
phrases that are thought to be customary (Swim and Cohen, 1997: 104); Butler and Geis 
(1990 in Swim and Cohen 1997) present an example of this kind of sexism as they report 
that while rating female and male leaders both male and female participants in the survey 
had negative non-verbal behaviors towards female leaders. The chances are that the 
participants had no idea of treating male and female leaders differently (Swim and Cohen, 
1997: 104). According to Mills (2008), overt sexism in public discourse it is stigmatized 
even though it has not been eliminated yet (Mills, 2008: 133).  
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Mills (2008) identifies a response to overt and covert sexism, which is political 
correctness (Mills, 2008: 124). Political correctness is defined “as an excessive attention 
to the sensibilities of those who are seen as different from the norm” (Mills, 2008: 100). 
It might be seen as a tool for pleasing people, in order to make sure that no one is offended 
and “political correctness” is generally used to demean and simplify what in certain 
context can be perceived as a problem (Mills, 2008: 102). Also, Doyle (2005), describes 
it as a tool of going against society and its status quo (Doyle, 2005: 152). Mills (2008) 
affirms that “political correctness” is a response to the feminist linguistic reforms, which 
have changed both how people refer to women but also how they feel about sexist 
utterances (Mills, 2008: 12). The term seems to have a negative connotation due to its 
connection to the feminist reform: the issues lies in the fact that feminists are accused of 
bringing politics into contexts where it is not necessary, contexts, including the linguistic 
field (Mills, 2008: 107).  However, Burridge (1996 in Mooney and Evans 2015) lists three 
possible reasons why people do not like linguistic changes: people do not like to be told 
what to do with language and people do not like the idea that a word that they have been 
using and considering neutral is actually demeaning to someone else (Mooney and Evans, 
2015: 39).  
 
Moreover, Mills (2008) pinpoints a shift in sexism between the Second and the Third 
Waves of Feminism. The Second wave had an easier job in identifying sexist practice 
because it was thought as a set of specific attitudes towards women, but the work that the 
Third Wave has to face is more complex. Sexism is now perceived as a set of opinions 
that can be considered offensive to some and normal to others (Mills, 2008: 136). The 
analysis of sexism conducted as a part of the two different waves of feminism should not 
be seen as chronological but simply suitable for the specific type of sexism that they are 
facing (Mills, 2008: 137). As a matter of fact, 
 
“Second Wave analysis can analyze those sedimented forms of overt sexism which 
seem to be embedded within the morphology of the language system itself, whereas 
Third Wave feminism is better able to analyze the ambivalences and uncertainties 





Connected to the topic of sexism is the concept of stereotypes. A stereotype is a 
generalization of a group as a whole and Mills (2008) suggests that stereotypes are the 
basis for inequalities (Mills, 2008:126). They create a prototype, which incorporates what 
people perceive of both women and men, because standardized ideas can damage both 
males and females considering the fact that are based on assumptions and not truths 
(Mills, 2008:127). A stereotype is to be considered sexist when it has a negative 
representation of women, such as women being weaker or less intelligent than men (Mills, 
2008:129). Talbot (2003) addresses the tendency of gender stereotyping which involves 
the idea that behavior and gender can be both generalized and linked (Talbot, 2003: 468). 
She defines stereotyping “as a representational practice” which “involves simplification, 
reduction, and naturalization” (Talbot, 2003: 470). The practice of stereotyping is linked 
to power, because stereotyping tends to be directed at subordinated groups, such as 
women. In the field of language and gender stereotypes are the representation of gender 
expectations (Talbot, 2003: 472). Talbot (2003) quotes Stanworth’s studies (1983). In 
doing so, she reports how in the school environment boys are taught to be assertive, while 
girls are taught not to dominate in classroom interactions. This example supports the idea 
that men are expected to dominate, while female should be subordinates (Talbot, 2003: 
472). Connected to this example, the writer quotes another stereotype which comes from 
Spender’s (1980) book: the idea that women talk too much because the benchmark is 
silence and not how much men talk (Talbot, 2003: 473).  
 
In summary, Talbot’s perception on stereotypes is based on the idea that a “good 
stereotypes” indicates how women should behave and a “bad stereotype” how not to 
(Talbot, 2003: 473). Again, Lakoff (1975) plays a role in the matter of stereotypes, 
because Cameron (1992) maintains that the work itself created a stereotype due to the fact 
that Lakoff identified what is referred to as “woman’s language”, which is subordinate to 
“neutral or men’s language” (Cameron, 1992: 44). Moreover, Crawford (1997) pinpoints 
the idea that Lakoff (1975) has created this stereotype by writing that women use fillers 
and hedges, which is a result of their hesitant and uncertain speech behavior (Crawford, 
1997 :31). Another example of stereotyping is reported by Xiaolan (2006), as Xiaolan 
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lists images used to describe men and women. One example offered by the author has to 
do with stereotyped characters, because the adjective used to describe a driven man would 
be “forceful” and a driven woman would be “pushy”. This indicates the different 
perception of behavior that people might have when it comes to judging men or women 
(Xiaolan, 2006: 93). 
 
1.4.3 Asymmetries and Lexical Gaps 
 
As mentioned above, Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny (2007) have identified three 
different types of languages. They also address the concept of sexism. They point out that 
“expressing or concealing sex in language is not in itself sexist or non-sexist”, since 
genderless languages are believed to be non-sexist (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 
2007: 167). Their query is about the asymmetry between female and male linguistic 
expressions and, hence they explore different examples of linguistic features. Other 
examples of asymmetries are lexical gaps, which provide evidence of lack a of 
counterpart between male and female expressions, such as “family man”: a speaker would 
not use the term “family woman” because a woman is expected to cover the role of a 
mother, which means that there is no need for a definition as such (Stahlberg, Braun, 
Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 168). Other examples of this asymmetry are terms such as 
“single mum, working mother, career women and unmarried woman” which do not have 
a male counterpart (Mills, 1995: 114). However, language asymmetry involves both 
women and men and, as a matter of fact, linguistic gaps stress the absence of reverses in 
other fields, such as job naming, both for men and women (Pauwels, 2003: 151). Female 
counterparts can be created from masculine forms with the idea that those are the more 
“complex” forms and it demonstrates that the masculine is the generic and the feminine 
forms need to be used to specify women’s involvement (Prewitt-Freilino, Caswell and 
Laasko, 2011,270). Example of asymmetries can be found in equivalent couples, such as 
master- mistress (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 69) bachelor- spinster (Mooney 
and Evans, 2015: 110) and fox and vixen (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 69). All 
the female counterparts have a negative connotation: mistress is someone’s lover, a 
spinster is an unmarried woman who is seen as having a negative status, and a vixen is 
used as a derogatory term towards women.  
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1.4.4 Generic “he” 
 
One of the most widely discussed sexist elements in language is the masculine generic. 
The use of the male as generic refers to male persons, mixed group of people and people 
whose identity are unknown (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 169). In 
grammatical gender languages, the pronoun and noun masculine form is used as the 
neutral form; in natural gender languages, it involves the use of male pronouns and lexical 
male forms, which means the noun is to be considered with its masculine form. Finally, 
genderless languages can experience lexical male forms, which means that the generic is 
male (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 169). The “asymmetrical treatment” 
mentioned by Pauwels (2003) describes how women are reduced to a “subsumed” role 
compared to the male prototype for human representation when using masculine forms 
such as generics (Pauwels, 2003: 553). Women are made visible through marked 
language and derived forms from the masculine counterpart: an example of the former is 
identified with “female doctor” and the latter includes examples such as “actor-actress, 
poet-poetess, author-authoress” (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 167). 
Traditionally, the argument behind the “he-man” language is that it is not used to specify 
gender because it is general (Mills, 1995: 87). However, the use of “generic he” to 
represent both men and women leads to the exclusion of women and the reference made 
at the pronoun cannot be perceived as fully generic (Mills, 1995: 88). To avoid this 
practice, one alternative is the use of the nongendered pronoun “they” (Eckert and 
McConnell-Ginet, 2003: 256). Baranowski (2002 in Mooney and Evans 2015) reports 
that the use of “they” is currently preferred to the use of “he” as the generic form (Mooney 
and Evans, 2015: 112). Moreover, Dorner (2010) explains three different possibilities of 
dealing with generic “he”: the first approach involves replacing it with “s/he, he” or “she”, 
“he/she”; the second approach uses “she” instead of “he” as the generic; the third is to 
use “they”, but there are some grammatical difficulties involved (Dorner, 2010: 5-6). 
Fasold (1990 in Dorner 2010) addresses that the idea that generic “he” should not be used 
as a generic pronoun only for convenience, because its use is a reinforcement of the 




1.4.5 Marked and Unmarked Forms 
 
Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny (2007) mention the markedness of female forms, 
such as “author-authoress”, but they also highlight the fact that femaleness is made more 
explicit than maleness (Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen and Sczesny, 2007: 167). Romaine (2001 
in Stahlberg, et al.  2007) found 155 explicit female markings for doctor (lady doctor, 
woman doctor, female doctor), compared to only 14 instances of male doctor” (Stahlberg, 
et al., 2007: 167). Mills (1995) reports the example of “lady poet”, which again creates 
the idea that the unmarked term is male and when referring to women the term needs to 
be associated with gender (Mills, 1995: 95). This overt sexism (Mills, 2008) seems to 
imply that female references are necessary, when male references are not.  
 
Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (2003) report a study by Langlois and Downs (1980) who 
mention children’s play styles. Girls tend to be neutral, while boys reject activities which 
are considered to be girly. This example highlights the idea that female activities are 
marked and appropriate for females only and boy’s activities are unmarked or normal 
(Eckert and McConnel-Ginet, 2003: 21). Again, Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (2003) 
highlight how the generic form of a term is the male version and the female equivalent 
becomes the marked term. Moreover, they observed how in English, but also other 
languages, affixes for masculinization are quite rare (Eckert and McConnel-Ginet, 2003: 
259). One of the solutions offered is the idea of gender neutralization, which involves the 
switch to neutral words, such as “steward” and “hostess” that have become “flight 
attendant” (Eckert and McConnel-Ginet, 2003: 260). In the context of gender, the 
unmarked term is often the one referring to men, while the marked one is the one referring 
to women. This idea can be proven with different example such as “waiter/waitress, 








1.4.6 Semantic Derogation  
 
Semantic derogation is defined as the “process by which a word comes to have negative 
meanings over time” (Mooney and Evans, 2015:115). Schulz (1975 in Spender 1980) 
reports her investigations into the fact that there are more positive words for males and 
more negative words for females in language, which have no semantic equivalent for the 
male counterparts (Spender, 1980: 16). Schulz (1975) refers to this phenomenon as the 
semantic derogation of women, because whenever a term is associated with females it is 
“pejorated” (Spender, 1980: 16). She pinpoints the importance of the relationship 
between semantics and sex and it influences, according to Spender (1980), all female 
marked words. Schulz (1975) in Spender (1980) reports the example of man and woman. 
If a woman is defined as an “old man” it is not considered as an insult, it is simply 
inaccurate. However, if you refer to a man as an “old woman”, still it is inaccurate but 
also an insult. This leads to the idea that woman is not equal to man in language (Spender, 
1980: 17).  
 
Schulz (1975) speculates that a word associated with women acquires a negative 
connotation, due to the “semantic rule in society which constructs male supremacy” 
(Spender, 1980: 18). Schultz (1990 in Mills 2008) reports three origins for pejoration: 
contamination, which has to do with the idea that terms acquire a sexual connotation when 
referring to women; euphemism, which is a tendency to not chose one of the many 
different specific terms designated for prostitutes but to opt for other terms referring to 
less sexually active women; prejudice is described as the “primary motivation of 
pejoration”, due to the fact that men need to describe women as a separate group and they 
focus of their sexuality (Mills, 2008: 61). Another trend however is the concept of 
reclaiming, which is what is happening to the word “slut”; the world “slut” first meant an 
untidy and dirty woman but also, it assumes the meaning of losing sexual morality. 
Nowadays women are deciding to call themselves “slut” in order to fight its sexist use 
(Mooney and Evans, 2015: 115). Another information about the word “slut” is that there 
is no male counterpart to the word and this case can be connected to the above-mentioned 
concept of asymmetries (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 115). Another example of semantic 
derogation are binary terms, in which the male term comes before the female term and it 
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represents the prioritized role played by men. Such terms include: “husband and wife, 
kings and queens and brother and sister” (Mills, 1995: 112- 113). However, there are 
cases in which the positioning is the reverse but they have to do with chivalry, like “bride 
and groom” or “ladies and gentleman” (Mills, 1995: 113). 
 
Overall the issues behind language, gender and sexism have been widely studied in the 
field of feminist linguistics. The aim is to overcome the gender bias that affects language 
in order to eradicate terms which can be derogatory to women. All of the topics presented 
in this chapter point to the need for a shift in language use and better awareness of the 
stereotypes that affect both women and men and the alienation of a gender through the 
























2 Dealing with Sexism 
 
In this second chapter I will report on the processes and the results of the feminist 
language reform to avoid sexism in language. To be precise, I will be presenting 
background knowledge of what this reform has achieved and the different options that 
were given in order to fight all of the problems mentioned in the first chapter. 
Furthermore, this part of my work will also focus on the proposal mentioned in Pauwels’s 
essay (2003) to deal with gender issues in language. Hence, I will be presenting the topic 
of gender specification and neutralization by introducing different example which will 
lead to the analysis of the corpora that will constitute the third chapter.  
 
In the sections contained in the first chapter I have explained the concept of sexism in 
language use. Once again, sexism is a discriminatory use of language towards women, 
but also the use of male generic forms as neutral and the use of terms like “mankind” to 
refer to both women and men (Doyle, 1998: 149). Doyle (1998) claims that most sexist 
terms have an inclusive counterpart that speakers can use to express themselves and that 
switching to more appropriate terms will highlight the fact that women’s presence needs 
to be addressed (Doyle, 1998: 151). Moreover, language equality is supported by studies 
quoted by Prewitt-Freilino, Caswell and Laasko (2011) in their work, as they report how 
the use of male generics lead the speaker to visualize in their mind the image of a men 
when talking generically (Prewitt-Freilino, et al., 2011: 270). Once more, women are 
made invisible through language and this would enforce stereotypes and role behaviors, 
especially in the occupational titles (Prewitt-Freilino, et al., 2011: 271). Equality in 
language is achieved when speakers are willing to step out of line in order to create a 
better environment for neologisms which at first might be judged as negative or 
demeaning, but in reality, might need time to be adjusted to culture and society (Oboe, 
2017: 6).  
 
2.1 Linguistic Relativity  
 
On the matter of language, many scholars have debated whether language shapes the way 
people think. Two different positions on the topic can be presented. One is linguistic 
relativity, a theory arising from Sapir and Whorf, which is presented, for example, both 
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in Lera Boroditsky’s work Linguistic relativity (2011) and by Claire Kramsch (2014). 
First and foremost, the well-known Sapir-Whorf hypothesis tries to portray Whorf’s 
views of the connection between language and thought and claims that language 
structures influence the manner in which people think and behave (Kramsch, 1998: 12).  
Kramsch (2014) introduces the two different claims made by Whorf and Sapir; she writes 
that Whorf strongly linked speakers to their grammatical and lexical structure, while a 
new field of research aligns with Sapir’s claim, who saw language as “a guide to social 
reality” as he believed that language habits are unconsciously the foundation of the “real 
world” (Kramsch, 2014: 32). Kramsch identifies two different version of the Whorf-Sapir 
hypothesis, the strong and the weak version. The former comes from Whorf’s claim that 
speakers are “prisoner of the grammatical and lexical structures of their language” while 
the latter trades Sapir moderate statement that “language is a guide to reality” and 
languages are not similar enough to represent the same social reality (Kramsch, 2014: 
32).  
 
According to Boroditsky (2011), a defender of the hypothesis, each language contains the 
perception of the world and depending on the language spoken, the speaker will have a 
different perception of it. As Kramsch (2014) mentions in her work, Boroditsky (2011) 
claims that the strong Whorf version has now been abandoned, but the discussion on 
whether language shapes thoughts and action is still highly debated (Boroditsky, 2011: 
917). Boroditsky’s essay explores the effects of language on space, time, substances and 
objects, but for the sake of this work I will quote the section on objects in which she 
explores the concept of gender.  She asks a question before delving into the studies: “does 
talking about inanimate objects as if they were masculine or feminine actually lead people 
to think inanimate objects as having a gender?” (Boroditsky, 2011: 920). Through the 
example introduced in the paper the reader can learn that, according to the author, gender 
can influence the way in which people mentally perceive objects and which associations 
are made. She goes on to say that marking a noun with gender implies adding to that noun 
a whole category of words that stereotypically correlated to a gender specifically. During 
her TED Talk in 2017 Boroditsky presented her study of How Language Shapes the Way 
We Think where she claimed that speakers of different languages are likely to pay 
attention to different details of reality due to their language structures. Boroditsky’s 
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opinion underlines the fact that having 7,000 languages pinpoints how ingenious the 
human mind can be. However, she states that we are currently losing one language per 
week and also that studies in linguistics are mainly conducted by American English 
speakers and this trend is restricting the real potential of the linguistic field2. 
 
On the other hand, there are linguists such as McWhorter (2014), who do not believe that 
every single language shape reality differently. As Boroditsky did, McWhorter quotes the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis but, he does not agree with the two scholars. He actually believes 
that the idea of language modeling thoughts can be interpreted as incoherent and 
dangerous (McWhorter, 2014: 23). It is important to point out that he does not believe 
that there is no connection between language and culture, but simply he does not believe 
that language can influence thoughts because he states that “language reflects culture” 
(McWhorter, 2014: 59). “Language is a part of a culture, and to speak, to express yourself, 
is what it is to be” (McWhorter, 2014: 64).  
 
McWhorter challenges the ideas behind the linguistic relativity; he admits that language 
can influence thought partially, but he expresses three different concepts that goes against 
Whorfianism: “features of language do not correlate with what their speaker are like; 
many of the things we are taught as language influences thought are reverse; if 
Whorfianism is correct, then many things in language trash innocent people”3. As regards 
the second concept, McWhorter goes into detail by saying that culture is expressed in 
language and the two are linked. He briefly mentions the example of the world “snow”, 
which has been dealt with by Pollum (1989) in the essay The Great Eskimo Vocabulary 
Hoax. This essay presents an overview of the “myth” of the 20 or more words to say snow 
amongst Eskimos, which according to the scholar is not entirely correct. Linguistics who 
have brought attention to this particular myth explain how Eskimos might not be 
completely interested in the concept of snow, because snow represents their everyday life 
or their background “like sand on the beach” (Pollum, 1989: 279). This concept brings 







people who live in specific environments to have a different number of worlds, because 
they need to describe their reality. Finally, McWhorter states that culture demonstrates 
diversity and language demonstrate similarity, because it represents a way of doing the 
same things in different languages 4. Moreover, determinism relates to “the prison house 
view of language”, because it implies that the limits brought by language are the limits of 
the world (Mooney and Evans, 2015: 28). If there is no linguistic sign, the concept is hard 
to imagine. However, language gives the opportunity to create new meanings. 
 
How can linguistic relativity be connected to sexism? As mentioned above, linguistic 
relativity claims that language influences society, and the way in which people think and 
perceive reality affects the use of sexist language as well. Whorf’s tenet of language and 
culture having a reciprocal relationship has been helpful to studies of sexist language in 
the 1970s (Teso, 2010: 24). Moreover, Pauwels (2003) maintains that many feminist 
linguistic activists support the weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis because it 
states that language both shapes and reflect reality (Pauwels, 2003: 554). This theory 
emphasizes the need for a language reform to find a starting point to reach equality in 
language use but also in society. Supporting stereotypes and pejorative terms through 
language reinforces clichés, which might be perceived by people as true. Reforming 
gender then, becomes the place for social change, and pinpointing sexist use is likely to 
be an effective strategy to eradicate unequal language, as I will report in the last section 
of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Feminist Language Reform 
 
Among the different linguistic and feminist activists who have worked for language 
reform and language planning in order to eradicate sexist language use in everyday 
vernacular, Anne Pauwels has been one of the main sources for this work. Her essay 
Feminist Linguistic Activism – Non-sexist Language Reform (2003) has been a great 
starting point for the development of this chapter, as it contains main topics that will be 





As previously reported it was the conjoined work of linguistic activism and the feminist 
movement during the 1970s that started challenging the male dominance in language. 
One of the main steps made against sexist language was the development of a non-sexist 
language which would challenge the norm created by men (Pauwels, 2003: 551). Pauwels 
(2003) when quoting the case study from Cooper (1989) highlights that first, the debate 
around non-sexist language use is a form of language planning and second, that the work 
to eradicate sexist language has the characteristics of a language reform (Pauwels, 2003: 
552). Pauwels (2003) creates a distinction between activists and planners’ idea of 
language change, because planners maintain that language change is behind schedule 
compared to social change while for activists the main goal is to expose language biased 
use (Pauwels, 2003: 555). The difference between activists, or campaigners as Mills 
(2008) calls them, is that they are not usually organized by a government, while language 
planners are (Mills, 2008: 84).  
 
As far as language planning is concerned, Liddicoat (2011) introduces the topic by 
presenting the two main concerns of feminist linguistics, which aim to expose the 
representation of women and men through language and to debunk the idea that women 
and men communicate differently. Liddicoat (2011) defines feminist language planning 
as “an active engagement with the ways in which language represent and reproduces 
gender” (Liddicoat, 2011: 2). The starting point of feminist language planning is that 
language allows both covert and overt sexism and identifying the expression of gender 
inequality has been one of the main goals for planners. The will to intervene on sexism is 
a fundamental part of language planning, because the idea of eradicating sexist language 
leads to the elimination of sexism in society (Liddicoat, 2011: 4).  
 
The main mechanisms to deal with linguistic inequality are gender neutralization and 
gender specification. The former aims to reduce the expression of gender, to neutralize it 
and the latter aims to explicitly mark gender. Those two strategies are applied at word 
level, but the idea was that the word level would eventually influence the discourse level 
and eliminate sexism (Pauwels, 2003: 556). Language planning has the purpose of 
implementing language changes through mechanisms and pathways that can penetrate 
speech communities (Pauwels, 2003: 560). According to Pauwels (2003), however, 
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feminist language planning has faced different obstacles due to the lack of collaboration 
of the language authorities, which means that changes had to be spread through personal 
use in order to pressure the use of non-sexist language (Pauwels, 2003: 560). As a matter 
of fact, “Feminist publications – both academic and general - became vehicles for 
spreading feminist linguistic practices throughout the feminist community” (Pauwels, 
2003: 560). Feminist activism aspired to eliminate semantic derogation and 
discriminatory naming practices towards women, such as the use of “Miss” or “Mrs” 
instead of the male equivalent “Ms”, which will be discussed later in this chapter 
(Pauwels, 2003: 565). Khosroshahi (1989 in Pauwels 2003) highlights that there is no 
change in imaginary if the speaker does not acknowledge the discriminatory nature of 
non-gender-inclusive forms and there is no real dedication to the linguistic change 
(Pauwels, 2003: 566-67). However, Pauwels does not fully agree with this statement 
because she believes in the power of awareness, which is spread by linguistic activism 
(Pauwels, 2003: 567). 
 
Romaine (2001) pinpoints how society is connected to language, and the reform needs to 
come from both. As a matter of fact, language reform cannot exist without social change 
(Dorner, 2010: 7). According to Dorner (2010), a change in the vocabulary does not imply 
a change in culture because inequality’s entrenched deeper than a linguistic level (Dorner, 
2010: 19). Romaine (2001) makes a distinction between the myth of male supremacy and 
the concept of male power, which is established in society and it needs more work to be 
defeated (Romaine, 2001: 128). Reform is needed to create a better self- image for women 
and to eliminate lexical gaps which do not allow women to express their experiences 
(Romaine, 2001: 128). One of the early challenges the feminist linguists faced was the 
use of “Mrs, Miss” that was planned to be replaced with “Ms” (Sunderland, 2006: 34). 
The asymmetry between the female and the male term (“Mr.”) highlights how women are 
judged and defined in terms of their marital status (Romaine, 2001: 131). Moreover, 
Romaine (2001) highlights how the introduction of the term “Ms” was not well received. 
One of the few arguments against “Ms” comes from the fact that there is no clear 
pronunciation, but mainly because it challenges the status quo (Romaine, 2001: 129). As 
mentioned above, the distinction between Mrs and Miss comes from women’s marital 
status and relationship with men. Romaine (2001) quotes different studies to pinpoint 
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how “Ms” has been misused: it was intended to replace the term “Mrs” but its meaning 
came to be associated with unmarried women. Romaine (2001) reports a study conducted 
in Canada which showed how “many people used Mrs for married women, Miss for 
women who have never been married, and Ms for divorced women” (Romaine, 2001: 
131). Another study revealed how in the state of Pennsylvania some documents required 
women to specify in brackets whether Ms referred to Mrs or Miss (Romaine, 2001: 131). 
Once again, Romaine demonstrated how women are defined through the marital status 
and even with the introduction of a new term, women are still asked to specify their status. 
In addition, Cameron (1998) reports how Ms is not considered a “permissible 
freestanding consonant cluster in English” because there is no tradition of this type of 
pronunciation and what the abbreviation stands for (Cameron, 1998: 963). 
 
Ehrlich and King (1998) in their essay Gender-based language reform and the social 
construction of meaning argue that feminist linguistics claimed the need for a reform due 
to the fact that language does not represent reality in a neutral perspective (Ehrlich and 
King, 1998: 165). As a matter of fact, the birth of the term “Ms” is located in the 1970s 
and it was created to “provide a parallel term to Mr.”. However, it has been misused or 
used to designate divorced women, even if it was created to be neutral (Ehrlich and King, 
1998: 168). The reform was needed to expand vocabulary and give women the 
opportunity to express experiences that were unnamed (Ehrlich and King, 1998: 169). 
According to Ehrlich and King (1998) language reform might not always be successful, 
but it might start to sensitize individuals. Penelope (1990 in Ehrlich and King 1998) 
emphasizes that awareness on language inequality helps the speaker to reconsider 
linguistics choices and “unlearn patriarchal ways of thinking” and a reform can empower 
those who are at disadvantage (Ehrlich and King, 1998: 170). Once more, introducing 
non-sexist strategies does not mean that sexist language can be eradicated (Ehrlich and 
King, 1998: 171). One of the most famous attempts of language reform has to do with the 
English pronominal system and Baron (1986 in Ehrlich and King 1998) has proposed 
different neologism such as “thon (1884), hes (1935), hse (1945), hir (1975), E (1977), 
hiser (1984)” (Ehrlich and King, 1998: 171). Another example is the case of “herstory”, 
whose aim was to highlight the fact that “history” referred mainly to men and to 
emphasizes the contribution of women in history (Ehrlich and King, 1998: 171). As a 
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matter of fact, Daly created the neologism “herstory” to underline women’s contribution 
in history but also its aim was never to be an alternative to “history” and according to 
Mills (2008), it has been created as a playful neologism (Mills, 2008: 88).  
 
Another standpoint comes from Mills (2008), who maintains that alternatives to sexist 
words is only one way of dealing with sexism in language. Hellinger and Bußmann (2001 
in Mills 2008) claim that reforms concern a change in the relation between the sexes and 
not a change in word use (Mills, 2008: 78). Cameron (1995 in Mills 2008), as Ehrlich and 
King (2003), advocate that changing the vocabulary does not erase sexist language (Mills, 
2008: 79).  
 
2.3 Strategies for Linguistic Equality  
 
Pauwels (1999) introduces the concept of feminist language planning and she starts by 
defining language from a feminist points of view as “a powerful instrument of 
patriarchy”5. However, one the main issues of the reform is the lack of a uniform 
approach, because within the movement women had different agendas and ideas. 
Exposing the patriarchal issue of language produces linguistic disruption, Pauwels (2001 
in Liddicoat 2011) has describes three processes through which feminist linguistics is 
facing the issues of sexism in language. One of them is disruption. The idea of this method 
is to create a dissonance and to draw the reader attention to a specific issue, which in this 
case is gender inequality. Examples of this strategy is the word “herstory” or the use of 
“she” as the generic (Liddicoat, 2011: 4). Pauwels (2003) goes into detail when explaining 
linguistic disruption as a method to highlight subtle and not so subtle use of 
discriminatory language to represent women. As I have already mentioned, examples of 
disruption are the “herstory” neologism, using she as the generic pronoun, inverting 
gender stereotypes or reclaiming words that used to have a derogatory meaning such as 
slut (Pauwels, 2003: 555). Another example is given by Niedzwiecki (1993) who 





sentence about women to discover whether it would have been said in the same way when 
referring to a man (Niedzwiecki, 1993: 54). 
Once more, Pauwels (1999) explains the two different strategies to fight linguistic sexism, 
which are gender neutralization and gender specification or feminization. These two 
different strategies seem to be chosen in specific types of languages: gender specification 
is more likely to occur in grammatical gender language such as Italian or German, while 
gender neutralization will be used in natural gender languages like English or in languages 
such as Danish or Dutch in which suffixes are no longer or less used. The choice of 
strategies is not simply influenced by grammatical or linguistic systems, because even 
social arguments play an important role. The linguistic equality approach is, according to 
Pauwels (1999), the most popular one. Gender neutralization supporters aim at a society 
where sex does not play a role and it is not significant, but feminization proponents deem 
that expressing gender fairly can highlight the increase in women’s presence in the field 
of work, which can only be represented through gender specification strategies6.  
 
Therefore, language planning plays a vital role in the reform process, because planners 
are interested in the impact of linguistic change in speech communities. They are not 
interested only in the outcome, but also in the process and what they call “unplanned” 
linguistic change7. Briefly, what is defined as an “unplanned” feature is another part of 
language planning and the two are coexistent. “Unplanned” language planning involves 
all those aspects that are an effect of planning and Kaplan (1989 in Baldauf 1994) claims 
that in some situations and groups of people the outcome of language planning will create 
unplanned outcomes for others (Baldauf, 1994: 82-83). 
 
Even though English is considered a genderless language, Engelhardt (2001 in Dorner 
2010) claims that many terms in English are masculine, unless they are specified as 
feminine. Dorner (2010) names three different reforms that have been proposed to 
eliminate gender bias in the Second Wave of feminism (Dorner, 2010: 10). The first one 
is the aforementioned pronoun reform, which aims to eradicate the generic “he” as the 






not have proper guidelines (Dorner, 2010: 11). What emerges from Dorner’s work is that 
the choice of a specific pronoun depends on the author’s intentions or habits (Dorner, 
2010:13). The second reform involves vocabulary reform. Dorner quotes authors such as 
Ehrlich, King and Lakoff to underline the idea, which has been mentioned before in this 
work, that a simple change in words will not overcome the use of sexist terms, because 
the social aspect of language plays a key role (Dorner, 2010: 19). However, authors like 
Spender support the idea that vocabulary reform is necessary and possible because she 
claims that the gender bias is located in language (Dorner, 2010: 21). Lastly, there is the 
language reform which suggests that languages might need new syntax and morphology 
(Dorner, 2010: 6-7).  Elgin (2009 in Dorner 2010) describes how languages are 
inadequate to express women’s perception’s and a language made for women would 
create a new perception, but also what so far has been called “natural” has only being the 
male way of describing reality (Dorner, 2010: 25-26).  
 
In the following sections I will present the two different strategies mentioned in Pauwels’ 
essay (2003), by exploring both their strengths and problems. Teso (2010) specifies how 
both gender specification and neutralization are mainly used to fight sexism in occupation 
names due to the strong elements of sexism of this field (Teso, 2010: 41). The 
feminization of the lexicon has been one the main linguistic changes of the 20th century 
(Teso, 2010: 52). Furthermore, Pauwels (1999) reinforces this concept, as she discusses 
how gender biased language against of women has created a state of invisibility for 
women, but also, the use of the generic masculine in job offers convey the idea of a desire 
for a male applicant (Pauwels, 1999).  
 
2.3.1 Gender Neutralization 
 
Gender neutralization aims to eliminate the different aspects of sexist language use, such 
as the generic “he”, marked feminine terms like “poetess”, the creation of compounds 
with the use of the term “person” instead of man or woman. It also aims to decrease the 
relevance of gender in society, especially in the job field, where sex will not influence 
occupational names (Pauwels, 1999). Moreover, a gender-neutral language was one of 
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the strongest reference points of Second Wave feminism and yet one of the most criticized 
(Kramer, 2016: 73). 
 
Teso (2010) describes the approaches. Neutralization implies using one term to describe 
both sexes, which means that the term will not carry gender relevance. Teso quotes 
Romaine (2001) as she has defined this strategy as “degendering” and then she also quotes 
Mucchi-Faina (2005) who has called the approach “inclusion”, because it eliminates the 
idea of excluding a sex from the other in a term (Teso, 2010: 41). The term in the gender 
neutralization strategy are unmarked, which involves the elimination of suffix. Also, 
terms that have been analyzed through gender neutralization strategies can been described 
as “unisex” (Teso, 2010: 41-42). The success of these strategies depends on the type of 
language to which they are applied. As mentioned above, in natural gender languages 
such as English, most occupational nouns are gender neutral and the strategy remains 
relevant to names which marked through suffixes. On the other hand, in grammatical 
gender languages, such as French, the process can be more complicated because the terms 
themselves express gender identification and using a neutral form most of the time means 
using the male term as the neutral (Teso, 2010: 42). One of the most well-known examples 
for these strategies is presented through the term “chairman” which has been replaced 
with “chairperson”. However, Dubois and Crouch (1987 in Teso 2010) report how 
“chairperson” is used when referring to a woman, while when the sex of the referent is 
known as male, the speaker will use “chairman” (Teso, 2010: 43). As far as opposition 
are concerned, Niedzwiecki (1993 in Teso 2010) points out the issue that using the generic 
as neutral, which is often the masculine, does not resolve the issue of sexism and 
Niedzwiecki (1993) claims that this strategy hides women by reinforcing masculine and 
excluding feminine forms (Teso, 2010: 44).  
 
However, Romaine (2001) specifies that some studies have discovered how even gender-
neutral terms can express sex-marked terms and questions whether this type of reform 
can actually be successful (Romaine, 2001: 131). As mentioned above, the issue stands 
with the term “chairperson”. The author’s examination of the word “chairman” 
highlighted how it is still used and preferred to its neutral counterpart. It can be defined 
as the counterpart because “chairman” remains the neutral term and “chairperson” is 
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likely to be used to refer to women (Romaine, 2001: 131). Moreover, Pauwels (1999) 
claims that one the reason why “chairperson” did not really stick in people’s vernacular 
is because of its gender association. While “spokesperson” achieved better results in 
everyday use, “chairperson” has faced quite the resistance. Pauwels (1999) argues that it 
is more likely to see a woman covering the role of a spokesperson which leads to better 
chances of using an unbiased term, but when it comes to a higher position such as 
“chairperson” it is more likely to be perceived as a male position, which means that there 
is no need to use gender fair terms8.  
 
Neutralization aims to use genderless and sexless terms in order to diminish the 
importance of femininity or masculinity in language. This strategy has become more 
common in natural gendered languages, in which nouns or adjectives are not conjugated. 
Another strategy that belongs to neutralization is the creation of new words, to replace 
the gendered terms, such as police officer instead of police man (Lindqvist, Renström and 
Gustafsson Sendén, 2018:111). 
 
According to Mills (2008) when referring to Pauwels’ work, it is better to make women 
visible in language rather than use a generic form. The ideal would be to create a new 
feminine term in order to avoid the negative perception of the already existing one, but 
Pauwels (2003 in Mills 2008) estimates that the negative connotations will fade over time 
(Mills, 2008: 84). In grammatical gender languages, such as Italian, the male term is 
considered the generic because it might be the case in which women have started working 
in that specific field recently or it is mainly man-dominated. In this case, the gender-
neutral term will erase the visibility of women and enforce the male presence (Mills, 
2008: 84). In this case, as Pauwels suggests, it is better to opt for gender specific terms 
(Mills, 2008: 85). An example for this case can be found in the Italian word for “minister”, 
“ministro”. It can be used to identify both women and men, but recently the feminine 
version of the word has entered the everyday vernacular, and now instead of using 







Another example of gender neutralization is the switch in expressions which used to 
include “man”: in order to replace “the best man for the job”, “the best person for the job” 
has been suggested (Xiaolan, 2006: 91). In the occupational names field there have been 
different proposals in order to avoid sexism and to avoid male generic lexis: 
 
Fireman  Firefighter 
Statesman  Leader/State leader 
Mankind Humankind 
Manmade Handmade 
(Xiaolan, 2006: 93) 
 
As mentioned above, the strategy of gender neutralization aims to eliminate suffixes, such 
as “-ette”, “-ess” and “-trix” (Teso, 2010: 42). In English, it would create “unisex” terms. 
Teso (2010) proposes two different examples, which are “poetess” and “actress”. Those 
two terms will lose their suffix and they will also lose their gender marking (Teso, 2010: 
42). However, Kramer (2016) reports some counter arguments towards this strategy and 
its “political correctness” behavior: neutralization can damage clarity, especially in the 
use of “they” as the generic pronoun because the reader does not know who “they” 
actually refers to: it can also come at the expense of precision, as one term to represent 
both genders can exclude information between interlocutors; lastly, using words such as 
“chairperson” can be seen as a pejorative of the beauty of language (Kramer, 2016: 73). 
Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (2013 in Kramer 2016), highlight how even if the male 
pronoun “he” is use as a generic, it will always represent male images (Kramer, 2016: 
74). 
 
2.3.2 Gender Specification 
 
Gender specification aims to make women visible through language with gender marking 
with uses such as “he or she” and phrases as “police woman and man”. Gender 
specification supporters want to designate gender to increase the visibility of women, 
again especially in the job field (Pauwels, 1999). Pauwels (2003) presents this strategy as 
an achievement of equal treatment in language use through gender marking (Pauwels, 
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2003: 556). Teso (2010) quotes two different definition from Romaine (2001) and 
Mucchi-Faina (2005) of this strategy after defining it “feminization”. The former 
describes it as “engendering” or “regendering” and the latter describes it as the “visibility 
principle”, whose aim is to note women’s presence in language (Teso, 2010: 45). In 
grammatical gender languages, such as Italian, when there is no feminine counterpart to 
a masculine term, it is created through a suffix or a neologism is created, which will 
become the norm (Teso, 2010: 45). This strategy acknowledges women’s presence and 
promotes the idea that everything is accessible to women as well, especially in the job 
field (Teso, 2010: 46). Again, Niedzwiecki (1993) highlights the downsides of this 
approach. Women are likely to use the masculine term in order to obtain prestige in what 
they do instead of the appropriate feminine form and those new feminine forms are 
difficult to adopt and accept (Teso, 2010: 46).  
 
Niedzwiecki (1993) identifies the basic tenet of feminization with the correct 
representation of women and men through language, which means using the appropriate 
terms and pronouns. Semantic rules are not natural because they are created by society 
and they translate the absence of women into language. Niedzwiecki (1993) maintains 
that feminization represents the right to be a woman in a language which is male 
dominated (Niedzwiecki, 1993: 52). One of the gains of feminization is the elimination 
of pejoratives terms and it aims to reduce the impoverishment of language, because its 
aim is to avoid the masculinization of language (Niedzwiecki, 1993: 53). According to 
Lindqvist, et al. (2018) gender feminization is considered the best strategy in grammatical 
gendered languages, but they also highlight how using paired forms of pronouns does not 
eliminate the male bias in language (Lindqvist, et al., 2018: 110).  
 
A more radical strategy to achieve equality in language is called “total feminization”, 
which involves the use of feminine forms instead of the generic masculine forms (Teso, 
2010: 46). This strategy is defined by Pusch (1990 in Teso 2010) as the “visibility 
strategy” or “positive strategy”. In this case, the feminine term becomes “the unmarked 
form in generic contexts” (Teso, 2010:47). This type of approach according to Pusch 
(1990 in Teso 2010) is an opportunity to show how women have been treated through 
language and have the opportunity to make men go through the same experience and 
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eventually to make women explicit through language (Teso, 2010: 47). Moreover, 
Pusch’s (1990) proposal is described as simpler because it does not need the creation of 
new words. The author is well aware of her radical position on the topic, but she believes 
that this strategy could rectify all the years of male dominance in language. In Pauwels’ 
essay (2003) this approach is defined as a “radical feminization” (Pauwels, 2003: 558).  
 
2.4 The Results of Language Reforms 
 
Niedzwiecki (1993) believes in the enrichment power of linguistic change. The work that 
has been done to achieve language change will affect social action and lack of equality 
will only lead to stereotyped behavior (Niedzwiecki, 1993: 50). Including feminine terms 
within the occupational field will change people’s minds, and therefore society. 
Niedzwiecki (1993) claims that once people are made aware of sexist language, they will 
see how language is male dominated. She believes that is up to women to encourage the 
change, because she claims that language “is a living thing”, which can explore new 
realities and eliminate gaps (Niedzwiecki, 1993: 52). 
 
The two different strategies aspire to reduce and eventually avoid sexism in language, in 
order to use a gender fair language and to make women visible. According to Teso (2010) 
linguists are debating about the fact that combining the two strategies is the best strategy 
(Teso, 2010: 47). Furthermore, Pauwels (2003) pinpoints how the effects of non-sexist 
language it is still at the beginning and the changes are not completely accepted (Pauwels, 
2003: 566).  The effectiveness of language reforms is expressed through the changes that 
have been made through the years to set in motion equality in language. There are many 
examples of essays, works and pamphlets that aim to provide guidelines to speakers and 
readers, in order to avoid mistakes and to recognize the presence of all genders.  
 
As a matter of fact, the University of Padua (2017) has published guidelines for 
administrative language for the three-year period of 2015-17. The guideline explores the 
different topics that were presented in this thesis, such as semantic derogation, the 
necessity to make women visible through language and the aim to use gender neutral 
language.  Then it goes on to give a list of terms which belongs to the academic field with 
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both the feminine and masculine counterparts in Italian; in this way a speaker has access 
to the appropriate counterparts, since the table is divided into grammatical gender 
variation (2017: 13-15). A common element between the University of Padua guidelines 
and the studies mentioned above in the first chapter is debate over suffixes. It is 
highlighted that it might happen that feminine counterpart does not stand at the same level 
as the male term because the masculine represents the generic and the feminine term 
represents the subordinate word. However, the advice given in the guidelines is to keep 
using those forms, such as “dottoressa, professoressa” because those are common forms 
(2017: 15). Lastly, the document introduces the guidelines for addressing both genders 
when using the plural, but also how to addresses unknown people through indefinite 
pronouns or collective nouns instead of using generics (2017: 19). 
 
Another example of a possible solution to sexist language use were the guidelines for 
nonsexist use of language in NCTE publications. In 1975, The National Council of 
Teachers of English published some guidelines to challenge sexism by highlighting 
linguistic patterns that should be avoided and by also providing non-sexist alternatives. 
In the introduction to the publication the council addresses the fact that vocabulary change 
is not enough to eliminate gender bias, but it is a starting point to change people’s mindset. 
Their aim is not to create new dogmatism, but to identify inaccurate use of language and 
to propose a solution (1975: 3). The guidelines are divided in two sections: general 
problems, such as the avoidance of “man-compounds”, marking terms with the “female” 
appellative, stereotyping (1975: 4-7); in the specific problems section the committee 
provides a few examples of the importance of giving women authors credit for their work 
and also of encouraging the introduction of materials by and about women (1975: 9). It 
is important to highlight that the guidelines were revised ten years later, in 1985. This 
newer version of the first manual recaps all the element mentioned in the 1975 version, 
but it also reports the editor’s duty of eradicating sexist language when encountered. 
There are many examples of the terms that should be used and the ones which should be 
avoided, plus it encourages the writers and the speakers to find the right balance between 






Apart from the academic field, there are a great number of non-sexist guidelines for 
different organizations. The European Parliament guidelines (2018) define the purpose of 
gender-neutral language in avoiding “word choices which may be interpreted as biased, 
discriminatory or demeaning by implying that one sex or social gender is the norm. Using 
gender-fair and inclusive language also helps reduce gender stereotyping, promotes social 
change and contributes to achieving gender equality” (2018: 3). In the first chapter I have 
identified three different types of gender-languages and these guidelines consider the 
differences between them and try to give a possible strategy to defeat gender inequality. 
As I have already mentioned, a possible solution for grammatical gender languages such 
as Italian with the University of Padua’s guidelines, which are supported by the European 
guidelines is the use of specification over neutralization. I will report the strategy for 
natural gender languages such as English. The European guidelines suggest to reducing 
as much as possible the use of gender specific terms and to adopt the neutralization 
strategy, through the use of terms such as “chairperson, director, police officer” (2018: 
5). Overall the guidelines identify the common issues connected to gender in language 
use, such as the generic us of masculine gender instead of including the feminine. At the 
end of the guidelines the different outcomes of the gender fair strategy are listed and when 
it comes to the highly debated “chairman” the offered solution is “chair” instead of 
“chairperson”. In this way the issue of the term “chairperson” used to identify women is 
avoided (2018: 11). 
 
Another result of non-sexist guidelines come from a supranational organization like 
UNESCO, which during the 1980s also drafted its own “Guide to Non-Sexist Language” 
(2019). They offer alternatives to discriminatory terms and concepts such as stereotypes, 
generics, man-compounds, occupational titles, generic “he” and the marital status of 
women. The guidelines suggest avoiding assumptions of how women look or think, such 
as “weaker sex or lady like” or overall assumption of gender like referring only to 
“delegates wives” instead of the more correct “delegates spouse” (2019: 1). The concerns 
over women’s marital status are addressed as it is advisable to use “Ms” to refer to when 
in general instead of differentiate between “Mrs” and “Miss” (2019: 2). The importance 
of this document stands in the fact that is the “most widely recognized international 
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standard for GFL [gender-fair language]” and “it also regulates language use in internal 
documents and publications of UNESCO (Sczesny, Formanowicz and Moser, 2016: 5). 
 
The goal of this chapter was to highlight the different possibilities that can be applied to 
deal with sexist language with a background knowledge of the theory behind feminist 
linguistic reform. Then after acknowledging the two main strategies of gender 
specification and neutralization I have presented different guidelines that should be 
considered when referring to people in order to make every gender visible through 
language. In the next chapter I will present four different declarations and I will present 
the linguistic changes and the strategies adopted by governments in order to deal with 
gender equality in language. Are women made feel visible through language in human 























3 Human Rights Declarations and Sexist Language 
 
In this chapter I will analyze the four declarations of human rights; the aim of this study 
is to discover whether women are made visible through language in those declarations, 
while bearing in mind the ground questions that have been asked throughout this thesis 
on language, gender and sexism and the representation of women through language over 
time.  The study will be carried out with the support of Baker’s book Using Corpora to 
Analyze Gender (2014), which has been helpful in the understanding of building and 
analyzing a corpus through a software which will be presented in the following sections. 
Moreover, I will explain the process and the steps of my analysis by presenting the 
problems and the strengths of each document, while using the literature of the previous 
chapter as both starting points and background knowledge. 
 
3.1 Corpus Linguistics 
 
I will now introduce the linguistic field which my corpus analysis can be included, as I 
will highlight other important notions that might be useful to understand the method of 
my study. First of all, Corpus Linguistics represents a change in the study of language 
towards an analysis of parole, which means that linguists are more interested in 
performances rather than competences, and the focus is the language use in a specific 
text, rather than a universal knowledge (Tognini Bonelli, 2010: 14-15). The birth of this 
type of analysis grew in the 1960s as the idea of collecting texts to analyze language 
became a rather new concept. At first the idea was not to collect culture elements, but to 
simply describe ordinary people’s vernacular. The spread of this type of studies has the 
development of technology to thank, as the computer started to play a vital role for this 
analysis (Tognini Bonelli, 2010: 15).  
 
A corpus is a collection of texts and its greatest characteristic is that it involves the use of 
authentic cases and not made-up sentences which might occur in linguistics books or 
studies in order to prove a point (Baker, 2014: 7). Hunston (2002 in Baker 2014) 
distinguishes between two types of corpora: “reference corpora”, which are representative 
of a particular language variety, and “specialized corpora”, which represent a specific text 
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type (Baker, 2014: 9). One of the greatest advantages of corpus analysis is that it allows 
one to identify and unveil the different nuances of a certain words (Baker, 2014: 10). As 
a matter of fact, Baker (2014) maintains that “corpora can therefore reveal something 
about hidden meanings associated with words and phrases, affording us a more robust 
way of pointing out biases” (Baker, 2014: 11).  
 
Another distinction is between “corpus-driven” and “corpus-based” investigation (Baker, 
2014: 15). The first one uses the corpus itself as data and its patterns are used to express 
regularities and exceptions in language, while the researcher is interested mainly in 
frequencies. A “corpus-based investigation” aims to prove an initial hypothesis or to 
analyze a term’s frequency in a smaller unit of data, while the researchers already know 
which terms or sentences to look for before delving into the research (Baker, 2014: 15-
16). Another element introduced by Baker is the concept of “triangulation”, which 
involves the use of multiple sources in order to obtain a better overlook of phenomena 
(Baker, 2014: 157). The issues of language and gender will be linked to my analysis as I 
will try to investigate whether the chosen declarations adopt sexist language or not. As a 
matter of fact, I will use four human rights acts as the basis of the research, a characteristic 
that complies with the concept of triangulation just explained.  
 
The analysis involves the use of a specific software, which according to Baker (2014) 
makes the research quicker and smoother (Baker, 2014: 11). As he suggested, I will use 
AntConc as my corpus tool. Baker (2014) mentions frequency lists, which are helpful in 
identifying linguistic patterns in corpora, although they reveal general use instead of 
specific cases, which might highlight unique features of the corpus. Another feature is the 
concept of concordances, which pinpoint how words are collocated in texts and how terms 
can vary their meaning based on context (Baker, 2014: 13). When the user searches for a 
term, s/he looks for every single grammatical role that the term can assume. Hence why, 
the context given through the software is such an important feature, as it clarifies the 
function of the term. Hunston (2002 in Evison 2010) clarifies how corpus linguistics does 





As mentioned above, Baker (2014) suggests the use of multiple corpus in order to have a 
fuller grasp on the aim of the study. My corpus will be made up of four different 
declarations: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights11, The Human Rights Act12, 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations13 and the Global Human Rights 
Sanctions Regulation 202014. Evison (2010) maintains that at the beginning of corpus 
analysis, the corpora were larger and longer which would provide too much data, but 
more recently smaller corpora are becoming more and more useful especially in the study 
of pronouns and verb forms frequency and as a matter of fact, pronouns are one of the 
main features of my study (Evison, 2010: 123). In Table 1 I have summarized the sizes 
of each sub-corpora and it is clear how my documents are not very extensive, notably the 
first one which is The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed in 1948 and it is viewed as 
a milestone for the human rights movement, considering the fact that it is the first example 
of a regulation of human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 sets all the rights and 
freedoms for UK citizens, such as the freedom of expression or the right to marry and 
start a family15. The third declaration is the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations, which came into force in 2007 and it provides protection to UK citizens 
against discrimination and promotes equality in society16. The fourth declaration is the 
Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulation 2020 that came into force in 2020 and it 




AntConc, the software that I will be using for the analysis, was developed by Anthony 
Lawrence and it is a tool for analyzing frequency patterns and word sequences in a corpus. 










software that were employed to examine the four declarations used to identify the 
linguistic representation of women in the field of human rights through time. The 
interface of the program is quite simple and easy to comprehend, which gives the user 
small space for errors and doubts. I have decided to organize the work in the following 
way: I have analyzed the declarations one at the time in order to be able to look at the 
specific terms in which I was interested, then I have used other functions of the software 
which involved the use of all the sub-corpora and at the end I have drawn my conclusions 
on the how their language has represented women. 
 
First of all, I had to convert all the files in the “.txt” format, the only format that the 
program allows, and then I started familiarizing myself with the program’s features. As I 
read the declarations before uploading them on AntConc, I already knew which terms I 
was going to look for. As a matter of fact, I started my research with the generic “he” 
pronoun and its inflected forms, as I had noticed its being one of the main features in the 
declarations. In Table 2 below, I have listed the concordance hits of the third person 
pronouns that I have looked for in order to give a general idea on how many times they 
occur in the texts. In my opinion, the software can be quite useful for this type of research 
because it accelerates the process of counting the concordances, as it also presents the 
context of the terms. Another interesting feature is the idea of using colours to identify 
the words: the user will see in blue the term that s/he searched for, and then the following 
(or previous words, depending on the type of research and settings) term will appear in 
other colours in order to highlight what follows the term precisely. The basic features of 
the program allow the operator to see the words that surround the searched term in order 
to have a general context. Moreover, the operator can increase the number of characters 
and have a larger context if desired. In my case, I have searched for specific words instead 
of all the inflected forms of a term because I was interested in seeing the precise use 
instead of a more general utilization, considering that I already knew which terms I was 
supposed to look for. If the user wants to search for all inflected forms, all s/he has to do 
is to replace the suffix of the term with an asterisk. In Table 1 I have reported the word 
tokens and types which identify the length of each sub-corpora, because I wanted to 































Table 1 Sub-Corpora sizes according to AntConc 
  
3.2 Discussion of the Analysis 
 
I have decided to open my discussion with a general overview of what is going to be 
touched on in the following sections, as in the tables below (Table 2 and 3) I have listed 
all the 3rd-person pronouns that I have searched for through AntConc and then the 
indefinite pronouns with other nouns which are often used as gender-fair terms. In this 
case, I was able to immediately highlight the most evident problems of each document, 
but also have a reference as I proceed with my analysis in this chapter. The reason why I 
have decided to include pronouns that I was not able to find in the documents has to do 
with the fact that it is vital for the success of the thesis to points out in which way women 


























He 2 27 24 0 53 
His 21 38 29 1 89 
Him 2 11 29 0 42 
Himself 2 1 0 0 3 
She 0 0 0 0 0 
Her 0 7 2 1 10 
Herself 0 0 0 0 0 
They 2 5 9 9 25 
Them 0 1 2 11 14 
Themselves 2 0 0 0 2 
 



















Person 5 43 94 263 405 
Persons 0 3 22 26 51 
People 2 1 1 0 4 
Peoples 4 0 0 0 4 
Everyone 30 13 0 0 43 
Anyone 0 0 1 0 1 
One 10 17 2 4 33 
 
Table 3 Use of Pronouns and Nouns in the Corpora 
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I will now present the process of analyzing the four declarations, the concordances of 
terms and the frequency lists. As I have mentioned above, I have decided to read the 
documents before using AntConc, which means that I already had a global idea of the 
problematics and the different strategies used. Baker (2014) defines this type of process 
as a “corpus-based investigation”, which I have explained in the previous section, as the 
user is already aware of what s/he is pursuing inside the corpus and s/he already has a 
theory. As I was reading the documents I immediately realized the common features of 
the generic “he” and its inflected forms uses as the neutral pronoun in the first three acts, 
terms that I have then search in AntConc to discover the actual concordance hits and 
context.  
 
I then uploaded one declaration at the time into the software, because if the user uploads 
all the documents together the search will cover every single part of the corpus. Then, I 
started typing the term that I was interested in, in order to observe their concordance hits 
and their context, which I have reported in Table 2 and Table 3. I had the opportunity to 
have a general look at the context of the terms in which I was interested, which has been 
one the most important recommendations that I have given myself before delving into the 
analysis. I have decided to report the concordance hits on the term “he” through the four 
Acts, as it is one of the most widely discussed features of sexist language use and also the 
hardest to eradicate, according to the literature mentioned in the previous chapter. 
 
I have also used the feature of frequency lists, which allow the user to see how many 
times a specific term appear in the corpus and can be found in the software under the 
name of “word lists”. The lists work on the four documents at the same time and I decided 
first to look at the general frequency list, which involves all the words used in the act to 
see the most used term in general. The software automatically ranks the word order by 
frequency, but the user can change that and use the alphabetic order as s/he prefers. 
Overall, in the corpus there are 2204-word types and the most used are articles and 
prepositions. My interest was in discovering the position of the words on which I have 
based my analysis, which are the same as from Tables 2 and 3, and for that specific reason 
I have used searched for pronouns, such as “he”, “she”, “they” and their inflected forms 
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and other indefinite pronoun and nouns. Here in the table below I have reported the 
ranking of the terms I have searched for and the number of times they occur in the corpus. 
 
 Rank Frequency 
she - - 
herself - - 
person 11 405 
his 58 89 
he 97 53 
persons 104 51 
him 125 42 
they 224 25 
individual 324 15 
them 351 14 
her 449 10 
people 879 4 
peoples 880 4 
himself 1025 3 
themselves 1453 2 
 
Table 4 Data of the “Word List” 
 
Another type is the frequency list per 10,000 which applies both to each sub-corpora and 
to the whole corpus as the user calculates how many times a term occurs every 10,000 
words. In order to do this, I had to upload the documents in the software and then I went 
into the “word list” section to see the number of words of the corpus, which information 
is provided through “word tokens” at the top of the software’s interface. The evaluation 
that has to be done is: taking the number of times the word appears and divide it by the 
number of words in the corpus and then multiply by 10,000. In tables 5,6,7 and 8 I have 
reported the frequency per 10,000 words for each document and then I have decided to 
put the data in one table which compares and summarizes the work that I have done. In 
this way I was able to point out the frequency of each declarations and how the terms 
occur considering the different lengths, but then I have worked on the overall corpus 
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where I was able to provide a more general occurrence of the terms, because eventually 
the study that I was aiming at was a diachronic analysis of the language change. It is 
important to emphasize that the results have been rounded up and down depending on 





𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔
)  
𝑿 𝟏𝟎, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
she 0 0 
herself 0 0 
person 5 29 
his 21 122 
he 2 12 
persons 0 0 
him 2 12 
they 2 12 
individual 1 6 
them 0 0 
her 0 0 
people 2 12 
peoples 4 41 
himself 2 12 
themselves 2 12 
 





𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔
)  
𝑿 𝟏𝟎, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
she 0 0 
herself 0 0 
person 43 24 
his 38 30 
he 27 21 
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persons 3 2 
him 11 9 
they 5 4 
individual 0 0 
them 1 1 
her 7 6 
people 1 1 
peoples 0 0 
himself 1 1 
themselves 0 0 
 





𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔
)  
𝑿 𝟏𝟎, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
she 0 0 
herself 0 0 
person 94 101 
his 29 31 
he 24 26 
persons 22 24 
him 29 31 
they 9 10 
individual 1 1 
them 2 2 
her 2 2 
people 1  
peoples 0 0 
himself 0 0 
themselves 0 0 
 







𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔
)  
𝑿 𝟏𝟎, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
she 0 0 
herself 0 0 
person 263 233 
his 1 1 
he 0 0 
persons 26 23 
him 0 0 
they 9 8 
individual 13 11 
them 11 10 
her 1 1 
people 0 0 
peoples 0 0 
himself 0 0 
themselves 0 0 
 
Table 8 The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations Frequency List per 10,000 words. 
 
 1948 1998 2007 2020 Total 
(
𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅 𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚
𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒅𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒖𝒔
)  
𝑿 𝟏𝟎, 𝟎𝟎𝟎 
she 0 0 0 0 0 - 
herself 0 0 0 0 0 - 
person 5 43 94 263 405 116 
his 21 38 29 1 89 26 
he 2 27 24 0 53 15 
persons 0 3 22 26 51 15 
him 2 11 29 0 42 12 
they 2 5 9 9 25 7 
individual 1 0 1 13 15 4 
them 0 1 2 11 14 4 
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her 0 7 2 1 10 3 
people 2 1 1 0 4 1 
peoples 4 0 0 0 4 1 
himself 2 1 0 0 3 1 
themselves 2 0 0 0 2 1 
 
Table 9 Frequency List per 10,000 words. 
 
Another feature involving the frequency lists are what can be called the “advanced lists”. 
Specifically, this type of list is a more in depth and precise research, as the user knows 
which words’ frequency to look for. Through the feature of “tool preferences” I was able 
to open the advanced section and create a list of words in which I was interested and then 
the software automatically produced the ranking and the frequency of the chosen terms 
instead of presenting the whole list of words in the corpus. Through this feature I was 
able to focus on the terms in which I was actually interested instead of having to look for 
every single one of them. This type of list was used to simplify the formation of the tables 
above. Overall, the general “word lists” was useful to see the most used term, but my 
analysis need to be more precise. 
 
3.2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is characterized by the use of the generic 
“he” and its inflected forms as the neutral and general pronoun used in the document. In 
Tables 2 and 3, I have reported the number of concordances of specific terms. The Act 
was proclaimed in 1948 which means that it was written before second Wave of Feminism 
and the Feminist Linguistics Reforms. As Baker (2014) pinpoints, the research should not 
stop at the single word use, but it should look also at the context. For this specific reason 
the use of AntConc has been vital for a proper analysis. One main advantage is that the 
software provides the context; more precisely, it gives an overlook of the sentence in 
which the reader can find the term. The generic “he” and the inflected forms are followed 
by nouns such as “rights, country and nationality” and as I have mentioned in the previous 
chapter it might give the idea that these articles and rights refers largely to men. Here I 
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have reported the concordance hits for the pronoun “he” in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as it represents one of the biggest problematics of the documents. 
Concordance Hits of “he” in Context What it Refers to 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense.   
Everyone 




Table 10 Concordance hits of the term “he” in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
In the declaration examples of indefinite pronouns such as “everyone” can be found as 
they are used to express a plurality. However, they are often followed by the generic “he” 
or its inflected forms, which actually dissolve a possible genderless sense of the articles 
because they exclude women from the intention of the declaration by making them appear 
invisible. 
 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.   
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country.   
 
More problematic and gender bias terms are “brotherhood”, “mankind” and “man” which 
might have been used as generics when the document was written but they represent the 
concept of making women invisible through language, as they might seem to be oriented 
more to men than women. In this specific case, the strategy of gender neutralization might 
be the best solution to deal with this kind of problems, as it aims at the elimination of 
gender to achieve a sense of fairness in language. 
 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,   
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All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
 
Baker (2014) introduces the concept of “male firstness”, which refers to binomial pairs 
and the order in which words are presented. Usually, the masculine term is placed as the 
first term of the pair, such as “men and women” which occurs in the universal declaration 
of human rights (Baker, 2014: 92). However, there are cases in which the feminine term 
is placed as first as a sign of chivalry, such as “ladies and gentleman” (Mooney and Evans, 
2015:113). 
 
Overall, this declaration and all its issues represents what could be eliminated or 
alleviated from the language of human rights declaration, in order to, as stated by the 
literature mentioned in the previous chapters, move towards equality between men and 
women in language through the acquisition of gender fair language. Later in this chapter 
I will present a possible solution to the sexist language that has been found in order to 
eradicate the problematics of this document. 
 
3.2.2 The Human Rights Act 
 
The Human Rights Act came into force in 1998, years after the feminist linguistic reform 
which was set into motion in the 1970s. However, the declaration still presents the use of 
the generic “he” and its inflected forms as the previous document did. Here in the table 
below I have listed all the example of the use of the masculine pronoun as the generic. 
The instances were taken from AntConc and I did for the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights I have decided to highlight the pronoun and then to specify for every single 
example the reference for the masculine pronoun which has been necessary for the rest 
of the analysis. 
 
Concordance Hits of “he” in Context What it Refers to 
amendments as he considers appropriate to reflect the effect  Secretary of State 
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Right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he is (or 
would be) a victim of the unlawful act 
Person 
A sufficient interest in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would 
be, a victim of that act 
Applicant 
Interest to sue in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would be, a 
victim of that act. 
Applicant 
A person is a victim of an unlawful act only if he would be a victim for 
the purposes of article 34 of the 
Person 
Rules in relation to a particular tribunal may, to the extent he considers it 
necessary to ensure that the tribunal can provide an 
Minister of the 
Crown 
Considers that there is compelling reason for proceeding under this 
section, he may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he 
Minister of the 
Crown 
He may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he considers 
necessary to remove the incompatibility. 
Minister of the 
Crown 
That there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this section, he 
may by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as 
Minister of the 
Crown 
May by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as he 
considers necessary. 
Minister of the 
Crown 
His right to make any claim or bring any proceeding which he could make 
or bring apart from sections 7 to 9. 
Person 
Must by order make such amendments to Schedule 3 as he considers 
appropriate to reflect – (a) any designation order 
Secretary of State 
Must by order make such amendment to this act as he considers 
appropriate to reflect –(a) any designation order 
Secretary of State 
Must by order make such amendments to this Act as he considers are 
required to reflect that withdrawal 
Secretary of State 
Without being required to relinquish his office. But he is not required to 
perform the duties of his juridical office 
Holder of a 
juridical office 
Not required to perform the duties of his juridical office while he is a 
judge of the court 
Holder of a 
juridical office 
In respect of any period during which he is a judge of the court – (a) a 
Lord Justice of 
Holder of a 
juridical office 
(temporary appointment of sheriff principal) applies, while he holds that 




For a temporary increase in the maximum number of judges he considers 
appropriate in relation to any holder of a juridical office 
The Lord 
Chancellor  
or the Secretary 
of State 
Or (b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a 
statement of compatibility the government nevertheless 
Minister of the 
Crown 
Who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest of any charge 
Everyone 
Minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the 
Everyone charged 
with a criminal 
offence 
Person or thought legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be 
Everyone accused 
of a crime 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court 
Everyone accused 
of a crime 
And (b) if, as a result of the representations, he considers it appropriate to 
make changes to the original order, 
Person 
As a mender of that scheme; (b) the terms on which he remains a member 
of the scheme are those which would have 
Judge 
Of that scheme are those which would have been applicable had he not 
been appointed as an ECHR judge; 
Judge 
 
Table 11 Concordance hits of the term “he” in the Human Rights Act 
 
In this case, the masculine pronoun is often associated with jobs and political figures such 
as “the Secretary of State”, “Minister of the Crown”, “Sheriff Principal” or “Lord 
Chancellor”. As stated in the literature of the previous chapters, English is a natural 
gender language and the nouns are usually not associated with a specific gender and this 
aspect brings back the issues on gender and occupational field. However, the fact that 
they are followed by a masculine pronoun could influence the reader to believe that those 
roles are limited to men and it might seem that the language use reinforce this concept 
while excluding women from those highest rank offices. As happened with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the problem of using “he” and its inflected forms as the 
generic might give the impression that those roles are often hold by men or that overall 
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the addressee of the documents does not include women. Again, when reporting figures 
such as “minor”, “person”, “judge” or “victim of unlawful act” the chosen pronoun is 
always masculine. 
 
the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an 
offence or fleeing after having done so; 
the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision 




3.2.3 The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
 
The Equality Act was issued in 2007, a reasonable period of time after the second Wave 
of Feminism and the Feminist Linguistic Reform. With this mind, my expectations of 
non-sexist language that have been published throughout the years at first were to 
encounter gender fair language, considering all the different guidelines, which I have 
presented in the second chapter of this thesis. However, in the act I found examples of 
use of the generic “he” and its inflected form as neutral forms. Once again, I will present 
the cases in which the generic “he” is used as the neutral form, while providing both the 
context and the reference.  
 
Concordance Hits of “he” in Context What it Refers to 
Or any other person except A, A treats B less favorably than he treats or 
would treat others (in cases where there is no material 
Person A 
Person’s sexual orientation includes a reference to a sexual orientation 
which he is thought to have.   
Person 
If A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice – (a) which he applies 
or would apply equally to persons not of B’s sexual 
Person A 
(“A”) discriminates against another (“B”) if A treats B lee favorably than 




A person to discriminate against another – (a) in the terms on which he 
offers to dispose of premises to hum, (b) by refusing to dispose 
Person 
Promises to discriminate against an occupier – (a) in the manner in which 
he provides access to a benefit or facility, (b) by refusing access to 
Person managing 
premises 
Anything done by a person as a participant in arrangements under which 
he (for reward or not) takes into his home, and treats as if 
Person 
Accept an application to admit him as a pupil or (c) where he is a pupil of 
the establishment – (i) in the way in which 
Person who is a 
pupil 
Under that section in respect of the publication of the advertisement if he 
proves that – (a) he published in reliance on a statement, made by 
Person  
Respect of the publication of the advertisement if he proved that (a) he 
published in reliance on a statement, made by a person causing the 
Person  
Member, by depriving him of membership, or varying the terms on which 
he is a member, or (c) in the case of an associate, by 
Person member of 
an association 
This regulation- (a) a person is a member of an association if he belongs 
to it by virtue of his admission to any sort of 
Person member of 
an association 
To which this regulation applies, not being a member of it, he has under 
its constitution some or all of the rights enjoyed by 
Person member of 
an association 
Provide benefits only to persons of a particular sexual orientation, if- (a) 
he acts in pursuance of a charitable instrument m and (b) the restriction of 
Person of a 
particular sexual 
orientation 
As the circumstances require. (2) A respondent or potential respondent 
may reply (if he so wishes) to questions served under paragraphs (1)- (a) 
in the form set 
Respondent 
Under these regulations, (b) “potential claimant” means a person which- 
(i) thinks he may have been the subject of an act that is unlawful by 
Person (potential 
claimant) 
Commencement of the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, from 
which he is excluded; (c) to take secret all or part 
Claimant or 
representative  
Paragraph (2) only- (a) in relation to proceedings in England and Wales, 




interest of a 
claimant 
Services Act 1990(a)), or (b) in relation to proceedings in Scotland, if he 





Appointed under paragraph (2) shall not be responsible to the person 
whose interests he is appointed to represent. 
Person appointed 
to represent 
Which is unlawful under these Regulations. (2) A person commits an 
offence if he knowingly or recklessly makes a false statement, in 




Employee it shall be a defense for the employer to prove that he took such 
steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee-  
Employer 
Receives less favourable treatment than another by reason of the fact that 
he has brought (or given evidence in or provided information in 
connection with) 
Person 
Otherwise done anything under or by reference to the Regulations, or 
because he intends to do so. Regulations 4 to 18 prohibit discrimination 
in the provision of  
Person 
 
Table 12 Concordance hits of the term “he” in the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 
 
Nevertheless, this act differs from the others in what I presume to be a possible strategy 
of gender neutralization. When giving examples of types of discrimination, the 
documents introduces the adoption of “person A” and “person B” for the different 
scenarios. Unfortunately, what follows is the use of the generic “he” and its inflected 
forms in both cases. Once again, this might give the idea that the act against sexual 
discrimination appeal more to men than women, considering the fact that both “A” and 
“B” are followed by masculine pronouns. Even when the act is not portraying different 
scenarios of discrimination but presenting other cases belonging to the juridical field, 
terms such as “person”, “advocate” or “claimant” are followed by the generic “he”. 
Overall, there is still the practice of choosing one gender over the other as the feminine 
pronouns in this document are nowhere to be found and women are still made invisible 
through language use. There are again examples of male firstness with “brother or sister” 
(Baker, 2014: 92) but also example of gender-neutral language as in the document 
“spouse” and “civil partner” appear more than one time, as is shown by the example 
below. Other examples involving the masculine pronouns recall the issues of gender and 




(3) In paragraph (1) “near relative” means—  
spouse or civil partner,  
parent or grandparent,  
child or grandchild (whether or not legitimate)  
spouse or civil partner of a child or grandchild,  
brother or sister (whether of full blood or half-blood), and  
any of the relationships listed in sub-paragraphs (b) to (e) that arises through marriage, 
civil partnership or adoption.  
 
3.2.4 The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations  
 
The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 202017 came into force in 2020. For the 
analysis I have proceeded in the same way as with the other three declarations that I have 
decided to include in my corpus. Having background knowledge on what the issues and 
lacks were for the other documents I immediately used the concordance hits features of 
AntConc in order to cover the biggest problematic: the generic “he”. The total absence of 
the generic “he” is the only reason why I was not able to produce a table in which I could 
show the difference instances and the references as I did for the previous declarations. 
 
While bearing that in mind, I uploaded the “.txt” file in the software, as I did for the 
others, and then I started searching for the same term as those reported in Tables 2 and 3. 
As far as pronouns are concern, the only hit that I found included “his” and “her”, which 
are used together in a sentence to avoid the use of one gender only. There is no trace of 
the generic “he” or its inflected forms in the document. Therefore, I knew that it was not 
necessary to search for general nouns such as “minor” or “judge” as I did for the previous 
documents, because the total absence of both male and female pronouns meant that there 
no examples of non-gender-fair language. Other lacks that characterized the first three 
declarations, such as examples of male firstness or jobs associated to male pronouns are 







The notice may be given to an individual— 
by delivering it to the individual, 
by sending it to the individual by post addressed to the individual at his or 
her usual or last-known place of residence or business, or (c) by leaving it for 
the individual at that place. 
 
In these sections I have decided to discuss the most evident features of each declaration, 
which is the use of the “generic he”. As my process involved reading the documents and 
then uploading them in the software, some issues have captured my attention. In the 
following sections I will present a more precise analysis of the corpus, which together 
with what has been presented so far, represent my study on how women are represented 
though language in human rights declarations. 
 
3.3 Other Results of the Analysis 
 
It is important to emphasize that this study did not aim to address only lacks or problems 
within the declarations, but to unveil strengths and strategies which might reflect the 
solution of the issues presented in the previous chapters through the examples of non-
sexist language guidelines. For this specific reason, I have tried to cover a wide range of 
time through the chosen declarations and specifically the last one was intended to show 
how the latest documents actually represent women through language. Even Baker 
(2014), points out the importance of starting the analysis with a neutral and unbiased mind 
set, instead of looking just for the problems and gender differences (Baker, 2014: 19). 
Another important fact is that this analysis aims to be a qualitative corpus analysis rather 
than a quantitative one, as with the former “no attempt is made to assign frequencies to 
the linguistic features which are identified in the data” and do not force a misleading 
interpretation (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 76).  
 
In the previous section I have underlined that one of the main problems of this analysis is 
the use of the generic “he” as the generic pronoun to refer to both men and women. It is 
vital to emphasize that I have chosen the term “he” because in the literature mentioned in 
the previous chapters, it represents an element of sexist language. However, the fact that 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights only has two examples of “he” as the generic 
does not mean that the document is gender-fair. On the contrary, there are many other 
examples of inflected forms that support the use of sexist language throughout the whole 
document (see table 2). 
 
For this specific reason I have then decided to search for more gender-neutral terms within 
the corpus, such as “they” and its inflected forms. Starting with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, I discovered that it occurs in the text, but it used for its grammatical 
function of plural pronoun referring to “men and women” and “human beings” and not 
as a strategy of gender neutralization. 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
 
The very same thing applies to the term “themselves” as it refers to “member states”. 
Ultimately, the plural pronouns are not used as gender-neutral terms, but only to cover 
their grammatical role, as it happens in the other two declarations, which are the Human 
Rights Act and the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations.  
 
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the 
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the Human Rights Act 1998, again, the plural pronoun and its inflected forms are used 
to refer to plural forms such as “articles”, “countries”, “persons” or “restrictions”.  
 
This section applies if— 
a provision of legislation has been declared under section 4 to be incompatible with 
a Convention right and, if an appeal lies— 
all persons who may appeal have stated in writing that they do not intend to do so; 
 
In the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations the term “they” had more 
concordance hits, still it is never used a gender-neutral asset.   
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Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for any person to do anything 
by way of—  
meeting special needs for education, training or welfare of persons on grounds of 
their sexual orientation, or 
 
Lastly in the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations there is still a small presence 
of the plural pronoun “they” and its inflected forms, but in the act other types of strategies 
were adopted to avoid sexist language.  
 
A “joint arrangement” is an arrangement between the holders of shares or rights that 
they will exercise all or substantially all the rights conferred by their respective shares 
or rights jointly in a way that is pre-determined by the arrangement. 
 
I have also searched for feminine pronouns in each declaration because I wanted to make 
sure I had covered all the possibilities and scenarios for my study. I found one use of the 
feminine pronoun “her” in the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations, which I have 
reported in the previous sections. Then, I was able to find concordances hits in the Human 
Rights Act with the pronoun “her”, which according to AntConc occurs seven times, but 
it always used to mention “Her Majesty” the Queen. “She” or its inflected forms do not 
occur neither as a generic pronoun or as a reference to a feminine noun in any documents.  
 
it appears to a Minister of the Crown or Her Majesty in Council that, having regard 
to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights made after the coming into force 
of this section in proceedings against the United Kingdom, 
 
All of the claims made above are supported by the fact that instead of stopping at the 
general context given by the search section of the software, which provides a selection of 
characters before and after the searched terms, I have decided to have a more precise look 
in the “file view” section, where I was able to get a better context of the terms. 
Furthermore, I have used the Concordance Plot function of AntConc, which needs to be 
used when all the documents of the corpora are uploaded into the software. This function 
highlights in which part of the document the term is mostly used, while specifying when 
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the term occurs in the sub-corpora and gives the total number of characters of the 
document.  
 
The most copious hit involved the use of the term “person” as it occurs 263 times in the 
Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations. When I first discovered the amount of 
concordances hit for this term I immediately used the “file view” features to see where 
the term occurred. The reason why “person” appears so many times in this sub-corpus is 
because it is highly repeated. In the act there is the tendency to avoid the use of pronouns 
to elude the predominance of one gender on the other. Below I have reported an example 
of the term “person” which highlight the change of course in the choice of words. In the 
previous documents we would have found a high presence of pronouns instead of trying 





















(2) For the purposes of this regulation a person is “involved in an activity falling 
within regulation 4(2)” if— 
(a) the person is responsible for or engages in such an activity; 
(b) the person facilitates, incites, promotes or provides support for such an 
activity; 
(c) the person conceals evidence of such an activity; 
(d) the person provides financial services, or makes available funds, economic 
resources, goods or technology, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
suspect that those financial services, funds, economic resources, goods or 
technology will or may contribute to such an activity; 
(e) the person provides financial services, or makes available funds, economic 
resources, goods or technology to a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (a); 
(f) the person profits financially or obtains any other benefit from an activity 
falling within regulation 4(2); 
(g) the person is responsible for the investigation or prosecution of such an 
activity and intentionally or recklessly fails to fulfil that responsibility; or 
(h) the person contravenes, or assists with the contravention of, any provision of 
Part 3 of these Regulations. 
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The method that I have adopted for this work has been to read the document before 
uploading it on AntConc to have a general background of what it is used and what is said. 
For that reason, I have started noticing how terms reoccurred. An example of this findings 
is the occurrence of the job title “Secretary of State” which appears 29 times in the 
document. The interesting discovery were not the hits because in the Human Rights Act 
it occurs 44 times, but the fact that in the 2020 Act it was never followed by a pronoun 




6.—(1)  The Secretary of State may not designate a person under regulation unless 
the Secretary of State— 
(a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is an involved person, 
and 
(b) considers that the designation of that person is appropriate, having regard 
to— 
(i) the purposes stated in regulation, and 
(ii) the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they 
appear to the Secretary of State to be on the basis of the information 
that the Secretary of State has). 
 
 
In the first chapter I mentioned Fernand De Saussure and his theory of the synchronic and 
diachronic study of language, which is strictly connected to the work that I have done in 
this chapter. The diachronic variation studies the change of language over time, which is 
one of the aims of this work. Through this corpus analysis I want to identify how the 
representation of women in human rights declaration has change throughout the years. As 
a matter of fact, Tognini Bonelli describes the corpus which presents an analysis of 
language over time as “diachronic corpora” and the first example of this type came from 
the 1960s (Tognini Bonelli E., 2010: 22). Moreover, having a diachronic study has helped 
me to create a parallel with the feminist linguistics reforms, in order to pinpoint whether 
the arguments of non-sexist reforms have actually influenced the language of declaration 
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to have a fair representation of gender. According to this logic, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights should be excluded from the analysis because it was written years before 
the feminist language reform. However, it creates a significant starting point for the 
research as it represents what should be changed or improved, and its gender bias 
elements have paved the way to the analysis of the following declarations. 
 
These examples highlight both how I have worked, but also how the software has been 
useful and time saving. As I have already mentioned, one the best feature is the 
importance given to context, because the user can actually see where and when the term 
is used. For research purposes, I have also looked for feminine pronouns and all of the 
inflected forms but neither of them occurred in the documents, apart from the use of “her” 
associated with “majesty”. In the first chapter I have discussed the issues of language and 
sexism and how the masculine is used as the neutral form, which has been proven by the 
corpus of the three declarations. According to Hadidi, Gharibeh and Aleshzadeh (2015), 
second wave feminism bestow to the generic use of masculine pronouns as the norm one 
of the main sexist aspect of language (Hadidi, et al., 2015: 4). Another reason why the 
masculine pronouns are used as the norm is because the male generic might be used when 
gender is considered irrelevant or when it needed to address a mixed-gender group or 
“referents whose gender is unknown or unspecified” (Sczesny, Formanowicz, Moser, 
2016: 1). Moreover, the use of non-sexist language does not come natural to people and 
making the effort of noticing sexist language is a necessarily step towards gender fair 
language (Hadidi, et al., 2015: 5). 
 
This effort was made by Amnesty International in 2017 as they decided to rewrite the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on their website. Even though the articles have 
been simplified and the preamble has been excluded from their website, people should 
appreciate the turn in the recognition of gender-neutral language. An example of what I 
have just mentioned occurs in article 25, as the version from 1948 states: 
 
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
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sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control.   Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same 
social protection.” 
 
And the renewed version from Amnesty International reports: 
 
“We all have the right to enough food, clothing, housing and healthcare for ourselves 
and our families. We should have access to support if we are out of work, ill, elderly, 
disabled, widowed, or can’t earn a living for reasons outside of our control. An 
expectant mother and her baby should both receive extra care and support. All 
children should have the same rights when they are born.”18 
 
Overall the strategy adopted by Amnesty International in their online version of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to eliminate the use the of generic masculine 
as the neutral form and to use the plural forms with indefinite pronouns which never refers 
to a singular pronoun. They use “we” and its inflected forms to support gender 
neutralization and to make every gender visible in the fundamental human rights.  
 
Moreover, Mucchi-Faina (2005) identifies different strategies to fight the use of the 
generic masculine: using “epicenes”, that is using a word to refer to both genders without 
acknowledging one such as “person”; pluralizing, which means using plural nouns and 
pronouns, which is what Amnesty International opted for; specify the gender when 
salient; using the “splitting” strategy with paired pronouns and nouns, such as “s/he”, as 
I tried to do throughout this thesis; using the feminine instead of the masculine as the 
generic pronoun or even alternate the genders in the text (Mucchi-Faina, 2005: 6-7). As 
a matter of fact, there are many different strategies which could be applied to the 
declaration in order to avoid the use of the masculine as the generic. The strategy of the 
“epicenes” of words such as “person, partner, spouse”, has been used in the declaration 
and through the concordance plot I was able to identify and portray the use of the word 





This section of my thesis was need to highlight the problems of sexist language and in 
which way those issues have been eradicated through language reforms. What I have 
learned through my analysis is that the work that has been done by feminist linguists has 
been successful in the language use of human rights declaration. The process of reforming 
has been slow, because as I show up until 2007 the language was not gender fair and 
many sexist uses were still present. I have mentioned several times the aim of this work 
to report how women are represented through language and in doing so I have tried to 
report the different scenarios. A drastic change in language can be seen between the first 
and the last declarations of my corpus, which are The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations, as in the latter there is no 
trace of sexist language. The chosen strategy is the gender neutralization one, because as 
I have already explained, is the best solution for natural gender languages such as English. 
The final result is a language were the gender is not present and there is no identification 
of occupational titles such as “judge” or “secretary of State” through one gender. The 
different types of frequency lists that I have reported in this chapter are very practicable 
because, especially when compared next to each other, report the change and the gradual 
decrease of sexist terms. Also, the concordances hits which are included in the frequency 
lists, helped me to identify the different uses of the terms that I have searched for, 
especially in the case of neutral terms such as “person” or “everyone” which in the first 
three documents were identified through the male pronoun. I believe that The Global 
Human Rights Sanctions Regulations represent the long-awaited change and the 
realization of the studies of language and gender which have fought for a fair 
representation of women in language. Within the analysis I was able to identify the topics 
that I have provided through the literature of the first two chapters, which have paved the 
way for my final work.  
 
In conclusion, I think that my diachronic study has shown a small part of the linguistic 
change towards a non-sexist language use, and I believe that the study over human rights 
declarations has been very interesting, because I wanted to find out whether the ideas 
expressed in those documents of equality between humans was manifested through 
gender-fair language. That represented a gap in the study of language and gender which 





At the beginning of this thesis I decided to ask two questions, which I have been trying 
to answer through my work and analysis: do women and men speak differently? Are 
women represented fairly through language? The former one has been central especially 
in the first chapter, in which I have quoted the work of Scholars such as Lakoff (1975) 
and Spender (1980), who have focused their work in the analysis of communication 
styles. The two of them together with other academics have focused mainly on the 
differences between the two genders instead of trying to eradicate the gap that has been 
dividing them. Authors such as Coates (2013) and Baker (2014) on the other hand tried 
to provide a different perspective on the subject as they support the notion that is better 
to study similarities instead of differences between the two sexes.  
 
In the first chapter I have presented the three cornerstones that are vital to the 
understanding of the entire work, while at the same time introducing how they are 
connected and their problems. This literature constituted the background knowledge that 
I have considered necessary to proceed with my work in the following chapters. I opened 
my thesis with the presentation of the concept of language and then I went into details on 
the matter of sociolinguistics which represents the linguistic field in which my study 
places itself. Another key point is made by the image of power, especially in the analysis 
of cross-sex conversation, because it is believed that speaking styles belonging to women 
and men possess different levels of power.  
 
I then moved to the topic of gender, which is strictly connected to sex as they are often 
confused with each other. Sex refers to the biological aspect, while gender is socially 
constituted. The common ground between language and gender is represented by the 
different types of language, such as gender natural, grammatical gender and genderless. 
This distinction has been key for the sake of the second chapter. Introducing the feminist 
linguistics was another a major step towards the explanation of the different models which 
have opposite opinions of how the issues of language and gender should be dealt with. I 
have always tried to present both arguments in favor and against in order to have an 
unbiased mind set on the topic. Another vital section has been made by Lakoff (1975), 
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whose work has paved the way for the analysis of women and conversational styles, 
which was then rearranged by Spender (1980) through a more radical point of view. 
Authors like Cameron (1995), which has been one the backbones of this thesis, suggests 
the necessity to overcome this idea of differences between man and women, whose 
opinion as I mentioned above is supported by Coates (2013) and Baker (2014). Also, 
these authors highlight the necessity to stop perceiving women as they lack something in 
their speaking style and instead focus on their skills. 
 
The last topic that I have presented in the first chapter is Sexism, which is probably the 
most important one out of the three. I have tried to give a definition of the phenomenon 
of sexism while explaining that one of the main downsides of it, is making women 
invisible through language. Sexism is strictly connected to the second and third chapter, 
as I have tried to report and eventually find the possible strategies to eradicate it in 
language use. There are many different types of sexist language, such as stereotypes, 
asymmetries, lexical gaps, generic “he”, marked and unmarked terms and semantic 
derogation, which have all been presented and illustrate in the first chapter. This chapter 
overall, presented some of the problematics that needed to be addressed in order to 
possibly overcome the issues of inequality in language. 
 
In the second chapter I have introduced the second question, which gravitates around how 
women are represented through language, which has been supported by Pauwels’s essay 
(2003) and the two different strategies to fight sexist uses in language. The overview of 
the section includes the introduction of the feminist linguistic reforms, the possible 
strategies and a few examples of non-sexist guidelines. The connection between sexism, 
reality and society can be explained by the theory of linguistic relativity, which I have 
presented through both its supporters and critics. Choosing to mention Relativism is 
supported by the fact that it is believed that language influences society, which means 
that using a language that can be described as sexist, influences society but also culture 
and it might create stereotypes that could possibly damage a specific group of people, 




As I already mention the importance of feminist reform, I went into details and report the 
two main concerns which are focused on exposing the representation of women through 
language and debunking the idea that men and women communicate differently. In order 
to do so, authors like Pauwels (2003) presented two different mechanisms: both the 
strategy of gender specification and neutralization are believed to be valid, but their 
outcome is believed to depend on the kind language seeking for a reform. As I presented 
the two strategies I tried to report both strengths and weaknesses. Neutralization aims to 
the elimination of gender relevancy in language, while specification aims to always 
clarify the gender. Here the two different strategies clash against each other, as 
specification believes in the importance of making women visible in language in order to 
highlight the presence of women in specific fields, while neutralization aims to a 
genderless language in which neither women or men are represented through language. 
A link between this section and the first chapter is created because each strategy is 
believed to have a better outcome depending on the language to which is applied. Gender 
neutralization might work at its best in natural gender languages such as English, while 
gender specification is more likely to be applied to grammatical gender languages such 
as Italian. Other key elements that were introduced in this chapter have to do with topics 
such as the elimination of the semantic derogation or the promotion of the “Ms” form 
instead of “Miss” or “Mrs”. In addition, a new question has arisen: can guidelines be 
helpful to eradicate sexist language use?  I have listed a series of examples of non-sexist 
guidelines that were published in different years in order to highlight the efforts that have 
been made in different communities and organizations to prevent the use of biased 
language.  
 
The first two chapters were needed to introduce the work that I was going to present in 
the third part of my thesis. I analyzed the language use in four different human rights 
declarations, while paying particular attention to which terms portrayed or avoided 
sexism in language. My analysis aimed to create a diachronic study and to highlight 
whether in more recent documents language can be consider non-sexist. I was able to find 
a recent regulation of Human Rights which presented many features of non-sexist 
language. Through my analysis I wanted to point out the progress of the language used in 
human rights declaration, and what I concluded from my corpus was that the adoption of 
 
 78 
gender-fair language has been a slow process as up until 2007 there were still traces of 
gender biased with examples like the use of the generic “he” as the neutral forms, which 
has been the main characteristic of the first three declarations, while the fourth one was 
definitely a success of gender neutralization. 
 
Moreover, as I have mentioned in the last sections of the third chapter, organizations such 
as Amnesty International rewrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with non-
sexist language. Still, it is not an official document, but as  Amnesty International is a 
worldwide known organization, this has made me think that people might look at their 
websites more than others. Despite the fact that there were traces of sexist language use, 
the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations presented a strategy of gender 
neutralization or more in general gender unbiased with words such as “person A/B, 
spouse, partner”. This factor needs to be pointed out as the analysis of corpora should not 
focus only on problems and lack, but also on non-sexist strategies, especially when the 
aim of the study is to have an overlook of the transformation of women’s representation 
through language.  
 
Overall, what I have learned through the analysis of the Acts is that there has been a 
change in language use, especially when comparing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations as they represent the opposite 
poles of the corpus. The former is definitely the more problematic one as there are many 
male oriented terms, while in the latter represent the success of a long-awaited process of 
fair representation of both women and men in official documents. Clearly, the use of the 
male generic as the neutral form has proven itself to be the hardest use of sexist language 
to be eradicated, which eventually has been substituted by other strategies, such as the 
adoptions of repetitions. 
 
The mind process for the composition of this thesis has been to cover all the arguments 
necessary to be able to understand the importance and the value of the final study. The 
idea was to going deeper and deeper through each chapter while managing to keep a 
common thread on the overall topic of sexism. My aim was to make sure that different 
counterparts were heard in order to provide an unbiased background, but as I kept on 
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reading and writing I discovered to be quite the challenging task. While the gap that my 
thesis intended to fulfil is on whether the representation of women through language in 
human rights declarations is non-sexist, the aim was to prove through the analysis that 
language issues connected to the misuse of gender can be solved, considering all the 
different guidelines and books on the matter that have been drafted since the 1970s, when 
the study of language and gender began. 
 
A possible criticism that can be moved against my work is that there is a difference in 
length between the first and the other three declarations. However, the language used in 
the four declarations is similar and they all belong to the same field and the aim was to 
look more into the quality of language rather than the quantity of characters contained in 
the documents. The first Act plays a vital role in the analysis because it almost represents 
a litmus test, as it includes different lacks in gender fair language, but also it represent all 
of those documents that were written before the 1970s and the study of Language and 
Gender. Even so, I reported the numbers of terms, but the goal was to give a better 
background to the reader, in order to cover all the aspects of the analysis. Eventually the 
first three documents present all the same issue of the male pronouns used as the neutral 
to represent both women and men, but they also highlight other issues and strategy, while 
the last one, as I already said, can be considered a success of the feminist linguistic reform. 
 
This leads to a final question, which I do believe can summarize what I have being trying 
to prove through my work: why is gender-fair language so important? Whether is it 
masculine or feminine, one gender should never either prevail on the other or be excluded 
from language use. Especially in the case of women representation through language, the 
marginality of one gender does not permit a full portrayal and in the event of women it is 
more and more fundamental to create exemplars of female presences in job applicants, 
job nomenclatures or human rights acts. In my opinion both strategies of specification 
and neutralization are valid and I believe that they can coexist to reform language, because 
one does not exclude the other. It is important to use the appropriate term and the accurate 
gender when referring to people, because it will transmit a sense of importance and value 
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Riassunto in Italiano 
 
L’argomento trattato all’interno della mia tesi riguarda la questione della lingua, del 
genere e del sessismo. Specialmente attraverso quest’ultimo punto sono riuscita a 
costruire la discussione che ha effettivamente composto il mio intero lavoro. Questi tre 
argomenti sono stati le colonne portanti della mia tesi che è andata a costituirsi all’interno 
di tre capitoli che hanno avuto come principale scopo quello di presentare man mano 
l’argomento in modo sempre più dettagliato. La domanda iniziale che mi sono posta 
prima di iniziare la stesura è stata “come vengono rappresentate le donne attraverso la 
lingua?” e più in particolare, ho deciso di analizzare il linguaggio utilizzato all’interno di 
quattro dichiarazioni dei diritti umani creando uno studio diacronico sulle mutazioni 
linguistiche. Ho pensato che potesse essere una ricerca interessante, poiché la mia volontà 
era quella di capire se effettivamente la lingua utilizzata all’interno di questi documenti 
fosse inclusiva nei confronti delle donne, in modo da rendere il messaggio comunicato 
attraverso questi documenti universale per tutti i generi. Le fonti che ho adoperato come 
letteratura hanno come campo quello linguistico, per poi addentrarsi anche nel campo 
della sociolinguistica e della linguistica femminista. Ci sono stati dei testi che più di altri 
hanno influenzato la stesura del mio lavoro, tra cui il testo di Baker (2014) e di Pauwels 
(2003), il primo mi è servito come lingua guida per l’analisi del terzo capitolo, mentre il 
secondo è stato il punto di partenza della mia tesi. Il testo di Pauwels (2003) al suo interno 
racchiude diverse informazioni sul movimento femminista e su come andrebbe 
combattuto il sessismo all’interno della lingua, argomento alquanto importante per il mio 
lavoro che ha trovato una sua collocazione del secondo capitolo. Altri autori e altri testi 
hanno costituito la letteratura di base che è stata fondamentale come conoscenza di base 
per iniziare ad addentrarmi tra le varie problematiche e questioni sollevate dalla 
linguistica femminista. 
 
Ora presenterò in breve il lavoro che è stato condotto e come è stato strutturato. Il primo 
capitolo è sicuramente la parte della mia tesi nella quale ho concentrato la maggioranza 
delle informazioni di base per la comprensione dell’argomento. Sono partita dalla 
questione della lingua cercando di presentare un’infarinatura generale su la parte più 
specifica del linguaggio attraverso le teorie di Saussure e linguisti più contemporanei ai 
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giorni nostri come Chomsky ad esempio, per poi introdurre il concetto di sociolinguistica 
che abbraccia effettivamente il campo in cui si colloca il mio lavoro. Un’altra tematica 
importante è quella del “potere”, inteso però come potere linguistico, che rappresenta una 
sorta di anteprima delle disuguaglianze tra uomo e donna all’interno della lingua, dal 
momento che le caratteristiche linguistiche conferite ad un determinato genere 
comportano anche un certo livello di potere all’interno della conversazione tra sessi.  
 
Nel secondo capitolo ho introdotto il concetto di genere. Immediatamente ho riportato la 
differenza tra sesso e genere, dal momento che il primo rappresenta la componente 
biologica di un individuo mentre la seconda si costruisce socialmente. Ho inoltre 
presentato le diverse classificazioni di genere che spero diano una migliore comprensione 
dell’importanza della distinzione sopracitata. Un altro punto di vista molto interessante è 
quello di McElhinny (2003) che sottolinea come lo studio del genere e delle conversazioni 
tra generi opposti porti a contemplare l’eterosessualità come normativa. La questione 
ruota attorno al fatto che il genere si manifesta al di là della distinzione binaria tra maschio 
e femmina identificata attraverso il sesso, perché è importante non categorizzare un 
genere e identificare determinate caratteristiche che non possono essere modificate nel 
tempo e in base alle esigenze. È quindi errato definire il linguaggio di una donna 
“femminile” perché non è detto che sia sempre quello il caso, ma soprattutto è necessario 
considerare quando effettivamente il genere è saliente e quando crea una vera distinzione 
tra uomo e donna, invece che partire immediatamente con l’idea di differenza tra i due 
sessi. La connessione tra linguaggio e genere è rappresentata dalla classificazione delle 
lingue in tre: a genere naturale, a genere grammaticale e senza genere. Un esempio di 
lingua a genere naturale è l’inglese, dal momento che il genere viene espresso attraverso 
l’utilizzo di pronomi, mentre nel caso delle lingue con genere grammaticale come 
l’Italiano, il genere viene espresso attraverso desinenze e articoli. Infine ci sono le lingue 
senza genere, come il turco, il genere non viene mai espresso attraverso il linguaggio.  
 
Dopo di che mi sono concentrata sulla linguistica femminista, in modo da iniziare a 
introdurre dei tempi più mirati e incentrati sul sessismo. Lo studio della lingua e del 
genere è iniziato a partire dagli anni ’70 e si è concentrato su tutti quegli elementi che 
creavano un’asimmetria tra genere femminile e maschile, cercando di proporre delle 
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soluzioni attraverso le diverse analisi. Ho così riportato i diversi modelli che sono stati 
identificati da Cameron (1995): il “deficit model”, che vede la donna sempre in una 
situazione di svantaggio rispetto agli uomini, includendo anche in questa posizione di 
debolezza anche l’utilizzo della lingua; il secondo approccio è definito “dominance 
model”, nel quale le donne capiscono di avere questo ruolo secondario rispetto alla norma 
maschile; l’ultimo approccio è il “cultural difference model” che sottolinea come donne 
e uomini facciano parte di due subculture diverse e di come proprio per questo motivo 
bisognerebbe cessare il costante paragone tra i due sessi. Gli ultimi due in particolare 
vengono descritti come la rappresentazione di due diversi momenti del femminismo, 
poiché il “dominance model” rappresenta la messa in evidenza delle grandi problematiche 
femminili e l’oppressione del patriarcato mentre il “difference model” è la celebrazione 
del femminismo, cercando inoltre di reclamare tutti quei tratti culturali appartenenti alle 
donne.  
 
Un momento molto importante dello studio della lingua e del genere è stato rappresentato 
dal saggio di Robin Lakoff del 1975 intitolato “Language and Woman’s Place”. La 
questione di base ruota attorno al concetto di linguaggio stilistico, perché grazie al lavoro 
svolto dall’autrice si inizia a parlare di linguaggio femminile e a descriverne 
caratteristiche e limitazioni. Il lavoro di Lakoff (1975) non è passato inosservato, anzi è 
stato criticato per la mancanza di prove empiriche, scatenando però la nascita di quella 
che oggi viene considerata la letteratura sulla lingua e il genere.  
 
Cinque anni il saggio di Lakoff (1975) viene pubblicato il testo di Dale Spender (1980) 
intitolato “Man Made Language” che rappresenta una visione più radicale della 
distinzione del linguaggio maschile e femminile. Le donne appartengono ad una classe 
secondaria della lingua e gli uomini hanno sempre avuto il controllo sulla conversazione. 
La lingua viene considerata come una delle cause dell’oppressione e non come un 
sintomo, dal momento che Spender ritiene che gli uomini esercitino un forte potere sulle 
donne. Sicuramente i testi di Lakoff e Spender rappresentano dei passi importanti nella 
linguistica femminista, ed è proprio per questo motivo che ho voluto dedicargli 




Il primo capitolo si chiude con la presentazione del concetto di sessismo, che viene 
definito come un atteggiamento attraverso il quale si pone il genere come caratteristica 
più importante. In questo caso il sessismo viene presentato come la prevaricazione di un 
genere sull’altro. Una lingua può essere sessista se viene utilizzata per ignorare il ruolo o 
la presenza delle donne, descrivere le donne in modo semplicistico o denigrare le donne. 
Inoltre la presenza di atteggiamenti sessisti può essere identificata in tre diversi modi 
secondo Mills (2008) e Swim and Cohen (1997): “overt” (diretto), che comprende 
evidenti utilizzati di parole e frasi sessiste; “covert” (indiretto), cioè il linguaggio sessista 
viene mascherato da espedienti come l’ironia; “subtle” (discreto), con l’utilizzo di 
stereotipi che vengono giustificati come prassi. Sono stati inoltre identificati i diversi 
elementi sessisti che si possono incontrare. All’interno della mia tesi ho deciso di citare 
quelli tra i più importanti che spiegherò qui in breve, tra cui gli stereotipi, le asimmetrie 
e i gap lessicali, l’uso del maschile come generico, le forme marcate e non marcate e 
infine la derogazione semantica.  
 
Uno stereotipo è la generalizzazione di un gruppo come un’unica entità, creando così 
un’etichetta o un prototipo. È da considerare negativamente quando è denigratorio nei 
confronti delle donne oppure generalizza un comportamento. Riprendendo l’idea riportata 
da Lakoff nel suo lavoro, lei stessa ha creato uno stereotipo identificando il linguaggio 
femminile come subordinato a quello maschile. Per quanto riguarda le asimmetrie e i gap 
lessicali, il loro utilizzo fa si che l’assenza di alcuni termini per identificare un genere 
porti ad uno stato di invisibilità di un genere, che di norma è quello femminile, oppure al 
dare per scontato il ruolo come accade coi termini “family man” del quale non esiste una 
controparte femminile.  Un esempio di asimmetria è riscontrabile nella coppia di parole 
“bachelor-spinster”, in italiano scapolo-zitella in cui è evidente come nel caso del termine 
femminile ci sia una connotazione altamente negativa della donna non sposata. Uno degli 
esempi più importanti di sessismo all’interno della lingua è l’utilizzo del maschile come 
generico, ossia del “generic he”. Viene quindi utilizzato il pronome maschile per 
identificare sia uomini che donne senza prestare però importanza alla necessità di 
rappresentare equamente entrambi i generi. Grazie alla riforma linguistica femminista di 
cui parlerò a breve, c’è stata un’inversione di marcia grazie alla promozione di strategie 
più neutrali, come ad esempio l’utilizzo del plurale oppure l’utilizzo di entrambi i 
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pronomi. Con forme marcate e non marcate si intendono tutti quei termini che necessitano 
la specificazione di genere, cosa che accade molto spesso nei nomi di mestieri sia nel caso 
maschile che femminile, dal momento che si trovano spesso specificazioni del tipo 
“infermiere maschio” e “chirurgo donna”. La derogazione semantica è l’acquisizione di 
un significato negativo di un termine nel corso del tempo, fenomeno che colpisce più 
spesso le parole di genere femminile. Esistono più parole per additare negativamente le 
donne rispetto agli uomini, per questo motivo negli ultimi anni un nuovo fenomeno sta 
prendendo piede, ossia la riappropriazione semantica. È la volontà di eliminare la 
connotazione negativa da un termine cercando di utilizzarlo in termini positivi. 
 
Dopo aver presentato le diverse problematiche nel primo capitolo, l’obiettivo del secondo 
è quello di cercare di riportare le varie possibilità al fine di eliminare l’utilizzo di un 
linguaggio sessista. In questo capitolo il testo di Pauwels (2003) ha ricoperto un ruolo 
molto importante dal momento che ha rappresentato la base per la ricerca di questa 
sezione della mia tesi. Come prima cosa ho riportato la teoria della relatività linguistica, 
che vede nella lingua un mezzo per influenzare la realtà in cui viviamo. Ancora una volta, 
ho cercato di riportare sia testimonianze di autori sia a favore che contro, in modo da 
consentire la formazione di un effettivo pensiero critico sull’argomento essendo 
anch’esso molto dibattuto. Molti linguisti femministi sostengono la teoria di Sapir-Whorf, 
che va appunto a creare il relativismo linguistico, perché sostengono che l’utilizzo di un 
linguaggio sessista sia da supporto anche ad atteggiamenti dello stesso genere.  
 
Lo scopo della riforma linguistica femminista è quello di eliminare l’idea che uomini e 
donne parlano diversamente e a sua volta, eliminare il concetto di subordinazione 
linguistica che ha perseguitato il genere femminile. Un esempio della riforma femminista 
è da ricercare nel termine “Ms” che doveva andare a sostituire il binomio “Mrs” e “Miss”. 
Il problema legato a quest’ultimi si cela nell’importanza che viene affidata allo stato 
maritale delle donne dal momento che non esiste una controparte maschile a questa 
distinzione. Sfortunatamente, secondo diversi studi che sono stati citati nel capitolo, 
ancora oggi viene richiesta la specificazione tra “Mrs”, che indica la donna sposata, e 
“Miss” per una donna celibe. 
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Pauwels (2003) identifica due diverse opzioni per l’eliminazione del sessismo all’interno 
della lingua, ossia la neutralizzazione e la specificazione di genere. Queste due strategie 
si pongono ai due poli opposti, dal momento che la neutralizzazione, come dice la parola 
stessa, mira a diminuire e quindi eliminare l’importanza di genere attraverso 
l’acquisizione di un linguaggio non di parte utilizzando termini neutrali, mentre la 
specificazione vuole aumentare l’importanza del genere assicurandosi un utilizzo corretto 
di pronomi, desinenze e nomi per designare le persone attraverso la lingua. In questo 
capitolo la distinzione tra i tipi di lingua legati al genere diventa di fondamentale 
importanza. In lingue dal genere naturale, come l’inglese, è più facile che la strategia della 
neutralizzazione abbia successo dal momento che il genere viene espresso attraverso 
pronomi, mentre per una lingua di genere grammaticale come l’italiano, sarà meglio 
adoperare la strategia della specificazione dal momento che è impensabile eliminare il 
genere. Per entrambe le strategie ho cercato di riportare sia gli effetti positivi che negativi 
in modo da, ancora una volta, avere tutte le informazioni necessarie per la formazione di 
un pensiero critico e personale sull’argomento.  
 
Come conclusione del secondo capitolo ho deciso di inserire una serie di linee guida che 
sono state pubblicate in diversi anni per sottolineare il ruolo ricoperto dalla riforma 
linguistica, e di come le questioni sulla parità di genere abbiano avuto dei riscontri 
positivi. Ho deciso di citare una linea guida dell’Università degli Studi di Padova poiché 
credo che sia importante sottolineare l’impegno per un linguaggio neutrale anche in 
campo accademico. Considerando il tipo di analisi che avrei condotto nel terzo e ultimo 
capitolo ho deciso di citare due linee guida appartenenti alla Commissione Europea e 
all’UNESCO in modo da evidenziare come la volontà di una parità lessicale sia stata 
abbracciata anche da istituzioni sovranazionali e influenti. 
 
Il terzo capitolo include la parte pratica della mia tesi, dal momento che attraverso 
l’utilizzo di un corpus di quattro documenti e del programma AntConc, ho deciso di 
analizzare la lingua utilizzata all’interno di dichiarazioni di diritti dell’uomo. Come ho 
già citato, l’obiettivo era quello di scoprire se le donne vengono rappresentate equamente 
anche all’interno di testi per i diritti umani, e se la lingua effettivamente rispecchiasse 
l’importanza dell’uguaglianza espressa dai concetti presenti nelle dichiarazioni stesse. 
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Prima di presentare la mia analisi ho deciso di introdurre il campo linguistico in cui si 
colloca lo studio dei corpus, in modo da evidenziare l’importanza di questo tipo di analisi 
e di come lo studio della lingua sia sempre in evoluzione. Ho poi presentato il programma 
adoperato per lo studio dei quattro documenti, introducendo tutte quelle funzioni di 
AntConc che avrei poi utilizzato nell’effettiva analisi.  
 
Il mio corpus si compone di quattro documenti: The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights del 1948, The Human Rights Act 1998, The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations del 2007 e The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations del 2020. Lo 
studio che è stato condotto mirava ad un’analisi diacronica della lingua, quindi lo scopo 
era di osservare i cambiamenti linguistici avvenuti nel corso degli anni nell’eliminare tutti 
quegli elementi di sessismo all’interno della lingua.  
 
Come prima cosa ho letto i documenti e poi ad uno ad uno li ho inseriti all’interno del 
programma. Avendo già avuto un’infarinatura generale attraverso la letteratura dei primi 
capitoli e conoscendo già alcune delle problematiche ho deciso di cercare come prima 
cosa i pronomi al maschile, al femminile e al plurale in modo da avere un quadro completo 
della situazione. Ho inoltre cercato altre parole che sapevo potevano essermi utili nella 
formulazione delle mie conclusioni. Nel terzo capitolo ho inserito numerose tabelle che 
riportano i dati raccolti attraverso la mia analisi, tra cui le liste di frequenza che mi hanno 
permesso di creare un elenco dei termini in base al numero di volte che vengono utilizzati 
nel testo. Ho deciso di concentrarmi sul pronome maschile “he” perché sapevo essere una 
delle problematiche maggiori del linguaggio sessista e conoscendone anche la difficoltà 
nel sostituirlo. Ho poi riportato i dati e i procedimenti che ho eseguito per altri termini 
assieme a spezzoni di testi in modo da rendere ancora più chiare le mie spiegazioni e le 
motivazioni che mi hanno spinto a formulare determinate ipotesi.  
 
La dichiarazione più “problematica” è la “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, 
dal momento che al suo interno compaiono sia l’utilizzo di pronomi strettamente maschili 
ma anche termini non inclusivi nei confronti del genere femminile. Per quanto riguarda 
sia “Human Rights Act” che “The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations”, 
l’utilizzo del pronome maschile si presenta ancora come una problematica essendo spesso 
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affiancato a ruoli di potere e lavori come “segretario di stato” o “giudice”. Questo 
elemento porta all’esclusione del genere femminile, poiché il rischio è che sembri che 
questi ruoli siano ricoperti da uomini e non da donne. L’ultima dichiarazione, “The Global 
Human Rights Sanctions Regulations”, invece rappresenta la riuscita della riforma 
femminista poiché al suo interno non sono presenti pronomi maschili utilizzati come 
generici o concordati con mestieri. Viene utilizzata la strategia della ripetizione per 
evitare di dover specificare il genere, infatti la parola “person” viene ripetuta ben 263 
volte all’interno del documento.  
 
In conclusione, l’obiettivo della mia tesi era quello di capire in che modo le donne 
venissero rappresentate attraverso lingua, ponendo sempre particolare attenzione anche a 
tutti quegli elementi che ho raccolto attraverso la letteratura dei primi due capitoli. È 
evidente come lo sviluppo della lingua all’interno dei documenti per i diritti umani abbia 
intrapreso un percorso lento ma adeguato al fine di dare spazio ad entrambi i generi in 
maniera equa, eliminando tutte quelle caratteristiche sessiste che sembrano far prevalere 
un genere sull’altro. Erano numerose le lacune presenti specialmente nel primo 
documento del 1948, che sono andate via via a dissolversi nel corso degli anni e dei 
documenti. Credo che sia stato comunque importante sottolineare il parallelismo tra le 
date di pubblicazione dei documenti e l’avvento dello studio di lingua e genere e la 
riforma linguistica femminista, poiché ha contribuito fortemente alla sostituzione di tutti 
quegli elementi sessisti del linguaggio in modo da rendere visibili anche il genere 














Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
 
Preamble  
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,   
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,   
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law,   
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,   
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal 
rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom,   
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the 
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms,   
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge,   
Now, therefore,   
The General Assembly,   
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
 
 98 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples 
of territories under their jurisdiction.   
Article I   
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.   
Article 2   
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  Furthermore, no 
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.   
Article 3   
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.   
 
Article 4   
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited 
in all their forms.   
Article 5   
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.   
 
Article 6   
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.   
 
Article 7   
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal 
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.   
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Article 8   
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.   
Article 9   
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.   
 
Article 10   
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him.   
Article 11   
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary 
for his defence.   
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it 
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable 
at the time the penal offence was committed.   
Article 12   
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.   
Article 13   
Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
State.   
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 





Article 14   
Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.   
This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.   
Article 15   
Everyone has the right to a nationality.   
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality.   
Article 16   
Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, 
have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.   
Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.   
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State.   
Article 17   
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.   
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.   
Article 18   
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.   
Article 19   
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 




Article 20   
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.   
No one may be compelled to belong to an association.   
Article 21   
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.   
Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.   
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.   
Article 22   
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with 
the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.   
Article 23   
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.   
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.   
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection.   
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.   
Article 24   
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working 






Article 25   
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control.   
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.   
Article 26   
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.   
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.   
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children.   
Article 27   
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy 
the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.   
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.   
Article 28   
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 





Article 29   
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of 
his personality is possible.   
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.   
These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.   
Article 30   
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 











The Human Rights Act 
 
 
Human Rights Act 1998 
CHAPTER 42 
An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to holders of certain 
judicial offices who become judges of the European Court of Human Rights; and for 
connected purposes. [9th November 1998] 
Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, 
and by the authority of the same, as follows:— 
 
Extent Information 
E1For the extent of this Act outside the U.K., see s. 22(6)(7) 
 
Modifications etc. (not altering text) 
C1 Act: certain functions of the Secretary of State transferred to the Lord Chancellor 
(26.11.2001) by S.I. 2001/3500, arts. 3, 4, Sch. 1 para. 5 
C2 Act (except ss. 5, 10, 18, 19 and Sch. 4): functions of the Lord Chancellor 
transferred to the Secretary of State, and all property, rights and liabilities to which the 
Lord Chancellor is entitled or subject to in connection with any such function transferred 




C3 Act modified (30.1.2020) by Direct Payments to Farmers (Legislative Continuity) 
Act 2020 (c. 2), ss. 2(8), 9(3) 
Introduction 
The Convention Rights. 
In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental freedoms set 
out in— 
Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, 
Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and 
[F1Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol], as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the 
Convention. 
Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any 
designated derogation or reservation (as to which see sections 14 and 15). 
The Articles are set out in Schedule 1. 
The [F2Secretary of State] may by order make such amendments to this Act as he 
considers appropriate to reflect the effect, in relation to the United Kingdom, of a 
protocol. 
In subsection (4) “protocol” means a protocol to the Convention— 
which the United Kingdom has ratified; or 
which the United Kingdom has signed with a view to ratification. 
No amendment may be made by an order under subsection (4) so as to come into 
force before the protocol concerned is in force in relation to the United Kingdom. 
Textual Amendments 
F1 Words in s. 1(1)(c) substituted (22.6.2004) by The Human Rights Act 1998 
(Amendment) Order 2004 (S. I. 2004/1574), art. 2(1) 
F2 Words in s. 1 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
Interpretation of Convention rights. 
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any— 
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judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 
opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the 
Convention, 
decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the 
Convention, whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the 
court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question 
has arisen. 
Evidence of any judgment, decision, declaration or opinion of which account may 
have to be taken under this section is to be given in proceedings before any court or 
tribunal in such manner as may be provided by rules. 
In this section “rules” means rules of court or, in the case of proceedings before a 
tribunal, rules made for the purposes of this section— 
by F3. . . [F4the Lord Chancellor or] the Secretary of State, in relation to any 
proceedings outside Scotland; 
by the Secretary of State, in relation to proceedings in Scotland; or 
by a Northern Ireland department, in relation to proceedings before a tribunal 
in Northern Ireland— 
which deals with transferred matters; and 
for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force. 
Textual Amendments 
F3 Words in s. 2(3)(a) repealed (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(2) 
F4 Words in s. 2(3)(a) inserted (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 8, Sch. para. 3 
 
Modifications etc. (not altering text) 
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C4 S. 2(3)(a): functions of the Secretary of State to be exercisable concurrently with the 
Lord Chancellor (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary 
of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 3(2) (with arts. 4, 5) 
Legislation 
Interpretation of legislation. 
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 
This section— 
applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted; 
does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation; and 
does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of 
revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility. 
Declaration of incompatibility. 
Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a 
provision of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right. 
If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it 
may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
Subsection (4) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a 
provision of subordinate legislation, made in the exercise of a power conferred by 
primary legislation, is compatible with a Convention right. 
If the court is satisfied— 
that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, and 
that (disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary legislation 
concerned prevents removal of the incompatibility, 
it may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
In this section “court” means— 
 [F5(a) the Supreme Court;] 
 
 108 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; 
the [F6Court Martial Appeal Court] ; 
in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court 
or the Court of Session; 
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the Court of 
Appeal. 
[F7(f) the Court of Protection, in any matter being dealt with by the President of 
the Family Division, the [F8Chancellor of the High Court] or a puisne judge of 
the High Court.] 
A declaration under this section (“a declaration of incompatibility”)— 
does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the 
provision in respect of which it is given; and 
is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made. 
Textual Amendments 
F5 S. 4(5)(a) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), ss. 40, 
148, Sch. 9 para. 66(2); S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
F6 Words in s. 4(5)(c) substituted (28.3.2009 for certain purposes and 31.10.2009 
otherwise) by Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52), ss. 378, 383, Sch. 16 para. 156; S.I. 
2009/812, art. 3 (with transitional provisions in S.I. 2009/1059); S.I. 2009/1167, art. 4 
F7 S. 4(5)(f) inserted (1.10.2007) by Mental Capacity Act 2005 (c. 9), ss. 67(1), 68(1)-
(3), Sch. 6 para. 43 (with ss. 27, 28, 29, 62); S.I. 2007/1897, art. 2(1)(c)(d) 
F8 Words in s. 4(5)(f) substituted (1.10.2013) by Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c. 22), s. 
61(3), Sch. 14 para. 5(5); S.I. 2013/2200, art. 3(g) 
Right of Crown to intervene. 
Where a court is considering whether to make a declaration of incompatibility, the 
Crown is entitled to notice in accordance with rules of court. 
In any case to which subsection (1) applies— 
a Minister of the Crown (or a person nominated by him), 
a member of the Scottish Executive, 
a Northern Ireland Minister, 
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a Northern Ireland department, is entitled, on giving notice in accordance with 
rules of court, to be joined as a party to the proceedings. 
Notice under subsection (2) may be given at any time during the proceedings. 
A person who has been made a party to criminal proceedings (other than in Scotland) 
as the result of a notice under subsection (2) may, with leave, appeal to the 
[F9Supreme Court] against any declaration of incompatibility made in the 
proceedings. 
In subsection (4)— 
“criminal proceedings” includes all proceedings before the [F10Court 
Martial Appeal Court]; and 
“leave” means leave granted by the court making the declaration of 
incompatibility or by the [F11Supreme Court] 
Textual Amendments 
F9 Words in s. 5(4) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), 
ss. 40, 148, Sch. 9 para. 66(3); S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
F10 Words in s. 5(5) substituted (28.3.2009 for certain purposes and 31.10.2009 
otherwise) by Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52), ss. 378, 383, Sch. 16 para. 157; S.I. 
2009/812, art. 3 (with transitional provisions in S.I. 2009/1059); S.I. 2009/1167, art. 4 
F11 Words in s. 5(5) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), 
ss. 40, 148, Sch. 9 para. 66(3); S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
 
Modifications etc. (not altering text) 
C5 S. 5(2) functions made exercisable concurrently or jointly with the Welsh Ministers 
by 2006 c. 32, Sch. 3A para. 1 (as inserted (1.4.2018) by Wales Act 2017 (c. 4), s. 71(4), 
Sch. 4 para. 1 (with Sch. 7 paras. 1, 6); S.I. 2017/1179, reg. 3(p)) 
Public authorities 
Acts of public authorities. 
It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right. 
Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if— 
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as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority 
could not have acted differently; or 
in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation 
which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce 
those provisions. 
In this section “public authority” includes— 
a court or tribunal, and 
any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature, but 
does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions 
in connection with proceedings in Parliament. 
F12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of 
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private. 
“An act” includes a failure to act but does not include a failure to— (a)
 introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for legislation; or (b) make 
any primary legislation or remedial order. 
Textual Amendments 
F12 S. 6(4) repealed (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), ss. 40, 146, 
148, Sch. 9 para. 66(4), Sch. 18 Pt. 5; S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d)(f) 
Modifications etc. (not altering text) 
C6S. 6 excluded (5.3.2015) by Infrastructure Act 2015 (c. 7), ss. 8(3)(b), 57(1); S.I. 
2015/481, reg. 2(a) 
C7 S. 6(1) applied (2.10.2000) by 1999 c. 33, ss. 65(2), 170(4); S.I. 2000/2444, art. 2, 
Sch. 1 (subject to transitional provisions in arts. 3, 4, Sch. 2) 
C8S. 6(3)(b) modified (1.12.2008 with exception in art. 2(2) of commencing S.I.) by Health 
and Social 
Care Act 2008 (c. 14), ss. 145(1)-(4), 170 (with s. 145(5)); S.I. 2008/2994, art. 2(1) 
C9 S. 6(3)(b) applied (1.4.2015) by Care Act 2014 (c. 23), s. 73(2)(3)127; S.I. 2015/993, 





A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way 
which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— 
bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court 
or tribunal, or 
rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but 
only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. 
In subsection (1)(a) “appropriate court or tribunal” means such court or tribunal as 
may be determined in accordance with rules; and proceedings against an authority 
include a counterclaim or similar proceeding. 
If the proceedings are brought on an application for judicial review, the applicant is 
to be taken to have a sufficient interest in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, 
or would be, a victim of that act. 
If the proceedings are made by way of a petition for judicial review in Scotland, the 
applicant shall be taken to have title and interest to sue in relation to the unlawful 
act only if he is, or would be, a victim of that act. 
Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— 
the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of 
took place; or 
such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard 
to all the circumstances, 
but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the 
procedure in question. 
In subsection (1)(b) “legal proceedings” includes— 
proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority; and (b)
 an appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal. 
For the purposes of this section, a person is a victim of an unlawful act only if he 
would be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if proceedings 
were brought in the European Court of Human Rights in respect of that act. 
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Nothing in this Act creates a criminal offence. 
In this section “rules” means— 
in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal outside Scotland, rules 
made by F13. . . [F14the Lord Chancellor or] the Secretary of State for the 
purposes of this section or rules of court, 
in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal in Scotland, rules made by 
the Secretary of State for those purposes, 
in relation to proceedings before a tribunal in Northern Ireland— 
which deals with transferred matters; and 
for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force, rules 
made by a Northern Ireland department for those purposes, 
and includes provision made by order under section 1 of the M1Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990. 
In making rules, regard must be had to section 9. 
The Minister who has power to make rules in relation to a particular tribunal may, 
to the extent he considers it necessary to ensure that the tribunal can provide an 
appropriate remedy in relation to an act (or proposed act) of a public authority which 
is (or would be) unlawful as a result of section 6(1), by order add to— (a) the relief 
or remedies which the tribunal may grant; or (b) the grounds on which it may grant 
any of them. 
An order made under subsection (11) may contain such incidental, supplemental, 
consequential or transitional provision as the Minister making it considers 
appropriate. 




F13 Words in s. 7(9)(a) repealed (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(2) 
F14 Words in s. 7(9)(a) inserted (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 8, Sch. para. 3, 
Modifications etc. (not altering text) 
C10 S. 7 amended (2.10.2000) by Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23), 
ss. 65(2)(a), 83 (with s. 82(3); S.I. 2000/2543, art. 3 
C11S. 7: referred to (11.3.2005) by Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 ( c. 2), {s. 11(2)} 
C12 S. 7(9)(a): functions of the Secretary of State to be exercisable concurrently with the 
Lord Chancellor (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary 
of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 3(2) (with arts. 4, 5) 
C13S. 7(11): functions of the Secretary of State to be exercisable concurrently with the Lord 
Chancellor 
(12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State) 
Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 3(2) (with arts. 4, 5) 
Judicial remedies. 
In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is 
(or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, 
within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. 
But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to award damages, 
or to order the payment of compensation, in civil proceedings. 
No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances 
of the case, including— 
any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in 
question (by that or any other court), and 
the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that 
act, 
the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the 




whether to award damages, or 
the amount of an award, the court must take into account the principles applied 
by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of 
compensation under Article 41 of the Convention. 
A public authority against which damages are awarded is to be treated— 
in Scotland, for the purposes of section 3 of the M2Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 as if the award were made in an action of 
damages in which the authority has been found liable in respect of loss or 
damage to the person to whom the award is made; 
for the purposes of the M3Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 as liable in 
respect of damage suffered by the person to whom the award is made. 
In this section— 
“court” includes a tribunal; 
“damages” means damages for an unlawful act of a public authority; 
and “unlawful” means unlawful under section 6(1). 
Judicial acts. 
Proceedings under section 7(1)(a) in respect of a judicial act may be brought only— 
(a) by exercising a right of appeal; 
(b) on an application (in Scotland a petition) for judicial review; or 
(c) in such other forum as may be prescribed by rules. 
That does not affect any rule of law which prevents a court from being the subject 
of judicial review. 
In proceedings under this Act in respect of a judicial act done in good faith, damages 
may not be awarded otherwise than to compensate a person to the extent required 
by Article 5(5) of the Convention. 
An award of damages permitted by subsection (3) is to be made against the Crown; 
but no award may be made unless the appropriate person, if not a party to the 
proceedings, is joined. 
In this section— 
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“appropriate person” means the Minister responsible for the court 
concerned, or a person or government department nominated by him; 
“court” includes a tribunal; 
“judge” includes a member of a tribunal, a justice of the peace [F15(or, 
in Northern Ireland, a lay magistrate)] and a clerk or other officer 
entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of a court; 
“judicial act” means a judicial act of a court and includes an act done 
on the instructions, or on behalf, of a judge; and 
“rules” has the same meaning as in section 7(9). 
Textual Amendments 
F15Words in definition s. 9(5) inserted (N.I.)(1.4.2005) by 2002 c. 26, s. 10(6), Sch. 4 para. 
39; S.R. 
2005/109, art. 2 Sch. 
Remedial action 
10 Power to take remedial action. 
This section applies if— 
a provision of legislation has been declared under section 4 to be incompatible 
with a Convention right and, if an appeal lies— 
all persons who may appeal have stated in writing that they do not 
intend to do so; 
the time for bringing an appeal has expired and no appeal has been 
brought within that time; or 
an appeal brought within that time has been determined or 
abandoned; or 
it appears to a Minister of the Crown or Her Majesty in Council that, having 
regard to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights made after the 
coming into force of this section in proceedings against the United Kingdom, 
a provision of legislation is incompatible with an obligation of the United 
Kingdom arising from the Convention. 
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If a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for proceeding 
under this section, he may by order make such amendments to the legislation as he 
considers necessary to remove the incompatibility. 
If, in the case of subordinate legislation, a Minister of the Crown considers— 
that it is necessary to amend the primary legislation under which the 
subordinate legislation in question was made, in order to enable the 
incompatibility to be removed, and 
that there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this section, he may by 
order make such amendments to the primary legislation as he considers 
necessary. 
This section also applies where the provision in question is in subordinate legislation 
and has been quashed, or declared invalid, by reason of incompatibility with a 
Convention right and the Minister proposes to proceed under paragraph 2(b) of 
Schedule 2. 
If the legislation is an Order in Council, the power conferred by subsection (2) or 
(3) is exercisable by Her Majesty in Council. 
In this section “legislation” does not include a Measure of the Church Assembly or 
of the General Synod of the Church of England. 
Schedule 2 makes further provision about remedial orders. 
Other rights and proceedings 
Safeguard for existing human rights. 
A person’s reliance on a Convention right does not restrict— 
any other right or freedom conferred on him by or under any law having effect 
in any part of the United Kingdom; or 
his right to make any claim or bring any proceedings which he could make or 





Freedom of expression. 
This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. 
If the person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is 
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is 
satisfied— 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; 
or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be 
notified. 
No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the 
court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not 
be allowed. 
The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the 
respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic 
material (or to conduct connected with such material), to— (a) the extent to which— 
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published; (b) any relevant privacy code. 
In this section— 
“court” includes a tribunal; and 
“relief” includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings). 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the 
exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the 
Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have 
particular regard to the importance of that right. 




Derogations and reservations 
Derogations. 
In this Act “designated derogation” means— F16 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
any derogation by the United Kingdom from an Article of the Convention, 
or of any protocol to the Convention, which is designated for the purposes 
of this Act in an order made by the [F17Secretary of State] 
F18 
If a designated derogation is amended or replaced it ceases to be a designated 
derogation. 
But subsection (3) does not prevent the [F19Secretary of State] from exercising his 
power under subsection (1) F20. . . to make a fresh designation order in respect of the 
Article concerned. 
The [F21Secretary of State] must by order make such amendments to Schedule 3 as 
he considers appropriate to reflect— 
any designation order; or (b) the effect of subsection (3). 
A designation order may be made in anticipation of the making by the United 
Kingdom of a proposed derogation. 
Textual Amendments 
F16S. 14(1): from “(a)” to “(b)” repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 2001/1216, art. 2(a) 
F17 Words in s. 14 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
F18S. 14(2) repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 2001/1216, art. 2(b) 
F19 Words in s. 14 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
F20S. 14(4): “(b)” repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 2001/1216, art. 2(c) 
F21 Words in s. 14 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
Reservations. 
In this Act “designated reservation” means— 
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the United Kingdom’s reservation to Article 2 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention; and 
any other reservation by the United Kingdom to an Article of the Convention, 
or of any protocol to the Convention, which is designated for the purposes of 
this Act in an order made by the [F22Secretary of State] . 
The text of the reservation referred to in subsection (1)(a) is set out in Part II of 
Schedule 3. 
If a designated reservation is withdrawn wholly or in part it ceases to be a designated 
reservation. 
But subsection (3) does not prevent the [F23Secretary of State] from exercising his 
power under subsection (1)(b) to make a fresh designation order in respect of the 
Article concerned. 
[F24Secretary of State] must by order make such amendments to this Act as he 
considers appropriate to reflect— (a) any designation order; or 
 (b) the effect of subsection (3). 
Textual Amendments 
F22Words in s. 15 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 
(S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
F23Words in s. 15 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 
(S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
F24 Words in s. 15 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
Period for which designated derogations have effect. 
If it has not already been withdrawn by the United Kingdom, a designated 
derogation ceases to have effect for the purposes of this Act— F25 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . ., at the end of the period of five years beginning with the date on which 
the order designating it was made. 
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At any time before the period— 
fixed by subsection (1) F26. . ., or 
extended by an order under this subsection, comes to an end, the [F27Secretary 
of State] may by order extend it by a further period of five years. 
An order under section 14(1) F28. . . ceases to have effect at the end of the period for 
consideration, unless a resolution has been passed by each House approving the 
order. 
Subsection (3) does not affect— 
anything done in reliance on the order; or 
the power to make a fresh order under section 14(1) F28. . .. 
In subsection (3) “period for consideration” means the period of forty days 
beginning with the day on which the order was made. 
In calculating the period for consideration, no account is to be taken of any time 
during which— 
Parliament is dissolved or prorogued; or 
both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. 
If a designated derogation is withdrawn by the United Kingdom, the [F29Secretary 
of State] must by order make such amendments to this Act as he considers are 
required to reflect that withdrawal. 
Textual Amendments 
F25S. 16(1): words from “(a)” to “any other derogation” repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 
2001/1216, art. 3(a) 
F26Words in s. 16(2)(a) repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 2001/1216, art. 3(b) 
F27 Words in s. 16 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(1) 
F28S. 16(3)(4)(b): “(b)” repealed (1.4.2001) by S.I. 2001/1216, art. 3(c)(d) 
F29 Words in s. 16 substituted (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 





Periodic review of designated reservations. 
The appropriate Minister must review the designated reservation referred to in 
section 15(1)(a)— 
before the end of the period of five years beginning with the date on which 
section 1(2) came into force; and 
if that designation is still in force, before the end of the period of five years 
beginning with the date on which the last report relating to it was laid under 
subsection (3). 
The appropriate Minister must review each of the other designated reservations (if 
any)— 
before the end of the period of five years beginning with the date on which the 
order designating the reservation first came into force; and 
if the designation is still in force, before the end of the period of five years 
beginning with the date on which the last report relating to it was laid under 
subsection (3). 
The Minister conducting a review under this section must prepare a report on the 
result of the review and lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament. 
Judges of the European Court of Human Rights 
18 Appointment to European Court of Human Rights. 
In this section “judicial office” means the office of— 
Lord Justice of Appeal, Justice of the High Court or Circuit judge, in England 
and Wales; 
judge of the Court of Session or sheriff, in Scotland; 
Lord Justice of Appeal, judge of the High Court or county court judge, in 
Northern Ireland. 
The holder of a judicial office may become a judge of the European Court of Human 
Rights (“the Court”) without being required to relinquish his office. 
But he is not required to perform the duties of his judicial office while he is a judge 
of the Court. 
 
 122 
In respect of any period during which he is a judge of the Court— 
a Lord Justice of Appeal or Justice of the High Court is not to count as a judge 
of the relevant court for the purposes of section 2(1) or 4(1) of the [F30Senior 
Courts Act 1981] (maximum number of judges) nor as a judge of the 
[F31Senior Courts] for the purposes of section 12(1) to (6) of that Act (salaries 
etc.); 
a judge of the Court of Session is not to count as a judge of that court for the 
purposes of section 1(1) of the M4Court of Session Act 1988 (maximum 
number of judges) or of section 9(1)(c) of the M5Administration of Justice Act 
1973 (“the 1973 Act”) (salaries etc.); 
a Lord Justice of Appeal or judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland is not 
to count as a judge of the relevant court for the purposes of section 2(1) or 3(1) 
of the M6Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (maximum number of judges) 
nor as a judge of the [F32Court of Judicature] of Northern Ireland for the 
purposes of section 9(1)(d) of the 1973 Act (salaries etc.); 
a Circuit judge is not to count as such for the purposes of section 18 of the M7 
Courts Act 1971 (salaries etc.); 
a sheriff is not to count as such for the purposes of section 14 of the M8Sheriff 
Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 (salaries etc.); 
a county court judge of Northern Ireland is not to count as such for the 
purposes of section 106 of the M9County Courts Act Northern Ireland) 1959 
(salaries etc.). 
If a sheriff principal is appointed a judge of the Court, section 11(1) of the M10Sheriff 
Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 (temporary appointment of sheriff principal) applies, 
while he holds that appointment, as if his office is vacant. 
Schedule 4 makes provision about judicial pensions in relation to the holder of a 
judicial office who serves as a judge of the Court. 
The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State may by order make such transitional 
provision (including, in particular, provision for a temporary increase in the 
maximum number of judges) as he considers appropriate in relation to any holder of 
a judicial office who has completed his service as a judge of the Court. 
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[F33(7A) The following paragraphs apply to the making of an order under subsection (7) 
in relation to any holder of a judicial office listed in subsection (1)(a)— 
before deciding what transitional provision, it is appropriate to make, the 
person making the order must consult the Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales; 
before making the order, that person must consult the Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales. 
(7B) The following paragraphs apply to the making of an order under subsection (7) 
in relation to any holder of a judicial office listed in subsection (1)(c)— 
before deciding what transitional provision it is appropriate to make, the 
person making the order must consult the Lord Chief Justice of Northern 
Ireland; 
before making the order, that person must consult the Lord Chief Justice of 
Northern Ireland. 
(7C) The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales may nominate a judicial office 
holder (within the meaning of section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) 
to exercise his functions under this section. 
(7D) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of the following 
to exercise his functions under this section— 
the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2002; 
a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).] 
 
Textual Amendments 
F30Words in s. 18(4)(a) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), 
ss. 59, 148, 
Sch. 11 para. 4; S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
F31Words in s. 18(4)(a) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), 
ss. 59, 148, 
Sch. 11 para. 4; S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
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F32 Words in s. 18(4)(c) substituted (1.10.2009) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 
4), ss. 59, 148, Sch. 11 para. 6; S.I. 2009/1604, art. 2(d) 
F33 S. 18(7A)-(7D) inserted (3.4.2006) by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4), ss. 15, 
148, Sch. 4 para. 278; S.I. 2006/1014, art. 2, Sch. 1 para. 11(v) 
 
Parliamentary procedure 
19 Statements of compatibility. 
A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament must, 
before Second Reading of the Bill— 
make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are 
compatible with the Convention rights (“a statement of compatibility”); or 
make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement 
of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed 
with the Bill. 
The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner as the Minister 
making it considers appropriate. 
Supplemental 
Orders etc. under this Act. 
Any power of a Minister of the Crown to make an order under this Act is exercisable 
by statutory instrument. 
The power of F34. . . [F35the Lord Chancellor or] the Secretary of State to make rules 
(other than rules of court) under section 2(3) or 7(9) is exercisable by statutory 
instrument. 
Any statutory instrument made under section 14, 15 or 16(7) must be laid before 
Parliament. 
No order may be made by F36. . . [F37the Lord Chancellor or] the Secretary of State 
under section 1(4), 7(11) or 16(2) unless a draft of the order has been laid before, 
and approved by, each House of Parliament. 
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Any statutory instrument made under section 18(7) or Schedule 4, or to which 
subsection (2) applies, shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of 
either House of Parliament. 
The power of a Northern Ireland department to make— 
rules under section 2(3)(c) or 7(9)(c), or 
an order under section 7(11), is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes 
of the M11Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979. 
Any rules made under section 2(3)(c) or 7(9)(c) shall be subject to negative 
resolution; and section 41(6) of the M12Interpretation Act Northern Ireland) 1954 
(meaning of “subject to negative resolution”) shall apply as if the power to make the 
rules were conferred by an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
No order may be made by a Northern Ireland department under section 7(11) unless 
a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by, the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. 
Textual Amendments 
F34 Words in s. 20(2) repealed (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(2) 
F35 Words in s. 20(2) inserted (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 8, Sch. para. 3 
F36 Words in s. 20(4) repealed (19.8.2003) by The Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs Order 2003 (S. I. 2003/1887), art. 9, Sch. 2 para. 10(2) 
F37 Words in s. 20(4) inserted (12.1.2006) by The Transfer of Functions (Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/3429), art. 8, Sch. para. 3 
Interpretation, etc. 
In this Act— 
“amend” includes repeal and apply (with or without modifications); 
“the appropriate Minister” means the Minister of the Crown having 
charge of the appropriate authorised government department (within 
the meaning of the M13Crown Proceedings Act 1947); 




“the Convention” means the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, agreed by the Council of Europe 
at Rome on 4th November 1950 as it has effect for the time being in 
relation to the 
United Kingdom; 
“declaration of incompatibility” means a declaration under section 4; 
“Minister of the Crown” has the same meaning as in the Ministers of 
the M14 Crown Act 1975; 
“Northern Ireland Minister” includes the First Minister and the deputy 
First 
Minister in Northern Ireland; 
“primary legislation” means any— 
public general Act; 
local and personal Act; 
private Act; 
Measure of the Church Assembly; 
Measure of the General Synod of the Church of England; 
Order in Council— 
made in exercise of Her Majesty’s Royal Prerogative; 
made under section 38(1)(a) of the M15Northern Ireland Constitution Act 
1973 or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; or 
amending an Act of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); 
and includes an order or other instrument made under primary 
legislation (otherwise than by the [F38Welsh Ministers, the First 
Minister for Wales, the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly 
Government,] a member of the Scottish Executive, a Northern Ireland 
Minister or a Northern Ireland department) to the extent to which it 
operates to bring one or more provisions of that legislation into force 
or amends any primary legislation; 
“the First Protocol” means the protocol to the Convention agreed at 
Paris on 20th March 1952; F39 
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. . . 
“the Eleventh Protocol” means the protocol to the Convention 
(restructuring the control machinery established by the Convention) 
agreed at Strasbourg on 11th May 1994; 
[F40“the Thirteenth Protocol” means the protocol to the Convention 
(concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances) 
agreed at 
Vilnius on 3rd May 2002;] 
“remedial order” means an order under section 10; 
“subordinate legislation” means any— 
(a) Order in Council other than one— 
made in exercise of Her Majesty’s Royal Prerogative; 
made under section 38(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 
1973 or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; or 
(iii) amending an Act of a kind mentioned in the definition of primary 
legislation; 
(b) Act of the Scottish Parliament; 
(ba) [F41Measure of the National Assembly for Wales; 
(bb) Act of the National Assembly for Wales;] 
Act of the Parliament of Northern Ireland; 
Measure of the Assembly established under section 1 of the M16Northern 
Ireland Assembly Act 1973; 
Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly; 
order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument 
made under primary legislation (except to the extent to which it operates 
to bring one or more provisions of that legislation into force or amends 
any primary legislation); 
order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument 
made under legislation mentioned in paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) or 
made under an Order in Council applying only to Northern Ireland; 
order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other instrument 
made by a member of the Scottish Executive [F42, Welsh Ministers, the 
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First Minister for Wales, the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly 
Government,] a Northern Ireland Minister or a Northern Ireland 
department in exercise of prerogative or other executive functions of 
Her Majesty which are exercisable by such a person on behalf of Her 
Majesty; 
“transferred matters” has the same meaning as in the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998; and 
“tribunal” means any tribunal in which legal proceedings may be brought. 
The references in paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 2(1) to Articles are to Articles of 
the Convention as they had effect immediately before the coming into force of the 
Eleventh Protocol. 
The reference in paragraph (d) of section 2(1) to Article 46 includes a reference to 
Articles 32 and 54 of the Convention as they had effect immediately before the 
coming into force of the Eleventh Protocol. 
The references in section 2(1) to a report or decision of the Commission or a decision 
of the Committee of Ministers include references to a report or decision made as 
provided by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of Article 5 of the Eleventh Protocol (transitional 
provisions). 
F43. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Extent Information 
E2For the extent of s. 21 outside the U.K. see s. 22(7) 
 
Textual Amendments 
F38 Words in the definition of "primary legislation" in s. 21(1) substituted by 
Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32), s. 160(1), Sch. 10 para.56(2) (with Sch. 11 para. 
22) the amending provision coming into force immediately after "the 2007 election" (held 
on 3.5.2007) subject to s. 161(4)(5) of the amending Act, which provides for certain 
provisions to come into force for specified purposes immediately after 
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the end of "the initial period" (which ended with the day of the first appointment of a 
First Minister on 
25.5.2007) - see ss. 46, 161(1)(4)(5) of the amending Act. 
F39 S. 21(1): definition of "the Sixth Protocol" omitted (22.6.2004) by virtue of The 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/1574), art. 2(2) 
F40 S. 21(1): definition of "the Thirteenth Protocol" inserted (22.6.2004) by virtue of 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/1574), art. 2(2) 
F41 Words in the definition of "subordinate legislation" in s. 21(1) substituted by 
Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32), s. 160(1), Sch. 10 para.56(3) (with Sch. 11 para. 
22) the amending provision coming into force immediately after "the 2007 election" (held 
on 3.5.2007) subject to s. 161(4)(5) of the amending Act, which provides for certain 
provisions to come into force for specified purposes immediately after the end of "the initial 
period" (which ended with the day of the first appointment of a First Minister on 
25.5.2007) - see ss. 46, 161(1)(4)(5) of the amending Act. 
F42 Words in the definition of "subordinate legislation" in s. 21(1) substituted by 
Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32), s. 160(1), Sch. 10 para.56(4) (with Sch. 11 para. 
22) the amending provision coming into force immediately after "the 2007 election" (held 
on 3.5.2007) subject to s. 161(4)(5) of the amending Act, which provides for certain 
provisions to come into force for specified purposes immediately after the end of "the initial 
period" (which ended with the day of the first appointment of a First Minister on 
25.5.2007) - see ss. 46, 161(1)(4)(5) of the amending Act. 
F43S. 21(5) repealed (28.3.2009 for certain purposes and prosp. otherwise) by Armed Forces 
Act 2006 
(c. 52), ss. 378, 383, Sch. 17; S.I. 2009/812, art. 3 (with transitional provisions in S.I. 
2009/1059) 
22 Short title, commencement, application and extent. 
This Act may be cited as the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Sections 18, 20 and 21(5) and this section come into force on the passing of this Act. 
The other provisions of this Act come into force on such day as the Secretary of 




Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 7 applies to proceedings brought by or at 
the instigation of a public authority whenever the act in question took place; but 
otherwise that subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the coming 
into force of that section. 
This Act binds the Crown. 
This Act extends to Northern Ireland. 
February 2020. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. 
Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with 
annotations. (See end of Document for details) View outstanding changes 
Subordinate Legislation Made 
P1S. 22(3) power partly exercised: 24.11.1998 appointed for specified provisions by S.I. 
1998/2882, art. 
2 
S. 22(3) power fully exercised: 2.10.2000 appointed for remaining provisions by S.I. 
2000/1851, art. 2 
 
Textual Amendments 
F44S. 22(7) repealed (28.3.2009 for certain purposes and prosp. otherwise) by Armed Forces 
Act 2006 










RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
ARTICLE 2 
RIGHT TO LIFE 
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
ARTICLE 3 
PROHIBITION OF TORTURE 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
ARTICLE 4 
PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY AND FORCED 
LABOUR 1 No one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude. 
No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not include: 
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any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed 
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during 
conditional release from such detention; 
any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in 
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory 
military service; 
any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life 
or well-being of the community; 
any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
ARTICLE 5 
RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND SECURITY 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law; 
the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before 
the competent legal authority; 
the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts 
or vagrants; 
the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
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Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this 
Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release 
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
ARTICLE 6 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to 
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing 
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it 
free when the interests of justice so require; 
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to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. 
ARTICLE 7 
NO PUNISHMENT WITHOUT LAW 
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
ARTICLE 8 
RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 






FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
ARTICLE 10 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
ARTICLE 11 
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
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association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of his interests. 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. 
 
ARTICLE 12 
RIGHT TO MARRY 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
ARTICLE 14 
PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status. 
ARTICLE 16 
RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ALIENS 
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting 






PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention. 
ARTICLE 18 
LIMITATION ON USE OF RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHTS 
The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not 
be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed. 
 
PART II 
THE FIRST PROTOCOL 
ARTICLE 1 
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
ARTICLE 2 
RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which 
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of 





RIGHT TO FREE ELECTIONS 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by 
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature. 
[F45PART 3 
ARTICLE 1 OF THE THIRTEENTH PROTOCOL 
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or 
executed.] 
SCHEDULE 2 – Remedial 
Orders 
Document Generated: 2020-








THE SIXTH PROTOCOL 
ARTICLE 1 
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
ARTICLE 2 
DEATH PENALTY IN TIME OF WAR 
 SCHEDULE 2 Section 10. 
REMEDIAL ORDERS 
Orders 
1 (1) A remedial order may— 
contain such incidental, supplemental, consequential or transitional provision 
as the person making it considers appropriate; 
be made so as to have effect from a date earlier than that on which it is made; 
(c) make provision for the delegation of specific functions; (d) make different 
provision for different cases. 
The power conferred by sub-paragraph (1)(a) includes— 
power to amend primary legislation (including primary legislation other than 
that which contains the incompatible provision); and 
power to amend or revoke subordinate legislation (including subordinate 
legislation other than that which contains the incompatible provision). 
A remedial order may be made so as to have the same extent as the legislation 
which it affects. 
No person is to be guilty of an offence solely as a result of the retrospective effect 
of a remedial order. 
Procedure 
2 No remedial order may be made unless— 
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a draft of the order has been approved by a resolution of each House of 
Parliament made after the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the 
day on which the draft was laid; or 
it is declared in the order that it appears to the person making it that, because 
of the urgency of the matter, it is necessary to make the order without a draft 
being so approved. 
SCHEDULE 2 – Remedial Orders 
Orders laid in draft 
3 (1) No draft may be laid under paragraph 2(a) unless— 
the person proposing to make the order has laid before Parliament a 
document which contains a draft of the proposed order and the required 
information; and 
the period of 60 days, beginning with the day on which the document 
required by this sub-paragraph was laid, has ended. 
(2) If representations have been made during that period, the draft laid under paragraph 
2(a) must be accompanied by a statement containing— 
a summary of the representations; and 
if, as a result of the representations, the proposed order has been changed, 
details of the changes. 
Urgent cases 
4 (1) If a remedial order (“the original order”) is made without being approved in draft, 
the person making it must lay it before Parliament, accompanied by the required 
information, after it is made. 
If representations have been made during the period of 60 days beginning with the 
day on which the original order was made, the person making it must (after the end 
of that period) lay before Parliament a statement containing— 
a summary of the representations; and 
if, as a result of the representations, he considers it appropriate to make 
changes to the original order, details of the changes. 
If sub-paragraph (2)(b) applies, the person making the statement must— 
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make a further remedial order replacing the original order; and (b) lay the 
replacement order before Parliament. 
If, at the end of the period of 120 days beginning with the day on which the original 
order was made, a resolution has not been passed by each House approving the 
original or replacement order, the order ceases to have effect (but without that 
affecting anything previously done under either order or the power to make a fresh 
remedial order). 
Definitions 
5 In this Schedule— 
“representations” means representations about a remedial order (or 
proposed remedial order) made to the person making (or proposing 
to make) it and includes any relevant Parliamentary report or 
resolution; and 
“required information” means— 
an explanation of the incompatibility which the order (or proposed 
order) seeks to remove, including particulars of the relevant 
declaration, finding or order; and 
a statement of the reasons for proceeding under section 10 and for 
making an order in those terms. 
SCHEDULE 3 – Derogation and Reservation 
Calculating periods 
6 In calculating any period for the purposes of this Schedule, no account is to be taken 
of any time during which— 
Parliament is dissolved or prorogued; or 
both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. 
[F497 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to– 
(a) any remedial order made, and any draft of such an order proposed 
to be made,– 
by the Scottish Ministers; or 
within devolved competence (within the meaning of the Scotland 
Act 1998) by Her Majesty in Council; and 
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(b) any document or statement to be laid in connection with such an order (or 
proposed order). 
This Schedule has effect in relation to any such order (or proposed order), 
document or statement subject to the following modifications. 
Any reference to Parliament, each House of Parliament or both Houses of 
Parliament shall be construed as a reference to the Scottish Parliament. 
Paragraph 6 does not apply and instead, in calculating any period for the purposes 
of this Schedule, no account is to be taken of any time during which the Scottish 
Parliament is dissolved or is in recess for more than four days.] 
  
SCHEDULE 3 Sections 14 and 15. 
DEROGATION AND RESERVATION 
F50F50 




F50 Sch. 3 Pt. I repealed (8.4.2005) by The Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 
2005 (S.I. 2005/1071), art. 2 
United Kingdom’s derogation from Article 5(1) 
SCHEDULE 4 – Judicial Pensions 
PART II 
RESERVATION 
At the time of signing the present (First) Protocol, I declare that, in view of certain 
provisions of the Education Acts in the United Kingdom, the principle affirmed in the 
second sentence of Article 2 is accepted by the United Kingdom only so far as it is 
compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of 
unreasonable public expenditure. 
Dated 20 March 1952 
 
 143 
Made by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe. 
 SCHEDULE 4 Section 18(6). 
JUDICIAL PENSIONS 
Duty to make orders about pensions 
1 (1) The appropriate Minister must by order make provision with respect to pensions 
payable to or in respect of any holder of a judicial office who serves as an ECHR judge. 
(2) A pensions order must include such provision as the Minister making it 
considers is necessary to secure that— 
an ECHR judge who was, immediately before his appointment as an ECHR 
judge, a member of a judicial pension scheme is entitled to remain as a 
member of that scheme; 
the terms on which he remains a member of the scheme are those which 
would have been applicable had he not been appointed as an ECHR judge; 
and 
entitlement to benefits payable in accordance with the scheme continues to 
be determined as if, while serving as an ECHR judge, his salary was that 
which would (but for section 18(4)) have been payable to him in respect of 
his continuing service as the holder of his judicial office. 
Contributions 
2 A pensions order may, in particular, make provision— 
for any contributions which are payable by a person who remains a member 
of a scheme as a result of the order, and which would otherwise be payable 
by deduction from his salary, to be made otherwise than by deduction from 
his salary as an ECHR judge; and 
for such contributions to be collected in such manner as may be determined 
by the administrators of the scheme. 
SCHEDULE 4 – Judicial 
Pensions 
Amendments of other enactments 
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3 A pensions order may amend any provision of, or made under, a pensions Act in such 
manner and to such extent as the Minister making the order considers necessary or 
expedient to ensure the proper administration of any scheme to which it relates. 
Definitions 
4 In this Schedule— 
“appropriate Minister” means— 
in relation to any judicial office whose jurisdiction is exercisable 
exclusively in relation to Scotland, the Secretary of State; and 
otherwise, the Lord Chancellor; 
“ECHR judge” means the holder of a judicial office who is serving 
as a judge of the Court; 
“judicial pension scheme” means a scheme established by and in 
accordance with a pensions Act; 
“pensions Act” means— 
the M17County Courts Act Northern Ireland) 1959; 
the M18Sheriffs’ Pensions (Scotland) Act 1961; 
the M19Judicial Pensions Act 1981; or 
the M20Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993; 
[F51the Public Service Pensions Act 2013;] and 
“pensions order” means an order made under paragraph 1. 
 
Textual Amendments 
F51 Words in Sch. 4 para. 4 inserted (1.4.2014) by Public Service Pensions Act 2013 (c. 25), 
s. 41(2), Sch. 8 para. 26 (with Sch. 11 para. 8); S.I. 2014/839, art. 4(2)(k) 
Marginal Citations 
M17 1959 c. 25 (N.I.). 
M18 1961 c. 42. 
M19 1981 c. 20. 
M20 1993 c. 8. 
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Changes to legislation:  
Human Rights Act 1998 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 
07 February 2020. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. 
Changes that have been made appear in the content and are referenced with annotations. 
View outstanding changes 
Changes and effects yet to be applied to the whole Act associated Parts and 
Chapters: 





The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
 
 
S T A T U T O R Y I N S T R U M E N T S  
2007 No. 1263  
EQUALITY 
The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
 Made  -  -  -  -  17th April 2007  
 Coming into force -  -  30th April 2007  
CONTENTS  
Citation, commencement and extent  
Interpretation  
Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation  
Goods, facilities and services  
Premises  
Exceptions to regulations 4 and 5  
Educational establishments, local education authorities, and education authorities  
Public authorities  
Discriminatory practices  
Discriminatory advertisements  
Instructing or causing discrimination  
Statutory requirements  
Education, training and welfare  
Organisations relating to religion or belief  
Adoption and fostering agencies  
Associations  
Exceptions from regulation 16 for certain associations  
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Charities  
Restriction of proceedings  
Claims of unlawful action  
Claims of unlawful action: immigration cases  
Remedies for unlawful action  
Claims of unlawful action: timing  
Claims of unlawful action: information  
National security  
Validity and revision of contracts  
Insurance  
Blood donation  
Aiding unlawful acts  
Employers’ and principals’ liability  
Police etc.  
Amendment to the Equality Act 2006  
Crown application  
Territorial application   
  SCHEDULE 1 — Discrimination by public authorities: exceptions  
  PART 1 — Bodies to which regulation 8 does not apply  
  PART 2 — Functions and actions to which regulation 8 does not apply  
  SCHEDULE 2 — Information: Forms  
  PART 1 — Form of Questions by Claimant or Potential Claimant  
  PART 2 — Form of Reply by Respondent or Potential Respondent  
  SCHEDULE 3 — Responsible bodies of Educational Establishments  
The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government makes the following 
Regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by section 81(1) of the Equality Act 
2006(a).  
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In accordance with section 81(4)(b) of that Act, a draft of this instrument was laid before 
Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.  
Citation, commencement and extent  
1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2007 and shall come into force on 30th April 2007.  
(2) These Regulations do not extend to Northern Ireland.  
Interpretation  
2.—(1) References in these Regulations to discrimination are to any discrimination 
falling within regulation 3 (discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation) and related 
expressions shall be construed accordingly.  
(2) In these Regulations—  
“the Commission” means the Commission for Equality and Human Rights,  
“criminal investigation” means an investigation into the commission of an alleged 
offence, and a decision whether to institute criminal proceedings,  
“enactment” includes an enactment in or under an Act of the Scottish Parliament,  
“fostering agency” means a fostering agency within the meaning of section 4(4) of 
the Care Standards Act 2000(b) and a person providing a fostering service within the 
meaning of section 2(14)(b) of the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001(c),  
“the 2006 Act” means the Equality Act 2006,  
“voluntary adoption agency” means an adoption society within the meaning of the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002(d) which is a voluntary organisation within the 
meaning of that Act, and a person, providing an adoption service within the meaning 
of section 2(11)(b) of the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001(e).  
To be substituted by section 7 of the Adoption and Children Act (Scotland) 2007 (asp 4) 
from a date to be appointed.  
a reference to act or action includes a reference to deliberate omission,  
a reference to refusal includes a reference to deliberate omission, and  
a reference to providing a service, facility or benefit of any kind includes a reference 
to facilitating access to the service, facility or benefit.  
Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation  
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3.—(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against 
another (“B”) if, on grounds of the sexual orientation of B or any other person except 
A, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat others (in cases where there 
is no material difference in the relevant circumstances).  
In paragraph (1) a reference to a person’s sexual orientation includes a reference to a 
sexual orientation which he is thought to have.  
For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (“A”) discriminates against another 
(“B”) if  
A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice—  
which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of B’s sexual orientation,  
which puts persons of B’s sexual orientation at a disadvantage compared to some or 
all others (where there is no material difference in the relevant circumstances),  
which puts B at a disadvantage compared to some or all persons who are not of his 
sexual orientation (where there is no material difference in the relevant 
circumstances), and  
which A cannot reasonably justify by reference to matters other than B’s sexual 
orientation.  
For the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (3), the fact that one of the persons (whether or 
not B) is a civil partner while the other is married shall not be treated as a material 
difference in the relevant circumstances.  
A person (“A”) discriminates against another (“B”) if A treats B less favourably than 
he treats or would treat another and does so by reason of the fact that, or by reason of 
A’s knowledge or suspicion that, B—  
has brought or intended to bring, or intends to bring, proceedings under these 
Regulations,  
has given or intended to give, or intends to give, evidence in proceedings under these 
Regulations,  
has provided or intended to provide, or intends to provide, information in connection 
with proceedings under these Regulations,  
has done or intended to do, or intends to do, any other thing under or in connection 
with these Regulations, or  
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has alleged or intended to allege, or intends to allege, that a person has contravened 
these Regulations.  
(6) Paragraph (5) does not apply where A’s treatment of B relates to 
B’s— (a) making or intending to make, not in good faith, a false 
allegation; or  
(b) giving or intending to give, not in good faith, false information or evidence.  
Goods, facilities and services  
4.—(1) It is unlawful for a person (“A”) concerned with the provision to the public or 
a section of the public of goods, facilities or services to discriminate against a person 
(“B”) who seeks to obtain or to use those goods, facilities or services—  
by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services,  
by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services of a quality which is the 
same as or similar to the quality of goods, facilities or services that A normally 
provides to—  
the public, or  
a section of the public to which B belongs,  
by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services in a manner which is the 
same as or similar to that in which A normally provides goods, facilities or services 
to— (i) the public, or  
a section of the public to which B belongs, or  
by refusing to provide B with goods, facilities or services on terms which are the same 
as or similar to the terms on which A normally provides goods, facilities or services 
to— (i) the public, or  
a section of the public to which B belongs.  
(2) Paragraph (1) applies, in particular, to—  
access to and use of a place which the public are permitted to enter,  
accommodation in a hotel, boarding house or similar establishment,  
facilities by way of banking or insurance or for grants, loans, credit or finance,  
facilities for entertainment, recreation or refreshment,  
facilities for transport or travel, and  
the services of a profession or trade.  
 
                                              
 
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply —  
in relation to the provision of goods, facilities or services by a person exercising a 
public function, or  
to discrimination in relation to the provision of goods, facilities or services, where 
such discrimination—  
is unlawful by virtue of another provision of these regulations or by virtue of a 
provision of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003(a) 
(“the 2003 Regulations”), or  
would be unlawful by virtue of another provision of these Regulations or of the 
2003 Regulations but for an express exception.  
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (1) it is immaterial whether or not a person charges 
for the provision of goods, facilities or services.  
Premises  
5.—(1) It is unlawful for a person to discriminate against 
another— (a) in the terms on which he offers to dispose of 
premises to him,  
by refusing to dispose of premises to him, or  
in connection with a list of persons requiring premises.  
(2) It is unlawful for a person managing premises to discriminate against an occupier—  
in the manner in which he provides access to a benefit or facility,  
by refusing access to a benefit or facility, (c) by evicting him, or  
(d) by subjecting him to any other detriment.  
It is unlawful for a person to discriminate against another by refusing permission for 
the disposal of premises to him.  
This regulation only applies to premises in Great Britain.  
Exceptions to regulations 4 and 5  
6. —(1) Regulation 4 does not apply to anything done by a person as a participant in 
arrangements under which he (for reward or not) takes into his home, and treats as if 
they were members of his family, children, elderly persons, or persons requiring a 
special degree of care and attention.  
 
                                              
 
(2) Regulation 5 does not apply to anything done in relation to the disposal or 
management of a part of any premises by a person (“the landlord”) if—  
the landlord or a near relative of his resides, and intends to continue to reside, in 
another part of the premises,  
the premises include parts (other than storage areas and means of access) shared by 
residents of the premises, and  
the premises are not normally sufficient to accommodate—  
in the case of premises to be occupied by households, more than two households 
in addition to that of the landlord or his near relative, or  
in the case of premises to be occupied by individuals, more than six individuals 
in addition to the landlord or his near relative.  
(3) In paragraph (1) “near relative” means—  
spouse or civil partner,  
parent or grandparent,  
child or grandchild (whether or not legitimate)  
spouse or civil partner of a child or grandchild,  
brother or sister (whether of full blood or half blood), and  
any of the relationships listed in sub-paragraphs (b) to (e) that arises through 
marriage, civil partnership or adoption.  
(4) Regulation 5(1) and (3) shall not apply to the disposal of premises by a person 
who—  
owns an estate or interest in the premises,  
occupies the whole of the premises,  
does not use the services of an estate agent for the purposes of the disposal, and  
does not arrange for the publication of an advertisement for the purposes of the 
disposal.  
Educational establishments, local education authorities, and education authorities  
7.—(1) It is unlawful for the responsible body of an educational establishment listed in 
Schedule  
3 to discriminate against a person—  
in the terms on which it offers to admit him as a pupil,  
 
                                              
 
by refusing to accept an application to admit him as a pupil, or (c) where 
he is a pupil of the establishment—  
in the way in which it affords him access to any benefit, facility or service,  
by refusing him access to a benefit, facility or service,  
by excluding him from the establishment, or (iv) by subjecting him to any other 
detriment.  
(2) In the application of this regulation and Schedule 3 to England and Wales—  
an expression also used in any of the Education Acts (within the meaning of section 
578 of the Education Act 1996(a)) has the same meaning as in that Act, and  
“pupil” in relation to an establishment includes any person who receives education at 
that establishment.  
In the application of this regulation and Schedule 3 to Scotland, an expression also used 
in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980(a) has the same meaning as in that Act.  
It is unlawful for a local education authority (in England and Wales) or an education 
authority (in Scotland) in the exercise of their functions to discriminate against a 
person.  
Public authorities  
8.—(1) It is unlawful for a public authority exercising a function to do any act which 
constitutes discrimination.  
(2) In paragraph (1)—  
“public authority” includes any person who has functions of a public nature (subject 
to paragraph (3)), and  
“function” means function of a public nature.  
(3) Paragraph (1) does not apply to— (a) a 
body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1, or  
(b) the functions or actions listed in Part 2 of that Schedule.  
Discriminatory practices  
9.—(1) It is unlawful for a person to operate a practice which would be likely to result 
in unlawful discrimination if applied to persons of any sexual orientation.  
 
                                              
 
It is unlawful for a person to adopt or maintain a practice or arrangement in accordance 
with which in certain circumstances a practice would be operated in contravention of 
paragraph (1).  
In this regulation “unlawful discrimination” includes discrimination which is unlawful 
by virtue of any of regulations 4 to 8.  
Proceedings in respect of a contravention of this regulation may be brought only—  
by the Commission, and  
in accordance with sections 20 to 24 of the 2006 Act.  
Discriminatory advertisements  
10.—(1) It is unlawful to publish, or to cause to be published, an advertisement which 
indicates (expressly or impliedly) an intention by any person to discriminate 
unlawfully.  
In this regulation the reference to unlawful discrimination is a reference to 
discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of any of regulations 4 to 8.  
Proceedings in respect of a contravention of this regulation may be brought only—  
by the Commission, and  
in accordance with section 25 of the 2006 Act.  
(4) A person who publishes an advertisement shall not be liable in proceedings under 
that section in respect of the publication of the advertisement if he proves that—  
(a) he published in reliance on a statement, made by a person causing the 
advertisement to be published, that paragraph (1) would not apply, and (b) it was 
reasonable to rely on that statement.  
(5) A person who knowingly or recklessly makes a false statement of the kind 
mentioned in paragraph (4)(a) commits an offence and shall be liable on summary 
conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale. 
 
 
Instructing or causing discrimination  
11.—(1) It is unlawful for a person—  
to instruct another to discriminate unlawfully,  
to cause or attempt to cause another to discriminate unlawfully, or (c) to 
induce or attempt to induce another to discriminate unlawfully.  
For the purposes of paragraph (1)(c) inducement may be direct or indirect.  
In this regulation a reference to unlawful discrimination is a reference to 
discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of any of regulations 4 to 8.  
Proceedings in respect of a contravention of this regulation may be brought only—  
by the Commission, and  
in accordance with section 25 of the 2006 Act.  
Statutory requirements  
12. Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful to do anything which is 
necessary, or in so far as it is necessary, for the purpose of complying with—  
an Act of Parliament,  
an Act of the Scottish Parliament,  
legislation made or to be made—  
by a Minister of the Crown,  
by Order in Council,  
by the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive,  
by the National Assembly for Wales, or  
by or by virtue of a Measure of the General Synod of the Church of England, or  
a condition or requirement imposed by a Minister of the Crown by virtue of anything 
listed in paragraphs (a) to (c).  
Education, training and welfare  
13. Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for any person to do anything 
by way of—  
meeting special needs for education, training or welfare of persons on grounds of their 
sexual orientation, or  




Organisations relating to religion or belief  
14.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (8) this regulation applies to an organisation the 
purpose of which is—  
to practise a religion or belief,  
to advance a religion or belief,  
to teach the practice or principles of a religion or belief,  
to enable persons of a religion or belief to receive any benefit, or to engage in any 
activity, within the framework of that religion or belief.  
(2) This regulation does not apply —  
to an organisation whose sole or main purpose is commercial,  
in relation to regulation 7 (Educational establishments, local educational authorities, 
and education authorities).  
(3) Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for an organisation to which 
this regulation applies, or for anyone acting on behalf of or under the auspices of an 
organisation to which this regulation applies—  
to restrict membership of the organisation,  
to restrict participation in activities undertaken by the organisation or on its behalf or 
under its auspices,  
to restrict the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of activities 
undertaken by the organisation or on its behalf or under its auspices, or  
to restrict the use or disposal of premises owned or controlled by the organisation, in 
respect of a person on the ground of his sexual orientation.  
(4) Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for a minister—  
to restrict participation in activities carried on in the performance of his functions in 
connection with or in respect of an organisation to which this regulation relates, or  
to restrict the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of activities 
carried on in the performance of his functions in connection with or in respect of an 
organisation to which this regulation relates,  
in respect of a person on the ground of his sexual orientation.  
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(5) Paragraphs (3) and (4) permit a restriction only if imposed — 
(a) if it is necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation; 
or  
(b) so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a 
significant number of the religion’s followers.  
(6) In paragraph (4) the reference to a minister is a reference to a minister of religion, 
or other person, who —  
performs functions in connection with a religion or belief to which an organisation, 
to which this regulation applies, relates; and  
holds an office or appointment in, or is accredited, approved or recognised for 
purposes of, an organisation to which this regulation applies.  
For the purposes of paragraph (3)(d), “disposal” shall not include disposal of an interest 
in premises by way of sale where the interest being disposed of is the entirety of the 
organisation’s interest in the premises, or the entirety of the interest in respect of which 
the organisation has power of disposal.  
This regulation does not apply where an organisation of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (1) or any person acting on its behalf or under its auspices— (a) makes 
provision of a kind referred to in regulation 4, or  
(b) exercises a function of a kind referred to in regulation 8,  
on behalf of a public authority under the terms of a contract for provision of that kind 
between that authority and an organisation referred to in paragraph (1) or, if different, the 
person making that provision.  
Adoption and fostering agencies  
15.—(1) Paragraph (2) applies to a voluntary adoption agency or fostering 
agency that — (a) is an organisation of the kind referred to in regulation 14(1), 
or (b) acts on behalf of or under the auspices of such an organisation.  
Subject to paragraph (3), during the period from the commencement of these 
Regulations until 31st December 2008, nothing in these Regulations shall make it 
unlawful for such a voluntary adoption agency or fostering agency to restrict the 
provision of its services or facilities to a person on the grounds of his sexual orientation.  
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If such a voluntary adoption agency or fostering agency restricts the provision of those 
services or facilities as mentioned in paragraph (2), it must at the same time refer the 
person seeking them to another person who the agency believes provides similar 
services or facilities to persons of his sexual orientation.  
Paragraph (2) permits a restriction only if imposed —  
if it is necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation, or  
so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant 
number of the religion’s followers.  
Associations  
16.—(1) This regulation applies to any association of persons (however described, 
whether corporate or unincorporated, and whether or not its activities are carried on for 
profit) if—  
it has 25 or more members, and  
admission to membership is regulated by its constitution and is so conducted that the 
members do not constitute a section of the public within the meaning of regulation 
4(1); and  
it is not a trade organisation.  
In this regulation—  
“trade organisation” means an organisation of workers, an organisation of employers, 
or any other organisation whose members carry on a particular profession or trade for 
the purposes of which the organisation exists,  
“profession” includes any vocation or occupation, and 
“trade” includes any business.  
It is unlawful for an association to which this regulation applies, in the case of a person 
who is not a member of the association, to discriminate against him—  
in the terms on which it is prepared to admit him to membership, or  
by refusing or deliberately omitting to accept his application for membership.  
(4) It is unlawful for an association to which this regulation applies, in the case of a 
person who is a member or associate of the association, to discriminate against him—  
in the way it affords him access to any benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing 
or deliberately omitting to afford him access to them, or  
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in the case of a member, by depriving him of membership, or varying the terms on 
which he is a member, or  
in the case of an associate, by depriving him of his rights as an associate, or varying 
those rights, or  
in either case, by subjecting him to any other detriment.  
(5) For the purposes of this regulation—  
a person is a member of an association if he belongs to it by virtue of his admission 
to any sort of membership provided for by its constitution (and is not merely a person 
with certain rights under its constitution by virtue of his membership of some other 
association), and references to membership of an association shall be construed 
accordingly,  
a person is an associate of an association to which this regulation applies if, not being 
a member of it, he has under its constitution some or all of the rights enjoyed by 
members (or would have apart from any provision in its constitution authorising the 
refusal of those rights in particular cases).  
Exceptions from regulation 16 for certain associations  
17.—(1) Regulation 16 does not apply to any association if the main object of the 
association is to enable the benefits of membership (whatever they may be) to be 
enjoyed by persons of a particular sexual orientation.  
(2) In determining whether that is the main object of an association regard shall be had 
to the essential character of the association and to all relevant circumstances including, 
in particular, the extent to which the affairs of the association are so conducted that the 
persons primarily enjoying the benefits of membership are of the sexual orientation in 
question.  
Charities  
18.—(1) Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for a person to provide 
benefits only to persons of a particular sexual orientation, if— (a) he acts in pursuance 
of a charitable instrument, and  
(b) the restriction of benefits to persons of that sexual orientation is imposed by reason 
of or on the grounds of the provisions of the charitable instrument.  
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Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for the 
Charity Commission for England and Wales or the holder of 
the office of the Scottish Charity Regulator to exercise a 
function in relation to a charity in a manner which appears 
to the Commission or to the holder to be expedient in the 
interests of the charity, having regard to the provisions of the 
charitable instrument.  
In this regulation— “charitable instrument”–  
means an instrument establishing or governing a charity, and  
includes a charitable instrument made before these Regulations come into force; and  
“charity”—  
(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the meaning given by the Charities Act 
2006(a), (b) in relation to Scotland, means a body entered in the Scottish Charity 
Register(b).  
Restriction of proceedings  
19.—(1) Except as provided by these Regulations, no proceedings, whether criminal or 
civil, may be brought against a person on the grounds that an act is unlawful by virtue 
of these Regulations.  
(2) But paragraph (1) does not preclude—  
proceedings by the Commission under Part 1 of the 2006 Act,  
an application for judicial review,  
proceedings under the Immigration Acts(c),  
proceedings under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997(d), or  
in Scotland, the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court of Session to entertain an 
application for reduction or suspension of an order or determination or otherwise to 
consider the validity of an order or determination, or to require reasons for an order 






Claims of unlawful action  
20.—(1) A claim that a person has done anything that is unlawful by virtue of these 
Regulations may be brought—  
in England and Wales, in a county court, by way of proceedings in tort, or  
in Scotland, in the sheriff court, by way of proceedings in reparation, for 
breach of statutory duty.  
Proceedings in England and Wales alleging that a local education authority or the 
responsible body of an educational establishment listed in Schedule 3 has acted 
unlawfully by virtue of regulation 7 or 8 may not be brought unless the claimant has 
given written notice to the Secretary of State.  
Proceedings in Scotland alleging that an education authority or the responsible body of 
an educational establishment listed in Schedule 3 has acted unlawfully by virtue of 
regulation 7 or 8 may not be brought unless the pursuer has given written notice to the 
Scottish Ministers.  
In paragraph (1) the reference to a claim that a person has done an unlawful act includes 
a reference to a claim that a person is to be treated by virtue of these Regulations as 
having done an unlawful act.  
In proceedings under this regulation, if the claimant (or pursuer) proves facts from 
which the court could conclude, in the absence of a reasonable alternative explanation, 
that an act which is unlawful by virtue of these Regulations has been committed, the 
court shall assume that the act was unlawful unless the respondent (or defender) proves 
that it was not.  
Claims of unlawful action: immigration cases  
21.—(1) Proceedings may not be brought under regulation 20 alleging that a person has 
acted unlawfully by virtue of regulation 8 if the question of the lawfulness of the act 
could be raised (and has not been raised) in immigration proceedings (disregarding the 
possibility of proceedings brought out of time with permission).  
If in immigration proceedings a court or tribunal has found that an act was unlawful by 
virtue of regulation 8, a court hearing proceedings under regulation 20 shall accept that 
finding.  
In this regulation “immigration proceedings” means proceedings under or by virtue 
of— (a) the Immigration Acts, or  
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(b) the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.  
Remedies for unlawful action  
22.—(1) In proceedings under regulation 20, the court (subject to paragraph (2))—  
(in addition to granting any remedy available to it in proceedings for tort) may grant 
any remedy that the High Court could grant in proceedings for judicial review,  
may award damages by way of compensation for injury to feelings (whether or not 
other damages are also awarded),  
may not award damages in proceedings in respect of an act that is unlawful by virtue 
of regulation 3(5) if the respondent proves that there was no intention to treat the 
claimant unfavourably on grounds of sexual orientation,  
(2) In respect of a contravention of regulation 8, the court—  
shall not grant an injunction unless satisfied that it will not prejudice criminal 
proceedings or a criminal investigation, and  
shall grant any application to stay the proceedings under regulation 20 on the grounds 
of prejudice to criminal proceedings or to a criminal investigation, unless satisfied 
that the proceedings or investigation will not be prejudiced.  
(3) In the application of this regulation to Scotland—  
a reference to the court shall be taken as a reference to the sheriff,  
a reference to the High Court shall be taken as a reference to the Court of Session,  
a reference to tort shall be taken as a reference to reparation,  
a reference to the claimant shall be taken as a reference to the pursuer,  
a reference to the respondent shall be taken as a reference to the defender,  
a reference to an injunction shall be taken as a reference to an interdict, and  
a reference to staying proceedings shall be taken as a reference to sisting proceedings.  
Claims of unlawful action: timing  
23.—(1) Proceedings under regulation 20 may be brought only—  
within the period of six months beginning with the date of the act (or the last act) to 
which the proceedings relate, or  
with the permission of the court in which the proceedings are brought.  
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(2) In relation to immigration proceedings (as defined in regulation 21) the period 
specified in paragraph (1)(a) shall begin with the first date on which proceedings under 
regulation 20 may be brought.  
Claims of unlawful action: information  
24.—(1) A claimant or a potential claimant may question a respondent or a potential 
respondent about the reasons for an action or about any matter that is or may be relevant 
and may do so—  
in the form set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2, or  
in a form to the like effect with such variation as the circumstances require.  
(2) A respondent or potential respondent may reply (if he so wishes) to questions served 
under paragraph (1)—  
in the form set out in Part 2 of Schedule 2, or  
in a form to the like effect with such variation as the circumstances require.  
(3) A claimant’s or potential claimant’s questions (whether or not put in a form 
mentioned in paragraph (1)), and a respondent or potential respondent’s replies shall be 
admissible as evidence in proceedings in respect of the action or about any matter that 
is or may be relevant, to which the questions relate if (and only if) the questions are 
served—  
within the period of six months beginning with the date of the action (or last action) 
to which they relate, and  
in accordance with paragraph (4).  
(4) A question may be served on a respondent or potential respondent and a reply may 
be served on a claimant or potential claimant—  
by delivering it to him,  
by sending it by post to him at his usual or last known residence or place of business,  
where the person to be served is acting by a solicitor, by delivering it at, or by sending 
it by post to, the solicitor’s address for service,  
where the person to be served is a claimant or potential claimant, by delivering the 
reply, or sending it by post, to him at his address for reply as stated by him in the 
document containing the questions, or if no address is so stated, at his usual or last 
known residence, or  
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where the person to be served is a body corporate or is a trade union or employers’ 
association within the meaning of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation)  
Act 1992(a), by delivering it to the secretary or clerk of the body, union or 
association at its registered or principal office, or by sending it by post to the 
secretary or clerk at that office.  
(5) A court may draw an inference from—  
a failure to reply to a claimant’s or potential claimant’s questions within the period of 
eight weeks beginning with the date the questions were served, or  
an evasive or equivocal reply to such questions (whether or not put in a form 
mentioned in paragraph (1)).  
(6) In this regulation—  
(a) “claimant” means a person who has brought proceedings under these 
Regulations, (b) “potential claimant” means a person who—  
thinks he may have been the subject of an act that is unlawful by virtue of these 
Regulations, and  
wishes to consider whether to bring proceedings under these Regulations,  
(c) “potential respondent” means a person questioned by a potential claimant for the 
purpose of considering whether to bring proceedings under these Regulations  
(7) In the application of this regulation to Scotland—  
a reference to a claimant or potential claimant shall be taken as a reference to a pursuer 
or potential pursuer, and  
a reference to a respondent or potential respondent shall be taken as a reference to a 
defender or potential defender.  
(8) Paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to a reply, or a failure to reply, to a 
question—  
if the respondent or potential respondent reasonably asserts that to have replied 




if the respondent or potential respondent reasonably asserts that to have replied 
differently or at all would have revealed the reason for not instituting or not 
continuing criminal proceedings, or  
if the respondent or potential respondent reasonably asserts that to have replied 
differently or at all would have frustrated the purpose of national security.  
National security  
25.—(1) Rules of court may make provision for enabling a county court or sheriff court 
in which a claim is brought under regulation 20, where the court considers it expedient 
in the interests of national security—  
to exclude from all or part of the proceedings—  
the claimant,  
the claimant’s representatives, or  
any assessors,  
to permit a claimant or representative who has been excluded to make a statement to 
the court before the commencement of the proceedings, or the part of the proceedings, 
from which he is excluded;  
to take steps to keep secret all or part of the reasons for the court’s decision in the 
proceedings.  
The Attorney General or, in Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland, may appoint 
a person to represent the interests of a claimant in, or in any part of, proceedings from 
which the claimant or his representatives are excluded by virtue of paragraph (1).  
A person may be appointed under paragraph (2) only—  
(a) in relation to proceedings in England and Wales, if he has a general qualification 
(within the meaning of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990(a)), or 
(b) in relation to proceedings in Scotland, if he is—  
an advocate, or  
qualified to practise as a solicitor in Scotland.  
(4) A person appointed under paragraph (2) shall not be responsible to the person whose 
interests he is appointed to represent.  
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Validity and revision of contracts  
26.—(1) A term of a contract is void where—  
its inclusion renders the making of the contract unlawful by virtue of these 
Regulations,  
it is included in furtherance of an act which would be unlawful by virtue of these 
Regulations, or  
it provides for the doing of an act which would be unlawful by virtue of these 
Regulations.  
Paragraph (1) does not apply to a term whose inclusion constitutes, furthers or provides 
for unlawful discrimination against a party to the contract; but that term shall be 
unenforceable against that party.  
A term in a contract which purports to exclude or limit a provision of these Regulations 
is unenforceable by a person in whose favour the term would operate apart from this 
paragraph.  
Paragraph (3) does not apply to a contract settling a claim under regulation 20.  
On the application of a person interested in a contract to which paragraph (1) applies, 
a county court or sheriff court may make an order removing or modifying a term made 
unenforceable by that paragraph, but an order shall not be made unless all persons 
affected—  
have been given notice of the application (except where notice is dispensed with in 
accordance with rules of court), and  
have been afforded an opportunity to make representations to the court.  
(6) An order under paragraph (5) may include provision in respect of a period before 
the making of the order.  
Insurance  
27. Nothing in these Regulations shall make it unlawful for a person (“A”) to treat a 
person less favourably than A treats or would treat others on grounds of sexual 
orientation in relation to an annuity, or life insurance policy, or similar matter involving 
the assessment of risk, where the treatment—  
is effected by reference to actuarial or other data from a source on which it is 
reasonable to rely, and  
is reasonable having regard to that data, and any other relevant factors.  
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Blood donation  
28.—(1) This regulation applies to any person operating a service for the collection and 
distribution of human blood for the purposes of medical services (“a blood service”).                                                                                                                                                   
  
(a) 1990 c. 41.  
Subject to paragraph (3), it is unlawful for a person operating a blood service to 
discriminate against a person on grounds of sexual orientation in the way it affords him 
access to any facility for the donation of his blood.  
Nothing in this regulation shall make it unlawful for a person operating a blood service 
to refuse to accept a donation of a person’s blood where that refusal is determined by 
an assessment of risk to the public based on—  
clinical, epidemiological and other data which was obtained from a source on which 
it was reasonable to rely, and  
the refusal is reasonable having regard to that data, and any other relevant factors.  
Aiding unlawful acts  
29.—(1) It is unlawful knowingly to help another person (whether or not as his 
employee or agent) to do anything which is unlawful under these Regulations.  
A person commits an offence if he knowingly or recklessly makes a false statement, in 
connection with assistance sought from another, that a proposed act is not unlawful 
under these Regulations.  
A person guilty of an offence under paragraph (2) shall be liable on summary conviction 
to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.  
Employers’ and principals’ liability  
30.—(1) Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated 
for the purposes of these Regulations as done by the employer as well as by the person.  
Anything done by a person as agent for another shall be treated for the purposes of 
these Regulations as done by the principal as well as by the agent.  
It is immaterial for the purposes of this regulation whether an employer or principal 
knows about or approves of an act.  
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In proceedings under these Regulations against an employer in respect of an act alleged 
to have been done by his employee it shall be a defence for the employer to prove that 
he took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee—  
from doing the act, or  
from doing acts of that kind in the course of his employment.  
(5) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply in relation to an offence committed under 
regulation 10(5).  
Police etc.  
31.—(1) This regulation applies to—  
a constable who is a member of a police force maintained under the Police Act 
1996(a) or the Police (Scotland) Act 1967(b),  
a special constable appointed for a police area in accordance with either of those Acts, 
and  
a person appointed as a police cadet in accordance with either of those Acts.  
A person to whom this regulation applies shall be treated for the purposes of these 
Regulations as the employee of his chief officer of police, and anything done by the 
person in the performance or purported performance of his functions shall be treated 
as done in the course of that employment.  
There shall be paid out of the police fund—  
compensation, costs or expenses awarded against a chief officer of police in 
proceedings brought against him under these Regulations,  
costs or expenses incurred by a chief officer of police in such proceedings so far as 
not recovered by him in the proceedings, and  
sums required by a chief officer of police for the settlement of a claim made against 
him under these Regulations if the settlement is approved by the police authority.  
(4) A police authority may pay out of the police fund—  
damages or costs awarded in proceedings under these Regulations against a person 
under the direction and control of the chief officer of police,  
costs incurred and not recovered by such a person in such proceedings, and  
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sums required in connection with the settlement of a claim that has or might have 
given rise to such proceedings.  
(5) In section 56(4) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005(a) (application 
of discrimination legislation to seconded staff), there is inserted after paragraph (g)— 
“; and  
(h) regulation 30 of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007”.  
Amendment to the Equality Act 2006  
32. In section 25(1) of the 2006 Act, there is inserted after paragraph 
(d)— “, and  
(e) regulations 10 and 11 of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007.”  
Crown application  
33.—(1) Regulation 8 binds the Crown.  
The remainder of these Regulations apply to an act done on behalf of the Crown as they 
apply to an act done by a private person.  
For the purposes of paragraph (2) an act is done on behalf of the Crown if (and only if)  
done—  
by or on behalf of a Minister of the Crown,  
by or on behalf of the Scottish Ministers,  
by a government department,  
by a body established under an enactment acting on behalf of the Crown,  
by or on behalf of the holder of an office established by an enactment acting on behalf 
of the Crown, or  
by or on behalf of an office-holder in the Scottish Administration (within the meaning 
of section 126(7) of the Scotland Act 1998(b)).  
The provisions of Parts 2 to 4 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947(c) shall apply to 
proceedings against the Crown under these Regulations as they apply to proceedings 
against the Crown in England and Wales which by virtue of section 23 of that Act are 
treated for the purposes of Part 2 of that Act as civil proceedings by or against the 
Crown; but section 20 of that Act (removal of proceedings from county court to High 
Court) shall not apply to proceedings under these Regulations.  
 
 170 
The provisions of Part 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 shall apply to proceedings 
against the Crown under these Regulations as they apply to proceedings in Scotland 
which by  
virtue of that Part are treated as civil proceedings by or against the Crown; but the proviso 
to section 44 of that Act (removal of proceedings from the sheriff court to the Court of 
Session) shall not apply to proceedings under this Part of these Regulations.  
Territorial application  
34.—(1) These Regulations apply—  
(a) to anything done in Great Britain, and 
(b) to the provision of—  
facilities for travel on a British vessel or an aircraft registered in Great Britain, 
and  
benefits, facilities or services provided on a British vessel or an aircraft registered 
in Great Britain.  
Regulation 8, in so far as it relates to granting entry clearance (within the meaning of 
the Immigration Acts), applies to anything done whether inside or outside the United 
Kingdom.  
This regulation shall not make it unlawful to do anything in or over a foreign country, 
or in or over the territorial waters of a foreign country, for the purpose of complying 
with a law of that country.  
In this regulation—  
“British vessel” means—  
(a) a hovercraft registered in Great Britain; or 
(b) a ship which is—  
registered in Great Britain, or  
used for the purposes of the Crown, and  
“foreign country” means a country other than the United Kingdom.  
  
  
Signed by the Secretary of State  
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  Ruth Kelly  
  Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 17th April 2007 
 Department for Communities and Local Government  
  SCHEDULE 1  Regulation 8  
Discrimination by public authorities: exceptions  
  PART 1  Regulation 8(3)(a)  
Bodies to which regulation 8 does not apply  
The House of Commons.  
The House of Lords.  
The authorities of either House of Parliament.  
The Security Service.  
The Secret Intelligence Service.  
The Government Communications Headquarters.  
A part of the armed forces of the Crown which is, in accordance with a requirement 
of the Secretary of State, assisting the Government Communications Headquarters.  
  PART 2  Regulation 8(3)(b)  
Functions and actions to which regulation 8 does not apply  
The exercise of a judicial function (whether in connection with a court or a tribunal).  
Anything done on behalf of or on the instructions of a person exercising a judicial 
function (whether in connection with a court or tribunal).  
Preparing, passing (or making), confirming, approving or considering an enactment 
(including legislation made by or by virtue of a Measure of the General Synod of the 
Church of England).  
The making of an instrument by a Minister of the Crown under an enactment.  
The making of an instrument by the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish 
Executive under an enactment.  
A decision not to institute or continue criminal proceedings (and anything done for the 
purpose of reaching, or in pursuance of, such a decision).  
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Action which—  
is unlawful by virtue of another provision of these Regulations, or  
would be unlawful by virtue of another provision of these Regulations other than 
regulation 4, but for an express exception.  
8. Action which—  
is unlawful by virtue of a provision of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003(a), or  
 
EXPLANATORY NOTE  
(This note is not part of the Regulations)  
These Regulations, which are made under section 81 of the Equality Act 2006, make it 
unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation in the provision of goods, 
facilities and services, education, disposal and management of premises and exercise of 
public functions. Sexual orientation is defined in section 35 of the Equality Act 2006 as 
meaning an individual’s sexual orientation towards persons of the same sex as him or 
her, persons of the opposite sex, or both.  
Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is defined in regulation 3. Direct 
discrimination occurs where a person is treated less favourably than another on grounds 
of sexual orientation (regulation 3(1)). Indirect discrimination occurs where a provision, 
criterion or practice, which is applied generally, puts a person of a particular sexual 
orientation at a disadvantage and cannot be shown to be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim (regulation 3(3)). Regulation 3(4) provides that for the purpose 
of the provisions defining whether discrimination has taken place, when comparing the 
treatment of two people, the fact that one is a civil partner and the other is married is not 
a material difference in the circumstances. Victimisation, defined in regulation 3(5), 
occurs where a person receives less favourable treatment than another by reason of the 
fact that he has brought (or given evidence in or provided information in connection with) 
proceedings, made an allegation or otherwise done anything under or by reference to the 
Regulations, or because he intends to do so.  
Regulations 4 to 18 prohibit discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, services, 
disposal and management of premises, education and the exercise of public functions.  
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Regulation 4 provides that it is unlawful to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation 
against a person who seeks to obtain or use goods, facilities or services. It sets out 
examples (although not exclusively) of the sorts of facilities and services that might be 
covered by the Regulations.  
Regulation 5 deals with the disposal and management of premises, and regulation 6 
provides for the various exceptions that apply to regulations 4 and 5 .  
The Regulations also extend the protections to those accessing education and educational 
facilities (regulation 7) and to those wishing to benefit from functions performed by 
public authorities (regulation 8) subject to certain exceptions in Schedule 1.  
Regulation 9 makes discriminatory practices unlawful, and regulation 10 makes 
discriminatory advertisements unlawful. It is unlawful to instruct or cause another person 
to discriminate (regulation 11).  
Regulation 12 lists the statutory requirements which these Regulations shall not render 
unlawful.  
It will not be unlawful for a person to do anything by way of meeting the needs for 
education, training or welfare of persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation, or 
providing ancillary benefits related to these aims (regulation 13).  
Regulation 14 provides an exception for organisations relating to religion and belief, that 
is those whose purpose is to practise a religion or belief, to advance a religion or belief, 
to teach the principles of a religion or belief, or to enable persons of a religion or belief 
to engage in any activity or receive a benefit within the framework of that religion or 
belief. It extends to those who act on behalf or under the auspices of such an organisation. 
It does not however extend the exception to organisations whose sole or main purpose is 
commercial, or those who act under a contract with and on behalf of a public authority.  
Regulation 15 provides a transitional period for religious adoption and fostering agencies 
to comply with the Regulations, provided they refer a person who has been refused their 
service on grounds of their sexual orientation, to another provider.  
Regulation 16 extends the Regulations to membership rights of private clubs and 
associations. Regulation 17 provides for exceptions to regulation 16 for associations 




Charities are also exempt from the Regulations as provided in regulation 18 in so far as 
they are established to confer a benefit on a particular group by virtue of sexual 
orientation, and act in accordance with this charitable instrument.  
Regulations 19 to 26 deal with the enforcement of the Regulations. Any legal recourse 
for individuals will be for a claim in tort for breach of a statutory duty (regulation 20(1)). 
But the Regulations do not prevent proceedings by the Commission for Equality and 
Human Rights under parts of the Equality Act 2006, judicial review or immigration 
proceedings (regulation 19).  
In England and Wales, where a local education authority or responsible body of an 
educational establishment has allegedly acted unlawfully, a claim may not be brought 
unless the claimant has given written notice to the Secretary of State. Similar 
arrangements apply to Scotland (regulation 20(2) and 20(3)).  
Regulation 21 provides that proceedings may not be brought under regulation 20 if the 
issue of lawfulness could be raised in immigration proceedings. Regulation 22 deals with 
remedies for unlawful action, and regulation 23 with time limits. Regulation 24 sets out 
how a claimant or potential claimant or respondent may obtain or provide information in 
forms set out in Schedule 2. It also states how questions may be given to the other party 
and how the court will interpret the answers or lack of response to the questions.  
Regulation 25 allows for rules of court to be made excluding claimants and others from 
all or part of proceedings under the Regulations if national security issues arise.  
Regulation 26 deals with the validity and revision of contracts and provides that a term 
of the contract is void where its inclusion makes the contract unlawful by virtue of the 
Regulations. Regulation 26(5) sets out the powers of the county court to remove or 
modify a term made unenforceable by this regulation.  
Regulation 27 provides an exception to these Regulations where a person is treated less 
favourably on grounds of his sexual orientation in relation to an annuity, or life insurance 
policy, or similar matter.  
Regulation 28 applies to any person who operates a service for the collection and 
distribution of human blood in order to provide a medical service. It is unlawful to 
discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation against a person who offers to donate blood, 
unless it is reasonably based on clinical and epidemiological data to do so.  
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Regulation 29 makes it unlawful knowingly to help another to do anything which is 
unlawful under these Regulations.  
Regulation 30 deals with liability of employers and principals and in particular makes 
acts committed by an employee treated as if they had been done by his employer as well 
as him.  
Regulation 31 applies to the police. It states that police officers shall all be treated as 
employees of their chief officer of police. Any compensation for an unlawful act must be 
paid out of police funds.  
Regulation 32 amends the Equality Act 2006 to add regulations 10 and 11 of these 
Regulations to section 25 of that Act, which deals with the power of the Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights to make applications to court to restrain unlawful advertising, 
pressure, &c.  
Regulation 33 deals with Crown application.  
Regulation 34 deals with territorial application.  
A Regulatory Impact Assessment and an Equality Impact Assessment in relation to these 
Regulations have been placed in the Libraries of the House of Commons and the House 























2020 No. 680 
SANCTIONS 
The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 
Approved by both Houses of Parliament 
Made       -      -      -      - 5th July 2020 at 11.00 a.m. on 6th 
Laid before Parliament  July 2020 at 1.00 p.m. on 6th 
Coming into force       -      - July 2020 
The Secretary of State(1), in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 1(1)(c) and 
(3)(b), 3(1) (a) and (d)(i), 4, 9(2)(a), 10(2)(a) and (c), (3) and (4), 11(2) to (9), 15(2)(a) 
and (b), (3), (4)(b), (5) and (6), 16, 17(2) to (5) and (8), 21(1), 54(1) and (2), and 62(4) 
and (5) of the Sanctions and AntiMoney Laundering Act 2018(2), and having decided, 
upon consideration of the matters set out in sections 2(2) of that Act, that it is appropriate 
to do so, makes the following Regulations: 
PART 1 
General 
Citation and commencement 
1.—(1)  These Regulations may be cited as the Global Human Rights Sanctions 
Regulations 2020. 
(2)  These Regulations come into force at 1.00 p.m. on 6th July 2020. 
Interpretation 
2. In these Regulations— 
“the Act” means the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018; 
“arrangement” includes any agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction or series of 
transactions, whether or not legally enforceable (but see paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 for 




The power to make regulations under Part 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering 
Act 2018 (c.13) is conferred on an “appropriate Minister”. Section 1(9)(a) of that Act 
defines an “appropriate Minister” as including the Secretary of State. 
2018 c.13. 
“document” includes information recorded in any form and, in relation to information 
recorded otherwise than in legible form, references to its production include producing a 
copy of the information in legible form; 
“Treasury licence” means a licence under regulation 20(1); 
“United Kingdom person” has the same meaning as in section 21 of the Act. 
Application of prohibitions and requirements outside the United Kingdom 
3.—(1)  A United Kingdom person may contravene a relevant prohibition by conduct 
wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom. 
Any person may contravene a relevant prohibition by conduct in the territorial sea. 
In this regulation, a “relevant prohibition” means any prohibition imposed by— 
regulation 9(2) (confidential information), 
Part 3 (Finance), or 
a condition of a Treasury licence. 
A United Kingdom person may comply, or fail to comply, with a relevant requirement 
byconduct wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom. 
Any person may comply, or fail to comply, with a relevant requirement by conduct in 
theterritorial sea. 
In this regulation, a “relevant requirement” means any requirement imposed— 
by or under Part 6 (Information and records), or by reason of a request made under a 
power conferred by that Part, or 
by a condition of a Treasury licence. 
Nothing in this regulation is to be taken to prevent a relevant prohibition or a 
relevantrequirement from applying to conduct (by any person) in the United Kingdom. 
Purposes 
4.—(1)  The purposes of the regulations contained in this instrument are to deter, and 
provide accountability for, activities falling within paragraph (2). 
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An activity falls within this paragraph if it is an activity which, if carried out by or on 
behalfof a State within the territory of that State, would amount to a serious violation by 
that State of an individual’s— 
right to life, 
right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, or 
right to be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour, whether or not the activity is carried out by or on behalf of a State. 
An activity falls within paragraph (2) if it is carried out— 
outside the United Kingdom by any person, or 
in the United Kingdom by a person who is not a United Kingdom person. 
In paragraph (2), an “activity” includes an omission. 
PART 2 
Designation of persons 
Power to designate persons 
5.—(1)  The Secretary of State may designate persons by name for the purposes of any 
of the following— 
(a) regulations 11 to 15 (asset-freeze etc.); (b) regulation 17 (immigration). 
(2)  The Secretary of State may designate different persons for the purposes of different 
provisions mentioned in paragraph (1). 
Designation criteria 
6.—(1)  The Secretary of State may not designate a person under regulation 5 unless the 
Secretary of State— 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that that person is an involved person, and 
considers that the designation of that person is appropriate, having regard to— 
the purposes stated in regulation 4, and 
the likely significant effects of the designation on that person (as they appear to the 
Secretary of State to be on the basis of the information that the Secretary of State has). 
In this regulation an “involved person” means a person who— (a) is or has been involved 
in an activity falling within regulation 4(2), 
is owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7) by a 
person who is or has been so involved, 
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is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a person who is or has been so involved, or (d) 
is a member of, or associated with, a person who is or has been so involved. 
For the purposes of this regulation a person is “involved in an activity falling 
withinregulation 4(2)” if— 
the person is responsible for or engages in such an activity; 
the person facilitates, incites, promotes or provides support for such an activity; 
the person conceals evidence of such an activity; 
the person provides financial services, or makes available funds, economic resources, 
goods or technology, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect that those financial 
services, funds, economic resources, goods or technology will or may contribute to such 
an activity; 
the person provides financial services, or makes available funds, economic resources, 
goods or technology to a person mentioned in sub-paragraph (a); 
the person profits financially or obtains any other benefit from an activity falling within 
regulation 4(2); 
the person is responsible for the investigation or prosecution of such an activity and 
intentionally or recklessly fails to fulfil that responsibility; or 
the person contravenes, or assists with the contravention of, any provision of Part 3 of 
these Regulations. 
Nothing in any sub-paragraph of paragraph (3) is to be taken to limit the meaning of any 
ofthe other sub-paragraphs of that paragraph. 
Any reference in this regulation to being involved in an activity falling within regulation 
4(2) includes being so involved wherever any actions constituting the involvement take 
place. 
Meaning of “owned or controlled directly or indirectly” 
7.—(1)  A person who is not an individual (“C”) is “owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly” by another person (“P”) if either of the following two conditions is met (or 
both are met). 
The first condition is that P— 
holds directly or indirectly more than 50% of the shares in C, 
holds directly or indirectly more than 50% of the voting rights in C, or 
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holds the right directly or indirectly to appoint or remove a majority of the board of 
directors of C. 
Schedule 1 contains provision applying for the purpose of interpreting paragraph (2). 
The second condition is that it is reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances, to 
expectthat P would (if P chose to) be able, in most cases or in significant respects, by 
whatever means and whether directly or indirectly, to achieve the result that affairs of C 
are conducted in accordance with P’s wishes. 
Notification and publicity where designation power used 
8.—(1)  Paragraph (2) applies where the Secretary of State— 
has made a designation under regulation 5, or 
has by virtue of section 22 of the Act varied or revoked a designation made under that 
regulation. 
The Secretary of State— 
must without delay take such steps as are reasonably practicable to inform the designated 
person of the designation, variation or revocation, and 
must take steps to publicise the designation, variation or revocation. 
The information given under paragraph (2)(a) where a designation is made must include 
astatement of reasons. 
In this regulation a “statement of reasons”, in relation to a designation, means a brief 
statementof the matters that the Secretary of State knows, or has reasonable grounds to 
suspect, in relation to the designated person which have led the Secretary of State to make 
the designation. 
Matters that would otherwise be required by paragraph (4) to be included in a statementof 
reasons may be excluded from it where the Secretary of State considers that they should 
be excluded— 
in the interests of national security or international relations, 
for reasons connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere, or (c) in the interests of justice. 
The steps taken under paragraph (2)(b) must— 
unless one or more of the restricted publicity conditions is met, be steps to publicise 
generally— 
the designation, variation or revocation, and 
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in the case of a designation, the statement of reasons; 
if one or more of those conditions is met, be steps to inform only such persons as the 
Secretary of State considers appropriate of the designation, variation or revocation and 
(in the case of a designation) of the contents of the statement of reasons. 
The “restricted publicity conditions” are as follows— 
the designation is of a person believed by the Secretary of State to be an individual under 
the age of 18; 
the Secretary of State considers that disclosure of the designation, variation or revocation 
should be restricted— 
in the interests of national security or international relations, 
for reasons connected with the prevention or detection of serious crime in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere, or (iii) in the interests of justice. 
Paragraph (9) applies if— 
when a designation is made, one or more of the restricted publicity conditions is met, but 
at any time when the designation has effect, it becomes the case that none of the restricted 
publicity conditions is met. 
The Secretary of State must— 
take such steps as are reasonably practicable to inform the designated person that none of 
the restricted publicity conditions is now met, and 
take steps to publicise generally the designation and the statement of reasons relating to 
it. 
Confidential information in certain cases where designation power used 
9.—(1)  Where the Secretary of State in accordance with regulation 8(6)(b) informs only 
certain persons of a designation, variation or revocation and (in the case of a designation) 
of the contents of the statement of reasons, the Secretary of State may specify that any of 
that information is to be treated as confidential. 
A person (“P”) who— 
is provided with information that is to be treated as confidential in accordance with 
paragraph (1), or 
otherwise obtains such information, must not, subject to paragraph (3), disclose it if P 




The prohibition in paragraph (2) does not apply to any disclosure made by P with lawful 
authority. 
For this purpose information is disclosed with lawful authority only if and to the extent 
that— (a) the disclosure is by, or is authorised by, the Secretary of State, 
the disclosure is by or with the consent of the person who is or was the subject of the 
designation, 
the disclosure is necessary to give effect to a requirement imposed under or by virtue of 
these Regulations or any other enactment, or 
the disclosure is required, under rules of court, tribunal rules or a court or tribunal order, 
for the purposes of legal proceedings of any description. 
This regulation does not prevent the disclosure of information that is already, or has 
previouslybeen, available to the public from other sources. 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (2) commits an offence. 
The High Court (in Scotland, the Court of Session) may, on the application of— 
the person who is the subject of the information, or 
the Secretary of State, grant an injunction (in Scotland, an interdict) to prevent a breach 
of the prohibition in paragraph (2). 
In paragraph (4)(c), “enactment” has the meaning given by section 54(6) of the Act. 
PART 3 
Finance 
Meaning of “designated person” in Part 3 
10. In this Part a “designated person” means a person who is designated under regulation 
5 for the purposes of regulations 11 to 15. 
Asset-freeze in relation to designated persons 
11.—(1)  A person (“P”) must not deal with funds or economic resources owned, held or 
controlled by a designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that P 
is dealing with such funds or economic resources. 
Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 5 (Exceptions and licences). 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence. 
For the purposes of paragraph (1) a person “deals with” funds if the person— 
uses, alters, moves, transfers or allows access to the funds, 
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deals with the funds in any other way that would result in any change in volume, amount, 
location, ownership, possession, character or destination, or 
makes any other change, including portfolio management, that would enable use of the 
funds. 
For the purposes of paragraph (1) a person “deals with” economic resources if the 
person— 
exchanges the economic resources for funds, goods or services, or 
uses the economic resources in exchange for funds, goods or services (whether by 
pledging them as security or otherwise). 
The reference in paragraph (1) to funds or economic resources that are “owned, held 
orcontrolled” by a person includes, in particular, a reference to— 
funds or economic resources in which the person has any legal or equitable interest, 
regardless of whether the interest is held jointly with any other person and regardless of 
whether any other person holds an interest in the funds or economic resources; 
any tangible property (other than real property), or bearer security, that is comprised in 
funds or economic resources and is in the possession of the person. 
For the purposes of paragraph (1) funds or economic resources are to be treated as owned, 
heldor controlled by a designated person if they are owned, held or controlled by a person 
who is owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7) by 
the designated person. 
For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in paragraph (1) to a designated person 
includesP if P is a designated person. 
Making funds available to designated persons 
12.—(1)  A person (“P”) must not make funds available directly or indirectly to a 
designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that P is making the 
funds so available. 
Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 5 (Exceptions and licences). 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence. 
The reference in paragraph (1) to making funds available indirectly to a designated 
personincludes, in particular, a reference to making them available to a person who is 




Making funds available for benefit of designated person 
13.—(1)  A person (“P”) must not make funds available to any person for the benefit of 
a designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that P is making the 
funds so available. 
Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 5 (Exceptions and licences). 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence. 
For the purposes of this regulation— 
funds are made available for the benefit of a designated person only if that person thereby 
obtains, or is able to obtain, a significant financial benefit, and 
“financial benefit” includes the discharge (or partial discharge) of a financial obligation 
for which the designated person is wholly or partly responsible. 
Making economic resources available to designated persons 
14.—(1)  A person (“P”) must not make economic resources available directly or 
indirectly to a designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect— (a) that 
P is making the economic resources so available, and 
(b) that the designated person would be likely to exchange the economic resources for, or 
use them in exchange for, funds, goods or services. 
Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 5 (Exceptions and licences). 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence. 
The reference in paragraph (1) to making economic resources available indirectly to 
adesignated person includes, in particular, a reference to making them available to a 
person who is owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 
7) by the designated person. 
Making economic resources available for benefit of designated persons 
15.—(1)  A person (“P”) must not make economic resources available to any person for 
the benefit of a designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that P 
is making the economic resources so available. 
Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 5 (Exceptions and licences). 
A person who contravenes the prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence. 
For the purposes of paragraph (1)— 
economic resources are made available for the benefit of a designated person only if that 
person thereby obtains, or is able to obtain, a significant financial benefit, and 
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“financial benefit” includes the discharge (or partial discharge) of a financial obligation 
for which the designated person is wholly or partly responsible. 
Circumventing etc. prohibitions 
16.—(1)  A person must not intentionally participate in activities knowing that the object 
or effect of them is (whether directly or indirectly)— 
to circumvent any of the prohibitions in regulations 11 to 15, or 
to enable or facilitate the contravention of any such prohibition. 




17. A person who is designated under regulation 5 for the purposes of this regulation is 
an excluded person for the purposes of section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971(3). 
PART 5 
Exceptions and licences 
Finance: exceptions from prohibitions 
18.—(1)  The prohibition in regulation 11 (asset-freeze in relation to designated persons) 
is not contravened by an independent person (“P”) transferring to another person a legal 
or equitable interest in funds or economic resources where, immediately before the 
transfer, the interest— (a) is held by P, and 
(b) is not held jointly with the designated person. 
In paragraph (1) “independent person” means a person who— 
is not the designated person, and 
is not owned or controlled directly or indirectly (within the meaning of regulation 7) by 
the designated person. 
The prohibitions in regulations 11 to 13 (asset-freeze in relation to, and making funds 
available to, or for the benefit of, designated persons) are not contravened by a relevant 
institution crediting a frozen account with interest or other earnings due on the account. 
The prohibitions in regulations 12 and 13 (making funds available to, or for the benefit 
of, designated persons) are not contravened by a relevant institution crediting a frozen 




(3) 1971 c. 77. Section 8B was inserted by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c.33), 
section 8 and amended by the Immigration Act 2016 (c.19), section 76; and the Sanctions 
and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, section 59 and Schedule 3, Part 1. 
The prohibitions in regulations 12 and 13 are not contravened by the transfer of funds to 
a relevant institution for crediting to an account held or controlled (directly or indirectly) 
by a designated person, where those funds are transferred in discharge (or partial 
discharge) of an obligation which arose before the date on which the person became a 
designated person. 
The prohibitions in regulations 11 to 13 are not contravened in relation to a designated 
person (“P”) by a transfer of funds from account A to account B, where— 
account A is with a relevant institution which carries on an excluded activity within the 
meaning of section 142D of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000(4), 
account B is with a ring-fenced body within the meaning of section 142A of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000(5), and 
accounts A and B are held or controlled (directly or indirectly) by P. 
In this regulation— 
“designated person” has the same meaning as it has in Part 3 (Finance); 
“frozen account” means an account with a relevant institution which is held or controlled 
(directly or indirectly) by a designated person; 
“relevant institution” means a person that has permission under Part 4A of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000(6) (Permission to carry on regulated activities). 
The definition of “relevant institution” in paragraph (7) is to be read with section 22 of 
theFinancial Services and Markets Act 2000(7), any relevant order under that section(8) 
and Schedule 2 to that Act(9). 
Exception for acts done for purposes of national security or prevention of serious crime 
19.—(1)  Where an act would, in the absence of this paragraph, be prohibited by 
regulation 9(2) (confidentiality) or any prohibition in Part 3 (Finance), that prohibition 
does not apply to the act if the act is one which a responsible officer has determined would 
be in the interests of— (a) national security, or 
(b) the prevention or detection of serious crime in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
Where, in the absence of this paragraph, a thing would be required to be done under orby 
virtue of a provision of Part 6 (Information and records), that requirement does not apply 
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if a responsible officer has determined that not doing the thing in question would be in 
the interests of— (a) national security, or 
(b) the prevention or detection of serious crime in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
In this regulation “responsible officer” means a person in the service of the Crown or 
holdingoffice under the Crown, acting in the course of that person’s duty. 
 
2000 c.8. Section 142D was inserted by section 4(1) of the Financial Services (Banking 
Reform) Act 2013 (c.33). 
Section 142A was inserted by section 4(1) of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) 
Act 2013 (c.33). 
Part 4A was inserted by the Financial Services Act 2012 (c.21), section 11(2) and 
amended by S.I. 2018/135. 
Section 22 was amended by the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 (c.10), section 
27(4); the Financial Services Act 2012 (c.21), section 7(1); and S.I. 2018/135. 
S.I. 2001/544, as most recently amended by S.I. 2019/679; S.I. 2020/117; and S.I. 
2020/480; and prospectively amended by 
S.I. 2019/710. 
Schedule 2 was amended by the Regulation of Financial Services (Land Transactions) 
Act 2005 (c.24), section 1; the Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act 2008 
(c.31), section 15 and Schedule 2, paragraph 1; the Financial Services Act 2012 (c.21), 
sections 7(2) to (5) and 8; the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 (c.10), section 
27(13); and S.I. 2013/1881; S.I. 2018/135; and it is prospectively amended by S.I. 
2019/632. 
Treasury licences 
20.—(1)  The prohibitions in regulations 11 to 15 (asset-freeze etc) do not apply to 
anything done under the authority of a licence issued by the Treasury under this 
paragraph. 
A licence— 
must specify the acts authorised by it; 






be of indefinite duration or a defined duration. 
The Treasury may issue a licence which authorises acts by a particular person only where 
theTreasury consider that it is appropriate to issue the licence for a purpose set out in 
Schedule 2. 
Where the Treasury issue a licence, the Treasury may vary, revoke or suspend it at any 
time. 
Where the Treasury issue, vary, revoke or suspend a licence which authorises acts by a 
particular person, the Treasury must give written notice to that person of the issue, 
variation, revocation or suspension of the licence. 
Where the Treasury issue, vary, revoke or suspend a licence which is general or 
whichauthorises acts by persons of a particular description, the Treasury must take such 
steps as the Treasury consider appropriate to publicise the issue, variation, revocation or 
suspension of the licence. 
Finance: exception for authorised conduct in a relevant country 
21.—(1)  Where a person’s conduct in a relevant country would, in the absence of this 
regulation, contravene a prohibition in any of regulations 11 to 15 (asset-freeze etc.) (“the 
relevant prohibition”), the relevant prohibition is not contravened if the conduct is 
authorised by a licence or other authorisation which is— 
issued under the law of the relevant country; and 
for the purpose of disapplying a prohibition in that jurisdiction which corresponds to the 
relevant prohibition. 
(2)  In this regulation, “relevant country” means— 
any of the Channel Islands; 
the Isle of Man; 
any British overseas territory. 
Notices 
22.—(1)  This regulation applies in relation to a notice required by regulation 20(5) 
(Treasury licences: written notice) to be given to a person. 
The notice may be given to an individual— 
by delivering it to the individual, 
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by sending it to the individual by post addressed to the individual at his or her usual or 
last-known place of residence or business, or (c) by leaving it for the individual at that 
place. 
The notice may be given to a person other than an individual— 
by sending it by post to the proper officer of the body at its principal office, or (b) by 
addressing it to the proper officer of the body and leaving it at that office. 
The notice may be given to the person by other means, including by electronic means, 
withthe person’s consent. 
In this regulation, the reference in paragraph (3) to a “principal office”— 
in relation to a registered company, is to be read as a reference to the company’s registered 
office; 
in relation to a body incorporated or constituted under the law of a country other than the 
United Kingdom, includes a reference to the body’s principal office in the United 
Kingdom (if any). 
In this regulation— 
“proper officer”— 
in relation to a body other than a partnership, means the secretary or other executive 
officer charged with the conduct of the body’s general affairs, and 
in relation to a partnership, means a partner or a person who has the control or 
management of the partnership business; 
“registered company” means a company registered under the enactments relating to 
companies for the time being in force in the United Kingdom. 
Finance: licensing offences 
23.—(1)  A person (“P”) commits an offence if P knowingly or recklessly— 
provides information that is false in a material respect, or 
provides or produces a document that is not what it purports to be, for the purpose of 
obtaining a Treasury licence (whether for P or anyone else). 
(2)  A person who purports to act under the authority of a Treasury licence but who fails 
to comply with any condition of the licence commits an offence. 
Section 8B(1) to (3) of the Immigration Act 1971: directions 
24.—(1)  The Secretary of State may direct that, in relation to any person within 
regulation 17 whose name is specified, or who is of a specified description, section 8B(1) 
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and (2) of the Immigration Act 1971, or section 8B(3) of that Act, have effect subject to 
specified exceptions. 
A direction under this regulation— 
may contain conditions; 
must be of a defined duration (and that duration may be expressed in any way, including, 
for example, being expressed in a way such that the direction ceases to have effect on, or 
within a specified period after, the occurrence of a specified event). 
The Secretary of State may vary, revoke or suspend a direction under this regulation at 
anytime. 
On the issue, variation, revocation or suspension of a direction under this regulation, 
theSecretary of State may take such steps as the Secretary of State considers appropriate 
to publicise the issue, variation, revocation or suspension of the direction. 
In this regulation “specified” means specified in a direction under this regulation. 
PART 6 
Information and records 
Finance: reporting obligations 
25.—(1)  A relevant firm must inform the Treasury as soon as practicable if— (a) it 
knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a person— 
is a designated person, or 
has committed an offence under any provision of Part 3 (Finance) or regulation 23 
(finance: licensing offences), and 
(b) the information or other matter on which the knowledge or cause for suspicion is based 
came to it in the course of carrying on its business. 
Where a relevant firm informs the Treasury under paragraph (1), it must state— (a) the 
information or other matter on which the knowledge or suspicion is based, and (b) any 
information it holds about the person by which the person can be identified. 
Paragraph (4) applies if— 
a relevant firm informs the Treasury under paragraph (1) that it knows, or has reasonable 
cause to suspect, that a person is a designated person, and (b) that person is a customer of 
the relevant firm. 
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The relevant firm must also state the nature and amount or quantity of any funds or 
economicresources held by it for the customer at the time when it first had the knowledge 
or suspicion. 
A relevant institution must inform the Treasury without delay if that institution— 
credits a frozen account in accordance with regulation 18(4) (finance: exceptions from 
prohibitions), or 
transfers funds from a frozen account in accordance with regulation 18(6). 
A person who fails to comply with a requirement in paragraph (1), (2) or (4) commits 
anoffence. 
In this regulation— 
“designated person” has the same meaning as it has in Part 3 (Finance); 
“frozen account” has the same meaning as it has in regulation 18; 
“relevant firm” is to be read in accordance with regulation 26; 
“relevant institution” has the same meaning as it has in regulation 18. 
“Relevant firm” 
26.—(1)  The following are relevant firms for the purposes of regulation 25— 
(a) a person that has permission under Part 4A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (Permission to carry on regulated activities); (b) an undertaking that by way of 
business— (i) operates a currency exchange office, 
transmits money (or any representation of monetary value) by any means, or 
cashes cheques that are made payable to customers; 
a firm or sole practitioner that is— 
a statutory auditor within the meaning of Part 42 of the Companies Act 2006 (Statutory 
Auditors)(10), or 
a local auditor within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Local Audit and Accountability 
Act 2014 (general requirements for audit)(11); 
a firm or sole practitioner that provides to other persons, by way of business— (i) 
accountancy services, 
legal or notarial services, 
advice about tax affairs, or 
trust or company services within the meaning of paragraph (2); 
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a firm or sole practitioner that carries out, or whose employees carry out, estate agency 
work; 
the holder of a casino operating licence within the meaning given by section 65(2)(a) of 
the Gambling Act 2005 (nature of a licence)(12); 
a person engaged in the business of making, supplying, selling (including selling by 
auction) or exchanging— 
articles made from gold, silver, platinum or palladium, or (ii) precious stones or pearls. 
In paragraph (1) “trust or company services” means any of the following services— 
forming companies or other legal persons; 
acting, or arranging for another person to act— 
as a director or secretary of a company, 
as a partner of a partnership, or 
in a similar capacity in relation to other legal persons; 
providing a registered office, business address, correspondence or administrative address 
or other related services for a company, partnership or any other legal person or 
arrangement; 
acting, or arranging for another person to act, as— 
a trustee of an express trust or similar legal arrangement, or (ii) a nominee shareholder 
for a person. 
In paragraph (1)— 
“estate agency work” is to be read in accordance with section 1 of the Estate Agents Act 
1979(13), but as if references in that section to disposing of or acquiring an interest in 
land included (despite anything in section 2 of that Act) references to disposing of or 
acquiring an estate or interest in land outside the United Kingdom where that estate or 
interest is capable of being owned or held as a separate interest; 
“firm” means any entity that, whether or not a legal person, is not an individual, and 







1979 c.38, amended by paragraph 40 of Schedule 1 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 (c.73); paragraph 42 of Schedule 2 to the Planning 
(Consequential Provisions) Act 1990 (c.11); paragraph 28 of Schedule 2 to the Planning 
(Consequential Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1997 (c.11); section 70 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (c.24); S.I. 2001/1283; S.I. 2000/121; and S.I. 1991/2684. 
Paragraph (1)(a) and (b) are to be read with section 22 of the Financial Services and 
MarketsAct 2000, any relevant order under that section and Schedule 2 to that Act. 
For the purposes of regulation 25(1), information or another matter comes to a relevant 
firm “in the course of carrying on its business” if the information or other matter comes 
to the firm— 
in the case of a relevant firm within paragraph(1)(a), in the course of carrying on an 
activity in respect of which the permission mentioned in that provision is required; 
in the case of a relevant firm within paragraph (1)(c)(i), in the course of carrying out 
statutory audit work within the meaning of section 1210 of the Companies Act 2006 
(meaning of statutory auditor)(14); 
in the case of a relevant firm within paragraph (1)(c)(ii), in the course of carrying out an 
audit required by the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014; 
in the case of a relevant firm within paragraph (1)(f), in the course of carrying on an 
activity in respect of which the licence mentioned in that provision is required; 
in the case of a relevant firm within any other provision of paragraph (1), in the course of 
carrying on an activity mentioned in that provision. 
Finance: powers to request information 
27.—(1)  The Treasury may request a designated person to provide information about— 
funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by or on behalf of the designated 
person, or 
any disposal of such funds or economic resources. 
The Treasury may request a designated person to provide such information as the 
Treasurymay reasonably require about expenditure— 
by the designated person, or 
for the benefit of the designated person. 
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For the purposes of paragraph (2), expenditure for the benefit of a designated person 
includesexpenditure on the discharge (or partial discharge) of a financial obligation for 
which the designated person is wholly or partly responsible. 
The power in paragraph (1) or (2) is exercisable only where the Treasury believe that it 
isnecessary for the purpose of monitoring compliance with or detecting evasion of any 
provision of Part 3 (Finance). 
The Treasury may request a person acting under a Treasury licence to provide information 
about— 
funds or economic resources dealt with under the licence, or 
funds or economic resources made available under the licence. 
The Treasury may request a person to provide information within paragraph (7) if the 
Treasurybelieve that the person may be able to provide the information. 
Information within this paragraph is such information as the Treasury may reasonably 
requirefor the purpose of— 
establishing for the purposes of any provision of Part 3 (Finance)— 
(i) the nature and amount or quantity of any funds or economic resources owned, held or 
controlled by or on behalf of a designated person, 
 
(14) Section 1210 was amended by S.I. 2005/1433; S.I. 2008/565; S.I. 2008/1950; S.I. 
2011/99; S.I. 2012/1809; S.I. 2013/3115; S.I. 2017/516 and S.I. 2017/1164; and it is 
prospectively amended by S.I. 2019/177. 
the nature and amount or quantity of any funds or economic resources made available 
directly or indirectly to, or for the benefit of, a designated person, or 
the nature of any financial transactions entered into by a designated person; (b) 
monitoring compliance with or detecting evasion of— 
any provision of Part 3, 
regulation 25 (finance: reporting obligations), or 
any condition of a Treasury licence; 
(c) detecting or obtaining evidence of the commission of an offence under Part 3 or 
regulation 23 (finance: licensing offences) or 25 (finance: reporting obligations). 




If no such period is specified, the information which has been requested must be 
providedwithin a reasonable time. 
A request may include a continuing obligation to keep the Treasury informed as 
circumstances change, or on such regular basis as the Treasury may specify. 
Information requested under this regulation may relate to any period of time during 
whicha person is, or was, a designated person. 
Information requested by virtue of paragraph (1)(b), (2) or (7)(a)(iii) may relate to any 
periodbefore a person became a designated person (as well as, or instead of, any 
subsequent period). 
Expressions used in this regulation have the same meaning as they have in Part 3. 
Finance: production of documents 
28.—(1)  A request under regulation 27 may include a request to produce specified 
documents or documents of a specified description. 
Where the Treasury request that documents be produced, the Treasury may— 
take copies of or extracts from any document so produced, 
request any person producing a document to give an explanation of it, and 
where that person is a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated body other than a 
partnership, request any person who is— 
in the case of a partnership, a present or past partner or employee of the partnership, or 
in any other case, a present or past officer or employee of the body concerned, to give 
such an explanation. 
Where the Treasury request a designated person or a person acting under a Treasury 
licenceto produce documents, that person must— 
take reasonable steps to obtain the documents (if they are not already in the person’s 
possession or control); 
keep the documents under the person’s possession or control (except for the purpose of 
providing them to the Treasury or as the Treasury may otherwise permit). 
In this regulation “designated person” has the same meaning as it has in Part 3 (Finance). 
Finance: information offences 
29.—(1)  A person commits an offence, if that person— 
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without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails within the time and in the manner specified 
(or, if no time has been specified, within a reasonable time) to comply with any request 
under regulation 27 (finance: powers to request information); 
knowingly or recklessly gives any information, or produces any document, which is false 
in a material particular in response to such a request; 
with intent to evade any provision of regulation 27 or 28 (finance: production of 
documents), destroys, mutilates, defaces, conceals or removes any document; 
otherwise intentionally obstructs the Treasury in the exercise of their powers under 
regulation 27 or 28. 
(2)  Where a person is convicted of an offence under this regulation, the court may make 
an order requiring that person, within such period as may be specified in the order, to 
comply with the request. 
Disclosure of information 
30.—(1)  The Secretary of State or the Treasury may, in accordance with this regulation, 
disclose— 
any information obtained under or by virtue of Part 5 (Exceptions and licences) or this 
Part, or 
any information held in connection with— 
anything done under or by virtue of Part 2 (Designation of persons) or Part 3 (Finance), 
or 
any exception or licence under Part 5 or anything done in accordance with such an 
exception or under the authority of such a licence. 
Information referred to in paragraph (1) may be disclosed for, or in connection with, any 
ofthe following purposes— 
any purpose stated in regulation 4; 
the exercise of functions under these Regulations; 
facilitating, monitoring or ensuring compliance with these Regulations; 
taking any action with a view to instituting, or otherwise for the purposes of, any 
proceedings in the United Kingdom— 
for an offence under any provision of these Regulations, or 
in relation to a monetary penalty under section 146 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 
(breach of financial sanctions legislation)(15); 
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taking any action with a view to instituting, or otherwise for the purposes of, any 
proceedings in any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, or any British overseas 
territory, for an offence under a provision in any such jurisdiction that is similar to a 
provision of these Regulations; 
compliance with an international obligation(16); 
facilitating the exercise by an authority outside the United Kingdom or by an international 
organisation of functions which correspond to functions under these Regulations. 
Information referred to in paragraph (1) may be disclosed to the following persons— (a) 
a police officer; 
(b) any person holding or acting in any office under or in the service of— 
2017 c.3. 
Section 1(8) of the Act defines an “international obligation” as an obligation of the United 
Kingdom created or arising by or under any international agreement. 
the Crown in right of the Government of the United Kingdom, 
the Crown in right of the Scottish Government, the Northern Ireland Executive or the 
Welsh Government, 
the States of Jersey, Guernsey or Alderney or the Chief Pleas of Sark, 
the Government of the Isle of Man, or 
the Government of any British overseas territory; 
any law officer of the Crown for Jersey, Guernsey or the Isle of Man; 
the Scottish Legal Aid Board; 
the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Bank of 
England, the Jersey Financial Services Commission, the Guernsey Financial Services 
Commission or the Isle of Man Financial Services Authority; 
any other regulatory body (whether or not in the United Kingdom); 
any organ of the United Nations; 
the Council of the European Union, the European Commission or the European External 
Action Service; 
the Government of any country; 
any other person where the Secretary of State or the Treasury (as the case may be) 
consider that it is appropriate to disclose the information. 
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Information referred to in paragraph (1) may be disclosed to any person with the consent 
ofa person who, in their own right, is entitled to the information. 
In paragraph (4) “in their own right” means not merely in the capacity as a servant or 
agentof another person. 
In paragraph (1)(b) the reference to information includes information obtained at a time 
whenany provision of these Regulations is not in force. 
Part 6: supplementary 
31.—(1)  A disclosure of information under regulation 30 does not breach any restriction 
on such disclosure imposed by statute or otherwise. 
But nothing in that regulation authorises a disclosure that— 
contravenes the data protection legislation, or 
is prohibited by any of Parts 1 to 7 or Chapter 1 of Part 9 of the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016(17). 
Nothing in this Part is to be read as requiring a person who has acted or is acting as 
counselor solicitor for any person to disclose any privileged information in their 
possession in that capacity. 
Regulation 30 does not limit the circumstances in which information may be disclosed 
apart from that regulation. 
Nothing in this Part limits any conditions which may be contained in a Treasury licence. 
In this regulation— 
“the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 
(see section 3 of that Act)(18); 
 
2016 c.25. Amendments have been made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, Schedule 
9, paragraph 74; the Data Protection Act 2018 (c.12), Schedule 19, paragraphs 198-203; 
S.I. 2018/652 and S.I. 2018/1123. Saving provisions are made by S.I. 2017/859. 
2018 c.12. There are amendments to this Act that are not relevant to these Regulations. 
“privileged information” means information with respect to which a claim to legal 
professional privilege (in Scotland, to confidentiality of communications) could be 





Penalties for offences 
32.—(1)  A person who commits an offence under any provision of Part 3 (Finance) or 
regulation 23 (finance: licensing offences) is liable— 
on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months or a fine (or both); 
on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months 
or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); 
on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); 
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or a fine 
(or both). 
A person who commits an offence under regulation 9(6) (confidentiality) is liable— 
on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months or a fine (or both); 
on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months 
or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); 
on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); 
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine 
(or both). 
A person who commits an offence under regulation 25(6) or 29 (information offences in 
connection with Part 3) is liable— 
on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
6 months or a fine (or both); 
on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months 
or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both); 
on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both). 
In relation to an offence committed before section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003(19) comes into force, the reference in each of paragraphs (1)(a) and (2)(a) to 12 
months is to be read as a reference to 6 months. 
Liability of officers of bodies corporate etc. 
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33.—(1)  Where an offence under these Regulations, committed by a body corporate— 
(19) 2003 c.44. Amendments have been made to section 154(1), but none are relevant to 
these Regulations. 
is committed with the consent or connivance of any director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such 
capacity, or 
is attributable to any neglect on the part of any such person, that person as well as the 
body corporate is guilty of the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished 
accordingly. 
In paragraph (1) “director”, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by 
itsmembers, means a member of the body corporate. 
Paragraph (1) also applies in relation to a body that is not a body corporate, with 
thesubstitution for the reference to a director of the body of a reference— 
in the case of a partnership, to a partner; 
in the case of an unincorporated body other than a partnership— 
(i) where the body’s affairs are managed by its members, to a member of the body; (ii) in 
any other case, to a member of the governing body. 
Jurisdiction to try offences 
34.—(1)  Wherever an offence under these Regulations is committed (whether in the 
United 
Kingdom or outside the United Kingdom)— 
proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in the United Kingdom, and 
the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed at any 
such place. 
In the application of paragraph (1) to Scotland, any such proceedings against a person 
maybe taken— 
(a) in any sheriff court district in which the person is apprehended or is in custody, or (b) 
in such sheriff court district as the Lord Advocate may determine. 
In paragraph (3) “sheriff court district” is to be read in accordance with the Criminal 
Procedure(Scotland) Act 1995 (see section 307(1) of that Act)(20). 
Procedure for offences by unincorporated bodies 
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35.—(1)  Paragraphs (2) and (3) apply if it is alleged that an offence under these 
Regulations has been committed by an unincorporated body (as opposed to by a member 
of the body). 
Proceedings in England and Wales or Northern Ireland for such an offence must be 
broughtagainst the body in its own name. 
For the purposes of proceedings for such an offence brought against an unincorporated 
body— 
rules of court relating to the service of documents have effect as if the body were a body 
corporate; 
the following provisions apply as they apply in relation to a body corporate— 
(i) section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925(21) and Schedule 3 to the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 1980(22); 
1995 c.46. 
1925 c.86, Amendments have been made to section 33 that are not relevant to these 
Regulations. 
1980 c.43. Amendments have been made to Schedule 3 that are not relevant to these 
Regulations. 
(ii) section 18 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945(23) and Article 166 
of, and Schedule 4 to, the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981(24). 
(4)  A fine imposed on an unincorporated body on its conviction of an offence under these 
Regulations is to be paid out of the funds of the body. 
Time limit for proceedings for summary offences 
36.—(1)  Proceedings for an offence under these Regulations which is triable only 
summarily may be brought within the period of 12 months beginning with the date on 
which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to justify the proceedings 
comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge. 
But such proceedings may not be brought by virtue of paragraph (1) more than 3 years 
afterthe commission of the offence. 
A certificate signed by the prosecutor as to the date on which the evidence in question 
cameto the prosecutor’s knowledge is conclusive evidence of the date on which it did so; 
and a certificate to that effect and purporting to be so signed is to be treated as being so 
signed unless the contrary is proved. 
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In relation to proceedings in Scotland— 
section 136(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (date of commencement of 
summary proceedings) applies for the purposes of this regulation as it applies for the 
purposes of that section, and 
references in this regulation to the prosecutor are to be treated as references to the Lord 
Advocate. 
Application of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
37. Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (investigatory 
powers)(25) applies to any offence under Part 3 (Finance) or regulation 23 (finance: 
licensing offences). 
Dominic Raab 
Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs 
5th July 2020 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
1945 c. 15 (N.I.). 
S.I. 1981/1675 (N.I. 26). 
2005 c.15. Chapter 1 of Part 2 has been amended by the Terrorism Act 2006 (c.11), 
section 33(3) and (4); the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006 (c.33), 
sections 26(2) and 30(2) and Schedules 3 and 5; the Bribery Act 2010 (c.23), section 
17(2) and Schedule 1; the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp.13), 
section 203 and Schedule 7, paragraph 77; the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (c.22), section 
15 and Schedule 8, paragraphs 157 and 159; the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (c.22), 
section 51(1); the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, section 59(4) and 





S C H E D U L E S 
 SCHEDULE 1 Regulation 7(3) 
Rules for interpretation of regulation 7(2) 
Application of Schedule 
1.—(1)  The rules set out in the following paragraphs of this Schedule apply for the 
purpose of interpreting regulation 7(2). 
(2)  They also apply for the purpose of interpreting this Schedule. 
Joint interests 
2. If two or more persons each hold a share or right jointly, each of them is treated as 
holding that share or right. 
Joint arrangements 
3.—(1)  If shares or rights held by a person and shares or rights held by another person 
are the subject of a joint arrangement between those persons, each of them is treated as 
holding the combined shares or rights of both of them. 
A “joint arrangement” is an arrangement between the holders of shares or rights that 
theywill exercise all or substantially all the rights conferred by their respective shares or 
rights jointly in a way that is pre-determined by the arrangement. 
“Arrangement” has the meaning given by paragraph 12. 
Calculating shareholdings 
4.—(1)  In relation to a person who has a share capital, a reference to holding “more than 
50% of the shares” in that person is to holding shares comprised in the issued share capital 
of that person of a nominal value exceeding (in aggregate) 50% of that share capital. 
(2)  In relation to a person who does not have a share capital— 
a reference to holding shares in that person is to holding a right or rights to share in the 
capital or, as the case may be, profits of that person; 
a reference to holding “more than 50% of the shares” in that person is to holding a right 
or rights to share in more than 50% of the capital or, as the case may be, profits of that 
person. 
Voting rights 
5.—(1)  A reference to the voting rights in a person is to the rights conferred on 





capital, on members) to vote at general meetings of the person on all or substantially all 
matters. 
(2)  In relation to a person that does not have general meetings at which matters are 
decided by the exercise of voting rights— 
a reference to holding voting rights in the person is to be read as a reference to holding 
rights in relation to the person that are equivalent to those of a person entitled to exercise 
voting rights in a company; 
a reference to holding “more than 50% of the voting rights” in the person is to be read as 
a reference to holding the right under the constitution of the person to block changes to 
the overall policy of the person or to the terms of its constitution. 
6. In applying regulation 7(2) and this Schedule, the voting rights in a person are to be 
reduced by any rights held by the person itself. 
Rights to appoint or remove members of the board 
A reference to the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of a 
person is to the right to appoint or remove directors holding a majority of the voting rights 
at meetings of the board on all or substantially all matters. 
A reference to a board of directors, in the case of a person who does not have such a 
board, is to be read as a reference to the equivalent management body of that person. 
Shares or rights held “indirectly” 
9.—(1)  A person holds a share “indirectly” if the person has a majority stake in another 
person and that other person— 
holds the share in question, or 
is part of a chain of persons— 
each of whom (other than the last) has a majority stake in the person immediately below 
it in the chain, and 
the last of whom holds the share. 
A person holds a right “indirectly” if the person has a majority stake in another person 
andthat other person— 
holds that right, or 
is part of a chain of persons— 
each of whom (other than the last) has a majority stake in the person immediately below 





the last of whom holds that right. 
For these purposes, a person (“A”) has a “majority stake” in another person (“B”) if— 
A holds a majority of the voting rights in B, 
A is a member of B and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of 
directors of B, 
A is a member of B and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders 
or members, a majority of the voting rights in B, or 
A has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, dominant influence or control over B. 
In the application of this paragraph to the right to appoint or remove a majority of the 
boardof directors, a person (“A”) is to be treated as having the right to appoint a director 
if— 
any person’s appointment as director follows necessarily from that person’s appointment 
as director of A, or 
the directorship is held by A itself. 
Shares held by nominees 
10. A share held by a person as nominee for another is to be treated as held by the other 
(and not by the nominee). 
Rights treated as held by person who controls their exercise 
11.—(1)  Where a person controls a right, the right is to be treated as held by that person 
(and not by the person who in fact holds the right, unless that person also controls it). 
(2)  A person “controls” a right if, by virtue of any arrangement between that person and 
others, the right is exercisable only— 
by that person, 
in accordance with that person’s directions or instructions, or (c) with that person’s 
consent or concurrence. 
12. “Arrangement” includes— 
(a) any scheme, agreement or understanding, whether or not it is legally enforceable, and 
(b) any convention, custom or practice of any kind. 
Rights exercisable only in certain circumstances etc. 






(a) when the circumstances have arisen, and for so long as they continue to obtain, or (b) 
when the circumstances are within the control of the person having the rights. 
But rights that are exercisable by an administrator or by creditors while a person is 
subjectto relevant insolvency proceedings are not to be taken into account while the 
person is subject to those proceedings. 
“Relevant insolvency proceedings” means— 
administration within the meaning of the Insolvency Act 1986(26), 
administration within the meaning of the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989(27), 
or 
proceedings under the insolvency law of another country during which a person’s assets 
and affairs are subject to the control or supervision of a third party or creditor. 
Rights that are normally exercisable but are temporarily incapable of exercise are to 
continueto be taken into account. 
Rights attached to shares held by way of security 
14. Rights attached to shares held by way of security provided by a person are to be treated 
for the purposes of this Schedule as held by that person— 
where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the 
security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in accordance with that person’s 
instructions, and 
where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part of normal 
business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving 
 
1986 c.45. 
S.I. 1989/2405 (N.I. 19). 
the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in that person’s 
interests. 
 SCHEDULE 2 Regulation 20(3) 
Treasury licences: purposes 
Interpretation 
1. In this Schedule— 





“frozen funds or economic resources” means funds or economic resources frozen by 
virtue of regulation 11, and any reference to a person’s frozen funds or economic 
resources is to funds or economic resources frozen as a consequence of the designation 
of that person for the purpose of that regulation. 
Basic needs 
2.—(1)  To enable the basic needs of a designated person, or (in the case of an individual) 
any dependent family member of such a person, to be met. 
In the case of an individual, in sub-paragraph (1) “basic needs” includes— (a) medical 
needs; 
(b) needs for— 
food; 
payment of insurance premiums; 
payment of tax; 
rent or mortgage payments; (v) utility payments. 
In the case of a person other than an individual, in sub-paragraph (1) “basic needs” 
includesneeds for— 
payment of insurance premiums; 
payment of reasonable fees for the provision of property management services; 
payment of remuneration, allowances or pensions of employees; 
payment of tax; 
rent or mortgage payments; (f) utility payments. 
In sub-paragraph (1)— 
“dependent” means financially dependent; 
“family member” includes— 
the wife or husband of the designated person; 
the civil partner of the designated person; 
any parent or other ascendant of the designated person; (d) any child or other descendant 
of the designated person; (e) any person who is a brother or sister of the designated person, 
or a child or other descendant of such a person. 
Legal services 
3. To enable the payment of— 





reasonable expenses associated with the provision of legal services. 
Maintenance of frozen funds and economic resources 
4. To enable the payment of— 
reasonable fees, or 
reasonable service charges, arising from the routine holding or maintenance of frozen 
funds or economic resources. 
Extraordinary expenses 
To enable an extraordinary expense of a designated person to be met. 
Pre-existing judicial decisions etc. 
To enable, by the use of a designated person’s frozen funds or economic resources, the 
implementation or satisfaction (in whole or in part) of a judicial, administrative or arbitral 
decision or lien, provided that— 
(a) the funds or economic resources so used are the subject of the decision or lien, (b) the 
decision or lien— 
was made or established before the date on which the person became a designated person, 
and 
is enforceable in the United Kingdom, and 
(c) the use of the frozen funds or economic resources does not directly or indirectly 
benefit any other designated person. 
Extraordinary situation 
To enable anything to be done to deal with an extraordinary situation. 
Prior obligations 
8. To enable, by the use of a designated person’s frozen funds or economic resources, the 
satisfaction of an obligation of that person (whether arising under a contract, other 
agreement or otherwise), provided that— 
(a) the obligation arose before the date on which the person became a designated person, 
and (b) no payments are made to another designated person, whether directly or 
indirectly. 
Diplomatic missions etc. 
9.—(1)  To enable anything to be done in order that the functions of a diplomatic mission 
or consular post, or of an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance 





(2)  In this paragraph— 
“consular post” has the same meaning as in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
done at Vienna on 24 April 1963(28), and any reference to the functions of a consular 
post is to be read in accordance with that Convention; 
“diplomatic mission” and any reference to the functions of a diplomatic mission are to be 
read in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations done at Vienna 
on 18 April 1961(29). 
Humanitarian assistance activity 
10.—(1)  To enable anything to be done in connection with the performance of any 
humanitarian assistance activity. 
(2)  In sub-paragraph (1), “humanitarian assistance activity” includes the work of 
international and non-governmental organisations carrying out relief activities for the 
benefit of the civilian population of a country. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
(This note is not part of the Regulations) 
These Regulations are made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 
(c.13) to establish a sanctions regime for the purpose of deterring, and providing 
accountability for, activities which, if carried out by or on behalf of a State, would amount 
to serious violations of certain human rights by that State. The activities could be carried 
out by a State or non-State actor. 
The Regulations confer a power on the Secretary of State to designate persons who are, 
or have been, involved in such activities. Designated persons may be excluded from the 
United Kingdom and may be made subject to financial sanctions, including having their 
funds or economic resources frozen. 
The Regulations provide for certain exceptions to this sanctions regime (for example to 
allow for frozen accounts to be credited with interest or other earnings and to allow acts 
done for the purpose of national security or the prevention of serious crime). The 
Regulations also confer powers on the Treasury to issue licences in respect of activities 
that would otherwise be prohibited under the Regulations. Schedule 2 sets out the 
purposes under which the Treasury will issue such licences. 
The Regulations prescribe powers for the provision and sharing of information to enable 





make it a criminal offence to contravene, or circumvent, any of the prohibitions in these 
Regulations and prescribe the mode of trial and penalties that apply to such offences. 
 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 596, p. 261. 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95. 
A full impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument as no, or no 
significant, impact on the private, voluntary or public sector is foreseen. Instead a de 
minimis assessment has been prepared as this instrument is likely to entail some costs for 
businesses, but the net impact is estimated to be below £5 million per year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
